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m The Agence Française de Développement (AFD) is a public 
development-finance institution that has worked for seventy 
years to alleviate poverty and foster sustainable development 
in the developing world and in the French Overseas Provinces. 
AFD executes the French government’s development aid 
policies. Working on four continents, AFD has seventy-one 
field offices and bureaus, including nine in France’s overseas 
provinces and one in Brussels. The Agency provides financing 
and support for projects that improve living conditions, 
promote economic growth, and protect the planet. In 2013, 
AFD committed €7.8 billion to projects in developing and 
emerging countries and in the French Overseas Provinces. 
These AFD-financed projects will provide schooling for 
children, improve maternal health, promote equality between 
men and women, support farmers and small businesses, and 
bolster access to drinking water, transportation and energy. 
These newly-funded projects will also help mitigate climate 
disruption by abating nearly 3.3 million metric tons of carbon 
dioxide-equivalent annually.
More information and publications available at  
www.afd.fr/lang/en/home
m The Institute for Sustainable Development and 
International Relations (IDDRI) is a non-profit policy 
research institute based in Paris. Its objective is to determine 
and share the keys for analyzing and understanding strategic 
issues linked to sustainable development from a global 
perspective. IDDRI helps stakeholders in deliberating on 
global governance of the major issues of common interest: 
action to attenuate climate change, to protect biodiversity, to 
enhance food security and to manage urbanization. IDDRI 
also takes part in efforts to reframe development pathways. A 
special effort has been made to develop a partnership network 
with emerging countries to better understand and share 
various perspectives on sustainable development issues and 
governance. For more effective action, IDDRI operates with 
a network of partners from the private sector, academia, civil 
society and the public sector, not only in France and Europe 
but also internationally. As an independent institute, IDDRI 
mobilises resources and expertise to disseminate the most 
relevant scientific ideas and research ahead of negotiations 
and decision-making processes. It applies a cross-cutting 
approach to its work, which focuses on seven themes: Global 
Governance, Climate and Energy, Biodiversity, Oceans and 
Coastal Zones, Urban Fabric, Agriculture, and New Prosperity. 
As a Sciences Po partner, IDDRI's experts are highly involved 
in teaching and in developing research programs.  
More information and publications available at www.iddri.org
m The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI) was set up 
in 1974 to deal inter alia with issues relating to sustainable 
development, the environment, energy efficiency and the 
sustainable use of natural resources. Its goal is to develop 
innovative solutions for achieving sustainable development. 
Its activities range from the formulation of local and national 
strategies, to proposals for global solutions, to energy and 
environment-related issues. TERI is based in New Delhi, and 
also present in many other regions of India. It has over 900 
employees and is headed by Rajendra K. Pachauri who is also 
the Chairman of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), which was awarded the 2007 Nobel Prize.
More information and publications available at www.teriin.org
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Foreword
M
ore than twenty years after the Rio Earth Summit which 
gave political and institutional birth to ‘sustainable 
development’, the nations of the world are on the verge 
of entering into a new era of negotiation and implemen-
tation of sustainable development policies. With three 
particularly important events – the Addis Ababa confer-
ence on development financing, the session of the UN 
General Assembly on the setting of universal sustain-
able development goals, and the ‘last chance’ confer-
ence on climate change in Paris – 2015 will certainly be 
a landmark. A two-decade long cycle of talks and experiences ends; while another 
begins, aiming at addressing challenges which by their magnitude and scope cannot 
be addressed with business as usual policies. 
As recalled by the UN Secretary-General, the year 2015 offers a unique opportu-
nity for global leaders and others to end poverty, and also to transform the world 
to better meet human needs and the necessities of economic transformation, while 
protecting our environment, ensuring peace and realizing human rights. ‘Transfor-
mation is our watchword’, the UN Secretary General emphasized. 
The unprecedented challenges of the twenty-first century incentivize us – people, 
institutions, decision-makers – to rise above ourselves and invent solutions to old 
and new problems. Our three institutions have stakes in this endeavour to produce 
meaning and shed light on our possible futures, leaving it up to the readers, we 
hope, to look at sustainable development as something that tomorrow will bring.
BUILDING THE FUTURE WE WANT
A PLANET FOR L IFE6
The Agenda 21 at Rio gave us the vision of the twenty-first century; the Future 
We Want at Rio+20 gave us the blueprint of the vision; 2015 will give us, we all 
hope, a common roadmap with clear goals, measurable targets and definite means 
to achieve them. The tasks are daunting and challenging, with many roadblocks 
and bumps ahead, but the people of the planet, across all countries and continents, 
must put their heads and hearts together and draw on all their resources to build 
the future we want. 
On this planet earth there can no longer be islands of hope and prosperity amidst 
oceans of despair and poverty. Technology, economy and climate have joined us 
together, as never before. The remotest parts of the world are connected with each 
other by production systems and supply chains, ideas and information. The changing 
climates have linked the melting glaciers of the Arctic with the rising sea levels of 
the Pacific islands. We can no longer remain centred on the idea of nation-states 
that were created in the past; we are all part of the same planet – we will sail or 
sink together in future. 
The Millennium Development Goals have given us the confidence to realize that 
together we can achieve many things that have eluded us for so long. Sustainable 
Development Goals should give us the guidance and the means to translate this 
confidence into action. Many of the goals and the targets recommended by the 
Open Working Group of the United Nations have already been adopted as national 
and local development goals in many countries. The synergies between global and 
national development goals should be reinforced through better technical guidance 
for programming, implementation and monitoring.
At the same time, we need better synergies in development assistance, which can 
sometimes be too thin and dispersed to create the desired impacts. Surely there is 
scope for better targeting and coordination to avoid duplication, just as there are 
opportunities for scaling up assistance from developed – and also from emerging 
– economies. 
AFD, TERI and IDDRI have joined forces, bringing together their ideas and creating 
a vast network of renowned scholars and experts from across the world to share their 
understanding and vision of this ongoing ‘transformation’. They provide us with the 
incomparable narrative of its intellectual and material underpinnings, and as the 
reader will see, of its different meanings and perspectives in a representative set of 
developing and developed countries.
This anthology of ideas and perspectives from countries and regions around the 
planet demonstrate the challenges and complexities of the roads ahead, but at the 
same time captures the common dreams and the desire to move ahead for a better 
future.
Let us dedicate ourselves to build The Future We Want. ❚
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T
he 2015 edition of A Planet for Life will reach bookshelves a few 
months before a meeting of the United Nations General Assembly 
in September 2015, when member states will determine a new 
development cooperation framework and design the 2016-2030 
sustainable development goals (SDGs). In December 2015, France 
will host the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP 21) of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), a 
decisive step in negotiating and adopting a global climate treaty. 
Following the same timetable, the Global Partnership for Effec-
tive Development Co-operation will devise financing modalities 
for the SDGs; the group will also suggest the forms of partnership and governance 
needed to overcome the challenges to implementing the SDGs and the climate treaty.
A superficial understanding of these events could convey the idea that global leaders 
will once again meet, write down lyrical declarations and leave international bureau-
cracy the daunting task of turning words into actions. The contributors to this book 
tell a different story: that the stakes at this ‘2015 juncture’ far exceed those of other 
recent global talks. 
In line with the increasing momentum behind this drive to make ‘sustainable devel-
opment’ the norm internationally, A Planet for Life explores what the promise of the 
'2015 juncture' really means. Contributors to this volume report on their exchanges 
with a host of stakeholders involved in behind-the-scenes negotiations and the United 
BUILDING THE FUTURE WE WANT
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Nations consultation process. Readers will learn in the first part how negotiators are 
seizing the moment to build a sustainable world and advance toward a comprehen-
sive environmental and social contract. 
Beyond the negotiators, central and local governments, private-sector companies, 
and civil society create concrete responses to environmental and social challenges. The 
second part of the 2015 edition of A Planet for Life tours five continents to understand 
what countries and regions are actually doing to achieve sustainable development in 
often ambitious ways, tackling their own local – and global – problems, in the face of 
frequently more immediate challenges to growth, competitiveness, employment and 
equality. In the third part, we address implementation issues and financing for devel-
opment options more specifically, with an overview of key propositions for making 
sustainable development financing a lever to transform economies and societies.
How are territories addressing the issue of sustainable 
development?
‘A Planet for Life Series’ takes a worldwide view of the issue, examining the ways in 
which various countries are addressing sustainable development challenges. For each 
country, several questions are raised: How do countries see their development in the 
year 2030? How do they determine priorities for growth, employment, redistribution 
and environmental protection? What trade-offs are made? How are priorities and 
trade-offs debated within society? What mechanisms fuel growth trajectories and 
what margin for manoeuver do countries have? What are the sustainable develop-
ment challenges for countries? Who raises these challenges and what is the appro-
priation by economic (particularly industry) and social actors? How do they disrupt 
national development strategies?
Looking at the paths taken by various countries, we see how sustainable develop-
ment and ‘green growth’ concepts percolate through society, distilling into develop-
ment plans. Sometimes such concepts even form the strategic backbone for decision-
making by public authorities. Some localities and nations rally all their development 
efforts around notions of sustainability. Jae-Seung Lee shows this to be the case 
in South Korea (Under the radar 7). In 2008, the country launched an ambitious 
‘Green Growth Strategy’ that continued under the second (2013-2018) ‘Five-Year 
Plan for Green Growth’. Marcelo Carneiro, Stéphane Guéneau and Fabiano Toni 
(Chapter 6) present Brazil’s long history of integrating environmental issues into its 
development strategy; it underpins efforts to preserve biodiversity and the Amazon 
rainforest, and to promote a sustainable agribusiness model. Liu Changyi and Liu 
Zhe (Under the radar 4) review the rise of an ‘ecological civilization’ in China. They 
also show how environmental issues have become central to China’s agenda, as the 
government proposes the launching of an ‘energy revolution’ and drives forward 
an ambitious ‘Energy Development Action Plan for 2014-2020’ to reduce Chinese 
energy intensity. The movement affects the great emerging countries and Western 
powers (see Chapter 7 on the United States and California, by Louise Bedsworth). 
It also affects many lower-income countries, as illustrated by Alexandre Magnan in 
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his focus on Small Island Developing States (Under the radar 2), one of these states 
having made a commitment to becoming the ‘world’s first “carbon-neutral” country 
through energy efficiency and renewables’.
Countries also promote the social dimensions of sustainable development. Valérie 
Schmitt and Daniel Kamelgarn (Under the radar 1) show this in the progress made 
by social-welfare protection schemes globally. Not even including the efforts of 
pioneering countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, China, Colombia, India, Mongolia, 
South Africa, and Thailand, ‘social protection has continued to grow since the Second 
World War, both geographically and in the number of sectors covered’ worldwide. 
The authors explain that ‘in Sub-Saharan Africa, private mutual health systems have 
developed to address the lack of social protection schemes for workers in the informal 
economy’. Some African cities, such as Johannesburg, presented by Anne Odic in 
Under the radar 7, ‘make their social priorities the engine of their development strat-
egies’. In MENA countries, Samir Aita (Chapter 5) recalls that unemployment and 
frustration fuelled by the perception of injustice have led to a crisis that would later 
be coined the Arab Spring. ‘The first priority today is certainly to find “decent jobs”, 
possibly with training, for the millions of young men and women that arrive each 
year on the job market’, Samir Aita acknowledges.
FIGURE 1 Countries and regions covered in this edition
Rio+20
(2012)
Negotiations
mentioned
Financing,
Addis Ababa (2015)
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Apia (2014)
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& Chapter 6, 10 Madagascar
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Chapter 10
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Chapter 10Pittsburgh, USAChapter 10
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Chapter 10
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Chapter 7, 10
Wales
Radar p. 225
Belgium
Radar p. 225
Germany
Radar p. 225
Middle East and North Africa
Chapter 5
Japan
Chapter 8
South Korea
Radar p. 196
South Africa
Radar p. 34, 196
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Russia
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& Chapter 4
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Global vision
Radar p. 38
Pacific Islands
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By comparing the histories of how countries have seized on sustainable develop-
ment and taken concrete steps to achieve it, we can see how strongly crises change 
politicians’ attitudes: suddenly they evoke the need to ‘change paths’, to ‘reorient the 
country’s development’, and to ‘propose a new global compact’ to turn the crisis into 
an opportunity to boost more inclusive and sustainable growth. The 2008 economic 
and financial crisis exemplified this on an international scale; in many countries, it 
hastened the adoption of sustainable development concepts by leaders, both within 
the state apparatus and in company boardrooms. Such crises may also be more local, 
as in China, where huge waves of pollution and smog engulf large cities, demon-
strating the urgent need to reconsider environmental issues. 
A reading of these histories shows the concepts and tools that have already entered 
society through various channels. In developing and emerging countries, civil society 
proves a major conduit, as Théo Bouma (Under the radar 2) explains in his article 
about the growing maturity and professionalism of non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs). He claims ‘there are now many countries where national NGOs are recog-
nized by policymakers and are truly part of the public debate.’ Such organizations 
play a critical role in public discourse, reintroducing previously excluded actors and 
stakes to ‘give a voice to the poorest and the weakest people, and to lobby and educate 
leaders and influence policies.’
However, sustainable development is no longer just a political slogan or a societal 
demand. Over the past ten years, it has started to become an economic and industrial 
reality. The way societies take sustainability into account affects the way companies 
position themselves and seize opportunities, proposing goods and services to meet 
new demands. The work of Nicolas Vincent and Raphaël de Guerre shows this as 
they look at the flourishing of ‘social business’ (Under the radar 11). Valérie Schmitt 
and Daniel Kamelgarn further illustrate how business can propose services central 
to social insurance coverage. 
In effect, an entire network of actors and factors has coalesced around the subject 
of sustainability. ‘Success depends on a solid base of research and data and strong 
communication skills, but also on the mobilization of political courage among govern-
ments,’ Mark Halle explains. He introduces the notion of ‘action coalitions’ marching 
forward, noting that ‘addressing fossil fuel subsidy report in Egypt, or India, or Mexico, 
requires the data available from the International Energy Agency of the World Bank 
and their official contacts at the national level. It requires to understand the political 
economy of skilled players in-country, in civil society, in academia, and in the media; 
and it requires trusted spokespersons prepared to stand up and express the inconve-
nient truth and offer alternatives.’
Even when agendas change, the promised changes do not automatically happen, 
despite the political will and substantial investments brought to bear. Sustainable 
development cannot be decreed from the top down. Indeed, we often see major disap-
pointments, as with South Korea’s ‘Green Growth Strategy’; a plan that was nowhere 
near as popular as the authorities had hoped, while its achievements in energy 
decarbonization remain debatable. When it comes to changing their development 
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trajectory, countries suffer powerful inertia and strong social and technical barriers, 
such as ‘fossil-fuel public subsidies’. Such forces slow down change; as Mark Halle 
explains, ‘most of the key issues around sustainable development share a common 
thread – they require a change in the pattern of incentives and disincentives that 
govern the consumption and lifestyle behaviour of citizens’.
What is at stake at the ‘2015 juncture’? 
With the achievement of many (but not all) of the UN’s Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs), the movement to define new SDGs finds its roots in the changes most 
countries have made to their development plans as they integrate environmental 
concerns. Development can no longer be imagined without the modifier ‘sustain-
able’; the slogan has become the standard, one we have watched gain purchase over 
the years in previous editions of A Planet for Life. After more than forty years of 
gradual progress, since sustainability was first embraced at the 1992 Rio Summit 
and the link between development and the environment was first recognized by 
officialdom, sustainable development has become the watchword, the expectation, 
the norm. The first and major issue at stake is for political leaders and stakeholders 
to make the global sustainable development agenda a genuine transformative agenda 
in their own territory. 
Other issues come into play, as Armand Rioust de Largentaye explains in his 
analysis of the ‘historical construction of the “2015 juncture”’ (Chapter 1). The SGDs 
will belong to what we might call the ‘Group of Twenty (G20) Era’, unlike the MDGs, 
which were set up in 2000 at a time when the world’s existing balance of power was 
entering into its twilight. That world was upended as large emerging nations – China 
foremost – burst onto the scene, rebalancing economic and political power between 
countries. Subsequently, the architecture of international aid also underwent great 
change, and needs further reinvention. ‘The mapping of donors is rapidly changing,’ 
Pascal Canfin notes (Under the radar 9). For example, African countries now have a 
choice of three funders for infrastructure projects of any size: bilateral and multilateral 
development banks, the Gulf States, and China as it shifts from aid recipient to donor. 
A Planet for Life informs us of the ins and outs of international negotiations. It shows 
that states are the primary actors; they lead the negotiations and are likely to conduct 
implementation in their territories. Over time, the number of states that negotiate and 
make implementation decisions has increased considerably. Countries like Colombia or 
Nigeria (Guatemala was at the initiative of SDGs) stand out in their drive to push for 
negotiation and change. Alexandre Magnan (Under the radar 2) explains how Small 
Island States seize on climate issues in the UNFCCC and the ‘unique opportunity to 
make their voices heard internationally.’ Indeed, they end up stimulating ‘a revival of the 
traditional negotiation processes of the United Nations.’ What is new is that at Rio+20 
countries acknowledged that this challenge was universal and had to be addressed by 
all countries, regardless of their income level. Debates within OECD countries on ‘post-
growth’ societies exemplify this. The need for cooperation, learning and experience 
sharing between OECD and non-OECD countries has never been so acute. 
BUILDING THE FUTURE WE WANT
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With decades of low growth and a high level of investment in R&D and educa-
tion, Japan provides a striking example of the pace and difficulties of adjustments 
and reforms, as Robert Boyer shows in his Chapter 8, where he explores the route 
for what he calls an ‘anthropogenetic regime’ and a new industrial model to which 
education, culture and health especially contribute. 
In this transformation process, non-state actors are also becoming increasingly 
involved, whether companies (multinationals, SME, social businesses), civil society 
organizations (NGOs, trade unions) and local authorities (major cities); these 
non-state actors are playing an increasing role in the preparation of negotiations, 
or even in the negotiations themselves. In Under the radar 3, Csaba Kőrösi, a major 
contributor to negotiations centring on SDG implementation, describes the mechanics 
of building consensus on the SDGs and shows how the negotiations clearly extend 
beyond inter-country relations. ‘Only a part of the work was done in the negotiation 
room. Around 80% of meetings and consultations took place in between sessions, 
with the majority of discussions being bilateral or involving stakeholders other than 
member states.’  
When setting up the negotiation process, the goal was to enlarge the arena as much 
as possible, opening it to anyone who wanted to participate, making the ‘we want’ 
become reality. The global political arena can no longer only be open to historical 
and institutionalized ‘Major Groups’. Challenging the Major Groups approach inher-
ited from Rio, internet-based participation mechanisms ‘aim to enhance the ability 
of civil society actors around the world, organized or not, to express their perspec-
tives, organize deliberations, take action and increase their participation and engage-
ment in the creation and implementation of sustainable development norms and 
agreements’ Carole-Anne Sénit (Chapter 3) tells us. To this end, the United Nations 
created an Internet site to host an open forum where anyone can say what he or she 
thinks about the SDG proposals. Carole Anne-Sénit examines how well this tool has 
been received and how much it can really guide negotiations. Quantitatively, the site 
has proven very successful. Qualitatively, it does not change the status quo; the most 
active contributors are groups with significant communication budgets and global 
reach. In addition, the technology itself creates a barrier: Internet access remains 
highly unequal across the world.
Are we moving towards a comprehensive 
environmental and social contract?
According to the post-2015 agenda set out by ‘The Future We Want’, sustainable 
development can be reduced to a limited series of universal, coherent and imple-
mentable goals, reflecting the harmonious preferences of nations. These goals, 
drafted by the open working group (OWG), are explored in Csaba Kőrösi’s chapter 
(Under the radar 3). The existence of a list of universal, implementable and coherent 
set of goals had not been established before the SDGs and one could wonder why. 
Before Rio+20, UN texts did not contain any, or at least very few such examples; and 
attempts at defining such goals did not simultaneously fulfil these three properties. 
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Csaba Kőrösi emphasizes that ‘the transformation potential of the SDG package 
is so great that many of the countries involved in the negotiations may not even fully 
comprehend the possible magnitude, which may be similar to that of the industrial 
or digital revolutions.’ One question arises here: will SDGs deliver real transforma-
tion in territories and countries, and if so, at what conditions? 
Mark Halle is sceptical on the capacity of large UN Summits to really deliver trans-
formation. He does not have much trust in the ‘repeated and disappointing mega-
summits, the pious reports of independent commissions, or the monotonous series 
of failed intergovernmental negotiations.’ Instead, he emphasizes the ‘wave of the 
future’ of new initiatives, that merge top-down and bottom-up approaches, ‘new 
forms of action, involving alliances of players from across the spectrum, coalitions 
of donors, and positive action at the public policy level.’ He notes that ‘Diversity and 
experimentation are the most likely routes to success.’
In his chapter, Mark Halle further argues that ‘we are stuck when it comes to making 
progress on issues that depend on addressing the equity gap’, adding that ‘we will not 
reach sustainable development unless and until we can take on equity as the funda-
mental core of the challenge. This means conceiving of a form of economic organiza-
tion that respects both the social floor and the planetary boundaries.’ Diversity and 
experimentation is required at the micro level as much as the macro level to make 
sustainable development policies and projects deliver.
Henry de Cazotte and Céline Ramstein (Under the radar 11) provide examples and 
evidence of the proliferation of voluntary initiatives on sustainable development issues, 
such as global warming, taken by development actors (public authorities and agencies, 
companies, the financial sector, NGOs, local universities, etc.). A new architecture seems 
to be emerging from these various networks of actors, alongside and in conjunction with 
the international negotiations between states. They highlight how much, for instance, 
the Global Alliance for Climate-Smart Agriculture, which includes large agribusiness 
multinational companies whose models are highly controversial in terms of environ-
mental sustainability or social inclusion, and is attacked by NGOs and defenders of family 
farming. The authors raise several questions, that remain unanswered, and that must 
be addressed seriously in debates: ‘in what way do these projects have a real impact 
on emissions and do they represent the latest embodiment of green washing, in the 
absence of control mechanisms and international reporting?’. One major challenge is 
‘to imagine a system of monitoring, evaluation and coordination within or linked with 
the United Nations.’ This issue is part of the ongoing talks in the post-2015 agenda. 
Nicolas Vincent and Raphaël De Guerre (Under the radar 11 bis) explore the 
opportunity for social business to bridge the implementation gap of national sustain-
able development policies in Madagascar. There is no silver bullet for (sustainable) 
development problems, they warn. ‘In addition to the usual difficulties for small 
and medium-sized enterprises in developing countries (such as financing, business 
environment, knowledge of the market, etc.), social business projects face additional 
difficulties inherent to their model.’ They add that ‘there is a significant tension 
between the social objective and the imperative of financial stability.’ 
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Changing the way development is measured is a key building block of a common 
narrative on sustainable development, intelligible by all in every country. Lucas 
Chancel, Géraldine Thiry and Damien Demailly (Under the radar 10) provide 
striking evidence of the use and misuse of Beyond GDP (BGDP) indicators in a set 
of European countries. The actual transformation triggered by BGDP initiatives 
with regard to national accounting systems and the design of public policies shows 
that there remains much work to be done in terms of crafting a new social contract 
for the route to 2030. Taking due note of this and pushing for a far more radical 
agenda, Michael Albert (Chaper 11) makes the claim for a complete reshuffling of 
our institutions, laying out the principles of what he calls ‘participatory economics’, 
‘without competition, without an authoritarian centre, and arriving at a worthy plan 
that manifests collective self-managed preferences all by a process consistent with, 
manifesting, and facilitating other features sought for society including balanced 
jobs, equitable remuneration, and self-managing councils - and thus without class 
hierarchy and rule’. 
Reinventing development and its financing
Implementation issues encompass development financing and other topics such as 
innovation protection and transfer, institutional capacity building, and policy space 
enabling experimentation and learning by doing. The focus for 2015 is being placed 
on development financing, with the Addis Ababa Conference in July addressing this 
issue. At least two key questions will be raised during the Conference. The first deals 
with the mobilization of additional financing sources, complementing conventional 
official development assistance (ODA), that will be needed to meet the massive 
financing needs of the SDGs and the post-2015 development agenda more broadly. 
The second relates to the definition of new allocation criteria for ODA, so as to use it 
where it has the highest leverage or catalytic effect. Both of these issues are closely 
related and provide the foundations to the Addis Ababa talks. 
In Chapter 9, Voituriez, Giordano, Bakkour and Boussichas show us that the 
financing needs for development after after 2015 are estimated to be, on a yearly basis, 
at least twenty times higher than the current annual ODA amount, which reached 
a record level in 2013 of $134 billion. The bulk of the additional funds required to 
cover the financing needs of the post-2015 agenda must therefore come from other 
sources of long-term financing – pension funds, insurance companies, sovereign 
wealth funds, among other institutional investors. They contend however that ODA 
remains unescapable and a core component of the development financing ecosystem 
– even if is marginalized in terms of volume – because of its unique capacity to carry 
over some risks that private actors will never dare to take on. Because of the polit-
ical and institutional reforms it entails, the mobilization of domestic resources is a 
highly sensitive issue. To be properly addressed, it requires in many cases substantial 
reforms: tax collection systems, capacity building for civil servants, the strengthening 
of democratic institutions monitoring government expenditure, the development 
of international norms and standards for combating illicit fiscal and financial flows 
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(account transparency for companies, action plans on base erosion and profit shifting, 
public budget transparency, open data, etc.). While there seems to be a consensus on 
the need to prioritize domestic resources mobilization, political hurdles remain that 
are hindering the making of this high profile agenda and in turning the momentum 
into action.
As Pascal Canfin (Under the radar 9) emphasizes in his chapter, the average tax 
burden in OECD countries is 35%, and about 15% in the countries of Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Illicit financial flows coming out of Southern countries are up to ten times 
greater than the amount of ODA. Bringing an end to abusive transfer pricing that 
concentrates value in very low tax countries is a high priority on an agenda that is 
progressing much more rapidly than we would have thought possible four years ago. 
Accounting transparency for every country is now part of the negotiations of the 
financing of the post-2015 agenda. 
Beyond the discussion on the amount of financing, the debate on development 
financing offers an opportunity to observe the progress of the construction of inter-
national cooperation efficiency, South-South and triangular in particular. Laetitia 
Martinet (Under the radar 9 bis) analyses the period that has seen the announce-
ment of the creation of new international financial institutions originated by member 
countries of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), China in partic-
ular. The New Development Bank (NDB), the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), 
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Silk Road Fund (SRF) have 
been created as a result of the frustration experienced by emerging countries with 
regard to the rigidity of the international financial architecture. She recalls that ‘it is 
also an expression of China’s will to strengthen its regional and global geopolitical 
weight.’ However, she warns, ‘while there is no doubt that these institutions have a 
geopolitical importance, their short-term impact on the architecture of aid is open to 
debate.’ The differences in the design of international cooperation between traditional 
and emerging donors may be an obstacle: while the former cooperate according to 
rules that are common to DAC members, a sort of ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ on devel-
opment, the latter see international cooperation through the prism of the compara-
tive advantages of each partner.  
How can we better connect (sustainable) development finance and climate change 
mitigation financing? The idea laid out by Jean-Charles Hourcade (Under the 
radar 9 ter) consists in creating a new real asset – the climate remediation asset – 
whereby Central Banks could remunerate emission reductions and incentivize investors 
to invest in low carbon and sustainable projects or technologies. Comparable to the clean 
development mechanism of the European Emission Trading Scheme, it does not act as 
a ‘punishment’ like a carbon tax, but as a reward for constructing the Future we want. 
Conclusion
‘Building the Future We Want’ has three key messages. First, we have long past the 
often-evoked criticism of the output of UN discussions as producing nothing but ‘pious 
wishes’. Indeed, the processes have begun: states and stakeholders are making their 
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moves, both backstage and outside of the UN. Second, our future is not written in 
stone; rather, we must collectively build it, experiment, learn, and exchange ideas on 
the possible pathways towards sustainability. It is not the job of the UN or national 
governments alone; it is everybody’s business – scientific and technical organizations, 
academic institutions, civil society, community and faith-based organizations, media 
and above all businesses. Multi-stakeholder participation marked the development of 
the SDGs and it should drive their implementation. Third, a sustainable world cannot 
be achieved by decree and the work does not stop once some goals have been written 
down. The world we are heading for will be the one we make. It may not automatically 
or necessarily resemble the sustainable world described in the UN report, ‘The Future 
We Want’, but it will nevertheless be the future we collectively build. This focus on 
collective choices and preferences allows us to emphasize everyone’s responsibility 
to transform vague aspirations into actions that we can no longer postpone if we are 
to build the future we want. n
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his chapter analyses the historical construction of the ‘2015 
juncture’, the year the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – 
unanimously adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2000 – are 
to be fulfilled, and the year the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) are to be decided. Moreover, in 2015 several programmes 
are supposed to converge; these include: the Action Plan for Sustain-
able Development that was launched as ‘Agenda 21’ in 1992 to lead 
towards the SDGs in 2015; the critical twenty-first session of the 
Conference of the Parties (COP 21) in Paris, as part of the climate 
change agenda; and the plan for financing sustainable develop-
ment. The chapter assesses the extent to which these different agendas will effec-
tively converge. It furthermore considers whether these initiatives and deadlines are 
of concern merely for international development cooperation institutions or whether 
the environmental and geopolitical issues they address are such as to make them the 
priorities of the world at large, particularly the G20. This question touches on issues of 
development finance which, depending on the views, may be just a matter of financial 
intermediation, of transferring global savings from rich to poor countries, or a matter 
of more general concern, such as the economic sovereignty of countries, or economic 
and monetary policy space to meet the challenge of full employment. 
Millennium Development Goals and assistance 
OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA) UNDERMINED
It is probably no coincidence that the genesis of the MDGs goes back to the years 
following the fall of the Berlin Wall, which took place in 1989, and the implosion of 
The United Nations’ intention to build ‘The future we want’ from 2015 
calls for several narratives to converge: the development narrative, rep-
resented by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); the sustain-
able development narrative, which has been somewhat overtaken by the 
MDGs in the last decade; and the narrative on government and non-gov-
ernment financing and implementation. The prospect of convergence 
is completely re-shaping the cooperation and negotiations involved in 
these different areas.
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the Soviet bloc. During the Cold War, ODA was justified as a means of solidarity, not 
without geopolitical connotations. For the liberal West and for multilateral institu-
tions, the intention was indeed to provide help primarily for political allies. However, 
promptly after this issue disappeared, studies began casting doubts on the impact 
of ODA on poverty reduction,1 calling into question the economic effectiveness of 
aid, denouncing its negative effects on economic incentives, highlighting the heavy 
human costs of ‘structural adjustments’ (i.e. austerity measures required by the 
Bretton Woods institutions) and the failure of conditionalities. The fall of the Berlin 
Wall thus opened a genuine crisis of ODA legitimacy (Amprou and Chauvet, 2007). 
First in line, the World Bank responded by publishing ‘Assessing Aid’ (1998), a 
report signed by two prominent US economists – David Dollar and Lant Pritchett. 
The report argued that aid effectiveness was a function of the governance of a 
country, particularly the control of inflation, fiscal balance and trade openness, 
elements of the ‘Washington consensus’, as described in 1989 by John Williamson, an 
English economist. The World Bank then became interested in assessing the quality of 
institutions and developed indicators for this purpose. Observing that conditionality 
had been ineffective, the Bank opted for ex-ante conditionality: no funding until 
reforms were implemented (the European Commission instead opted for ex-post 
conditionality). However, instead of calming the debate, the Bank’s studies revealed 
the fragility of the underlying assumptions. An evaluation of the Bank’s research 
programme even revealed a manipulation of statistics to justify the institution’s 
line of thought (Banerjee et al., 2006). Recognizing that the growth of economies 
depended on factors other than ODA, the Bank decided to focus on poverty reduction. 
GENESIS OF THE MDGS 
On 8 September 2000, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Millennium 
Declaration, a text that contained a programme to strengthen collective security and 
establish a global partnership for development. It was then that the eight MDGs were 
adopted unanimously, with a target date of 2015. The MDGs were inspired by the 
work of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and its 1996 report 
entitled ‘Shaping the 21st century: the contribution of development cooperation’. 
In the midst of the controversy on the issue of aid effectiveness, the DAC opted for 
clarity, proposing six goals that would inspire the MDGs a few years later, as shown 
in Figure 1 that compares the six DAC goals with the eight MDGs.
On 11 September 2001, the attack of New York’s twin towers increased the impact 
of the Millennium Declaration. Indeed, without this dramatic event, it is not certain 
that the MDGs would have galvanized public opinion and breathed new life into 
ODA. In March 2002, world leaders gathered in Monterrey, Mexico, where they 
agreed that ODA was vital in supplementing other sources of development finance, 
especially in countries that were poorly served by private direct investment. The 
‘Monterrey Consensus’ on financing for development thus recommended an increase 
1. For a detailed analysis of these studies, see Amprou and Chauvet, Notes and Documents, AFD 37, 2007
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in ODA, with donor countries being asked to allocate 0.7% of their GDP to ODA, as 
had been pledged in the late 1960s.
At the 2015 MDG deadline, some objectives and ‘targets’ (sub-objectives) have 
been reached, especially MDG 1 (halving the proportion of people living in extreme 
poverty) and MDG 7.C, which relates to the sustainable access to potable water. 
However, progress is uneven, particularly regarding MDG 1. The successes, which are 
in part attributable to China’s performance, are less evident in sub-Saharan Africa, 
where achievements in terms of access to safe drinking water have been particularly 
insufficient. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) considers that by 
clarifying the targeted objectives, the MDGs have helped galvanize public opinion 
and encouraged development cooperation. Regardless of the results, the initiative 
to launch a similar challenge (that of the SDGs) is a measure of MDG success.
TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
Alongside the debates on ODA, the world was awakening to the threats to its environ-
ment. In 1992, Meadows report ‘The Limits to Growth’ was an international success.2 
The same year, the UN organized the first global conference on human environment 
in Stockholm and created the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). 
However, it was not until 1987 that ‘Our Common Future’, the report commissioned 
by the UN to a group chaired by the former Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem 
Brundtland, called for a different trade-off between human welfare and the environ-
ment, while safeguarding the needs of developing countries. The report inspired the 
1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio.
Designated as the ‘Earth Summit’, the conference advocated ‘sustainable 
development’ based on three (economic, social and environmental) pillars.3 The 
Summit produced several documents, two of which are particularly topical in 2015: 
2. Donella and Dennis Meadows, wife and husband, were two key authors of the report that bears their name.
3. The term ‘sustainable development’ replaced the term ‘eco-development’ that was used following the Stockholm Confer-
ence (Sachs, 2007).
1996 DAC objectives MDGs (2000)
Eradicate extreme poverty 1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
Achieve universal primary education 2. Achieve universal primary education
Promote gender equality and empower women 3. Promote gender equality and empower women
Reduce child mortality 4. Reduce child mortality
Provide access to reproductive health 5. Improve maternal health
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
Stop environmental loss 7. Ensure environmental sustainability
8. Develop a global partnership for development
FIGURE 1 The building of common objectives
Source : Compilation by the author.
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the Climate Convention (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
- UNFCCC) and Agenda 21, an action plan for the twenty-first century. Agenda 21 
addressed the range of sustainable development challenges, which include poverty, 
health, housing, pollution, protection of the atmosphere (including the fight against 
climate change and variability), management of seas, forests and mountains, 
management of water resources and sanitation, agriculture and waste...
During the last quarter of the twentieth century, civil society organizations emerged 
as a global phenomenon, outlining a participatory democracy at different levels: 
local (rural and urban), national and global. In 1980, the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) established a strategy for nature conservation. These 
developments were not without the political overtones of a reaction to the extension 
of the neo-liberal ideology during the period; they peaked at the Seattle protests 
during the WTO summit in 1999. With pressure from NGOs, the Rio Conference 
forced environmental issues into the jurisdiction of international financial institutions 
(IFI). The Global Environment Facility (GEF) was created in 1992. IFI procedures 
were amended to incorporate systematic environmental assessments. 
Paradoxically, the environment, long considered an obstacle to development, 
became a boon for international financial institutions during the 1990s: the end 
of the Cold War, the debt crisis and the emergence in the 1980s of an international 
financial market serving centres of growth, particularly South Asia, were threatening 
to erode donor capacity. The GEF pioneered financing of global environmental 
public goods, such as climate, biodiversity, desertification control and soil 
protection. The Kyoto Protocol, signed in 1997 and ratified in 2005, created the 
Clean Development Mechanism, prompting the establishment of polluter-financed 
‘carbon funds’ to compensate the victims of greenhouse gas emissions. Budget aid 
and climate programmes stimulated research on reform implementation and on 
effective environmental interventions.
In 2008, the ‘green transition’ appeared as a general response to the crisis, as 
economist Nicholas Stern had suggested in his ‘Review of the Economics of Climate 
Change’, published in 2006. Some countries such as Korea began to develop 
environmental technology for its competitive advantage, while in Europe, Germany, 
Denmark and the Netherlands were quick to realize the potential of the sector.
The UN ‘Rio+20’ conference, held in Rio de Janeiro between 20 and 22 June 
2012 to mark the twentieth anniversary of the Earth Summit, stressed in its closing 
statement entitled ‘The Future We Want’, the UN’s consistent line of thought 
since Stockholm. The conference called for a set of SDGs, based on Agenda 21, to 
inspire the UN post-2015 development programme. Among the 26 thematic areas 
reviewed in the declaration, climate change raised deep concern and called for 
urgent decisions to limit the rise of temperatures to 2°C by 2100, as compared to 
the beginning of the industrial era. The conference requested an ‘Open Working 
Group’ to develop the SDGs. In 2014 seventy countries shared the thirty seats of the 
Group, France sharing its seat with Germany and Switzerland, India with Pakistan 
and Sri Lanka. 
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FIGURE 2 Development assistance, an unloved tool?
Despite repeated political mobilization, development assistance remains a modest and fragile source of funding for developing countries.
Emergence and constraints
THE EMERGENCE OF CHINA
Between 1978 and 2010, the economic performance of China was arguably one of 
the most dramatic economic developments of modern times, raising the country out 
of poverty at an unprecedented speed and scale. During those years, China’s annual 
average GDP growth exceeded 9.7%. GDP per capita increased at an average annual 
rate of 8.5% over this period, due in part to population control and the benefits 
of the ‘demographic dividend’ (the advantage of having a high proportion of the 
population in working age). China, a country of 1.3 billion people, saw its share of 
population living in poverty (living on less than $1.25 a day) fall from 60% in 1990 
to 12% in 2010.
China’s performance was the result of an endogenous and autocratic approach, 
far from the OECD’s liberal vision. The experiment began after the takeover of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949, under conditions of extreme difficulty 
and poverty, cut off from international aid (which at the time was mainly from the 
US), China having to rely on its own resources (Aglietta and Guo Bai, 2012). Soviet 
assistance arrived in the 1950s, putting the emphasis on the construction of heavy 
industry. This difficult period of investment was not without setbacks. The victims 
BUILDING THE FUTURE WE WANT
A PLANET FOR L IFE26
of the famine following the disastrous Great Leap Forward of 1960 are estimated 
to number in the tens of millions, not including other sufferings and massacres, 
particularly the Cultural Revolution a decade later.
However, China learned from its mistakes and adapted to developments. Access to 
the US market with a competitive exchange rate opened the way for an export industry. 
Through globalized value chains, China’s export-oriented industrialization benefited 
the entire world. Figure 3 is taken from the 2014 UNDP Human Development Report, 
presenting the HDI in 141 countries over the period from 1990 to 2010; this figure 
helps to understand how some of the MDGs were achieved. The emergence of other 
rising powers, too numerous to mention here, did not exert the same traction on 
world development as the integration of China into the global economy.
GLOBAL NEO-LIBERALISM 
From 1980, conservative parties in many Western countries rose to power, initiating 
the ‘neoliberal counter-reform’ that was accompanied by rising inequality. There was 
no shortage of research that highlighted the risks of this counter-reform. Amartya 
Sen, Nobel Laureate in Economics (1998), emphasized the link between inequality 
and poverty, advancing the idea of ‘capabilities’4 to assert the role of social factors in 
development. In 2006, under the leadership of François Bourguignon, World Bank 
Chief Economist, the World Development Report entitled ‘Equity and development’ 
departed from neo-liberal trends, including those influencing the president of the 
World Bank, Paul Wolfowitz. The report showed that inequalities were an obstacle 
not only to social well-being, but also to economic growth. In addition, the report 
noted the inability of some laissez-faire-inspired economic systems to promote devel-
opment for all and the eradication of poverty. 
The attitude of the IMF during the 1997 Asian crisis, shortly after the IMF had 
declared it favoured liberalizing capital accounts, led China to accumulate foreign 
exchange reserves to reduce its dependence on the Bretton Woods institutions. The 
liberalization of capital accounts, championed by IMF staff,5 ignored one of the IMF’s 
founding principles, derived from the Bretton Woods Conference (1944). According 
to these principles, national authorities should be able to maintain monetary 
independence, enabling low interest rates to stimulate private investment in the 
event of an economic slowdown and in periods of underemployment. Liberalization 
of capital movements had unwarranted restrictive effects on this policy space 
(Stiglitz 2002, Morel, 2011, UNDP 2014). 
The 2007 financial crisis finally called into question the doctrine of laissez-faire 
economics. The Washington Consensus, characterizing the policies of the Bretton 
Woods institutions, was criticized as an extreme type of laissez-faire economics, 
which was probably an exaggeration. However, the Arab Spring and other popular 
4. ‘Capabilities’ or ‘substantive freedoms’ are, according to Amartya Sen’s definition, the effective ability of a person to 
choose combinations of functionings, i.e. an assessment of the freedom a person actually has (Wikipedia ).
5. More so than the US, notwithstanding the favourable attitude of the US representative to the Board, see Abdelal 2009.
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protests that arose in 2011, showed the tragic consequences of inequality and social 
divisions in the cohesion of societies and in the trajectory of growth and development. 
With the effects of deregulation on the environment, they confirmed the need 
to simultaneously foster the three sustainable development pillars (economic, 
social and environmental), as stressed by the Earth Summit in the wake of the 
Brundtland Report.
CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS 
From 1992 global warming has been a major environmental concern and probably 
the one that is the biggest obstacle to development aspirations. As a result of green-
house gas emissions, global warming is related to industrialization, GDP growth 
and economic development, pitching the interests of developing countries against 
those of industrialized nations better positioned to worry about the threat of green-
house gas emissions. Developing countries argue that industrialized countries bear 
the main responsibility for climate degradation, causing all nations to suffer from 
global warming.
FIGURE 3 Human development boundary
Development should not be measured only in economic terms. Various indicators, including the human development index (HDI) devel-
oped by Amartya Sen, have attempted to address this issue. Despite a general trend of improvement, HDI also reveals that very harsh 
living conditions persist in several countries. 
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Following the Earth Summit, the UNFCCC Climate Convention has introduced 
regular meetings of the COP bringing together 192 member countries. In 2009, the 
fifteenth COP in Copenhagen was due to produce a climate agreement to replace 
the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. The aim was to agree on commitments for low-carbon 
development, translating into operational terms the objective to limit the increase 
in average temperature to 2°C by 2100. Although the parties were unable to reach 
an agreement, industrialized countries committed to provide $100 billion of ‘climate 
finance’ annually from 2020 to finance the investment required to reduce emissions 
(mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions) and to address the negative effects of these 
emissions (adaptation to warming). Climate finance refers to financial transfers from 
developed countries designed to mitigate climate change and to help developing 
countries adapt to its effects. 
The separation of climate finance commitments from other development 
assistance flows reflects the dual concern of developing countries to achieve greater 
influence while creating a separate source of finance, given that rich countries 
are not meeting their commitment, re-affirmed in the Monterrey Consensus, to 
provide 0.7% of their GDPs. In 2010, the COP 16 in Cancun decided to create a 
Green Climate Fund managed equally between donor and developing countries. 
One of the main objectives of the 2015 COP 21 in Paris will be to establish and 
capitalize this Fund.
The 2015 momentum 
THE PROPOSED SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND THEIR FINANCING
The year 2015 began with a sense of satisfactory preparation. The Open Working 
Group proposed seventeen SDGs. The Intergovernmental Committee of experts on 
financing sustainable development submitted its report, while the UN Secretary 
General produced a synthesis report6 presenting the overall preparation achieve-
ments. In addition, with the ‘Lima Call for Action’, the COP 20 provided a working 
basis for the COP 21 in Paris.
The proposed SDGs are inspired by the MDGs but give a more detailed description of 
basic services (water, energy, education and health, as part of ‘healthy lives’); economic 
components (growth, employment, industrialization and sustainable cities, modes of 
production and consumption); and environmental protections to be considered. The 
three pillars of sustainable development (social, economic and environmental) can be 
easily recognized. SDG 1 (End poverty in all its forms everywhere) gives a high priority 
to social protection, the subject of Target 1.37. Climate change appears in SDG 13 (Take 
urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts), but is accompanied by an 
asterisk, a reminder that this is the subject of a specific negotiation process.8 Governance, 
6. Entitled ‘The road to dignity by 2030: ending poverty, transforming all lives and protecting the planet’.
7. ‘Implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve 
substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable.’
8. The asterisk refers to the following clarification: ‘Acknowledging that the UNFCCC is the primary international, inter-
governmental forum for negotiating the global response to climate change.’
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which was not identified in 1992 as a separate pillar of sustainable development, is the 
subject of SDG 16 (Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, 
provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions 
at all levels). 
However, SDGs are distinct from the MDGs in their universal nature, a characteristic 
mandated by the Rio+20 Conference. They must therefore apply to rich and poor 
countries alike. They are ambitious (end poverty...) but remain a voluntary agreement; 
they are a statement of aspirations, rather than a binding treaty. Each government should 
set its own national targets according to the global objectives, while taking its national 
circumstances into account. Lastly, the legitimacy of the SDGs has been grounded in 
global public consultations that have reached millions of online contributors, while 
drawing on the wisdom of international experts, especially the High Level Panel, chaired 
by the British Prime Minister, David Cameron.
SDG 17 (Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership 
for sustainable development) addresses the 1992 global partnership, which was the 
subject of MDG 8 (Develop a global partnership for development). The challenge of this 
partnership (see further discussion below) was addressed at the first High-Level Meeting 
of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, organized jointly 
by UNDP and the OECD in Mexico in April 2014. This meeting resulted from the aid 
effectiveness agenda launched by OECD’s DAC in the 2005 Paris Declaration, following 
the Monterrey Summit (2002). Whether the Mexico meeting will help achieve the 
organization of the global partnership for sustainable development remains to be seen.
In its report on the financing of sustainable development, the Intergovernmental 
Committee of Experts mentions the Monterrey Consensus and its focus on the holistic 
mobilization of all forms of financing: public, private, domestic and international. 
In 2014, the OECD focused its development cooperation report on the same issue, 
considering that the challenge lay in the ability to transfer the required amount of 
savings from rich to poor countries (OECD, 2014). The Intergovernmental Committee 
rather emphasises the importance of respecting national policies and priorities, as well 
as national strategies for sustainable development, which should determine national 
financing plans. The Committee believes that development financing will not result 
from a simple solution but that a range of measures should allow each government to 
choose the desired combination. Finally, the Committee notes that without a stable 
international financial system, the post-2015 development agenda will remain 
vulnerable to financial crises. 
CONVERGENCE
How to assess the convergence of the three programmes? First, SDGs should be related 
to Agenda 21, the sustainable development action plan of 1992, because ‘The future 
we want’ (the Rio+20 document) specifically underlined this relationship. Inter-
national cooperation under the MDGs will therefore converge on the SDGs out of 
political necessity. This particular convergence draws on the legitimacy of the SDGs: 
during the preparation of the SDGs, the level of attention given to establishing their 
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legitimacy was a reminder that MDGs, originally formulated by the OECD’s DAC, had 
been adopted too hurriedly by the UN in 2000, without sufficiently reflecting the 
aspirations of the Earth Summit.
Moreover, the sought-for legitimacy of the SDGs is indicative of the opposition that 
persists between rich and poor countries. The latter consider that the neo-liberal line 
of discourse of OECD countries and the Washington Consensus contribute to maintain 
‘peripheral’ countries outside the OECD in an inferior status. For these countries, the 
recurring calls for equal opportunity for all and for a level playing field in international 
relations are a clever way for Northern countries to argue moralistically in favour of 
maintaining the geopolitical status quo. Fifty years ago, Latin American countries led 
by Raul Prebisch (1901-1986), the Argentinian director of the Economic Commission 
for Latin America (ECLA), were already arguing for a different form of cooperation 
and economic relations in the UN. The creation of the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964 was a result of this campaign (Toye and 
Toye, 2004). 
Rather than a level playing field, which would imply equal conditions of competition 
for unequal partners, cooperation for the SDGs requires support for institutions. 
According to Justin Yifu Lin, former World Bank Chief Economist, institutions must 
at every stage adapt to their social function and promote further progress. For the 
Intergovernmental Committee of experts, this issue appears to apply particularly 
to local financial institutions. Influencing the development of local systems, which 
are often complex, is however more subtle than copying a foreign model. The idea 
Justin Yifu Lin suggests is to support the adjustment of local behaviours to changing 
realities, such as OECD member states do in their peer reviews, on the basis of 
exchanges of knowledge, identification of best practices, and possible stigmatization 
of non-performers.
In addition, the opposition to the neo-liberal model explains the difficulty to 
achieve the convergence between SDGs, which are comparable to Agenda 21, and the 
climate programme. The asterisk on the climate-related SDG 13 serves as a reminder 
of the opposition between developing and industrialized countries. Added to this 
is the fact that the US and the UK want to maintain the specificity of the climate 
negotiations, no doubt to obtain the commitment of China and newly industrialized 
countries.
What do the Intergovernmental Committee’s proposals show, in terms of 
convergence? Analyses have suggested a double rapprochement: first, between 
development assistance and development financing, the latter focusing on all sources 
of funding that can work for development (public and private, internal and external); 
and second between development financing and sustainable development financing to 
reconcile the Rio agenda (SDGs, including the link with climate-financing) and that 
of Monterrey (MDGs). The Intergovernmental Committee’s proposals particularly 
emphasized that the financing of sustainable development will be meaningless without 
an alignment of economic incentives with public goods, nor without policies that 
encourage private investment in that direction.
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THE CHALLENGE OF THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP
This leads to the challenge of establishing a global partnership that is able to deal with 
the tasks ahead. On global financial governance, the Intergovernmental Committee’s 
proposals call for tough reforms, starting with the Bretton Woods institutions, which 
need to adapt the weighting of member votes to the new geopolitical realities.
In 2015, the context of the Addis Ababa conference is not unlike that of the 1944 
Bretton Woods conference. As in 2015, the world in 1944 was looking for ways to better 
manage the planet, and for future generations to avoid the series of disasters which 
were still ongoing at the time. Like in 1944, one of the difficult issues to deal with today 
is the policy space to be granted to countries to implement sustainable development 
policies. In 1944, the main concern being employment, the envisaged international 
architecture had just two pillars: social and economic. But even with these two pillars, 
the challenge proved difficult to meet and the Bretton Woods conference resulted in an 
unbalanced system of governance. Economic and financial discipline was applicable 
to debtors, not to creditor countries. Far from achieving the goal of full employment, 
after a few years the system revealed its deflationary bias. It took the Marshall Plan 
(1947) and the Korean War (1950) to relaunch global demand (Toye and Toye, 2004).
Today, the third pillar of the environment does not fundamentally change the nature 
of the challenge. Rather than a concern, some see the environment as an opportunity, 
provided the reforms entail investments of sufficient volume. According to Sir Nicholas 
Stern’s ‘Review of the Economics of Climate Change’, the investment volume should 
maintain demand at the level required to ensure ‘high levels of employment and real 
income’, consistent with the first of the  Articles of Agreement of the IMF. Thus, the 
environment can provide the justification for a post-2015 development programme 
inspired by the Marshall Plan, as well as the self-interest of industrialized countries. 
When at the end of the 1940s, the American war industry was returned to its peacetime 
activity, the Truman administration understood that outlets for this activity were 
required. By duly providing such outlets, the Marshall Plan became the historical 
gesture of international solidarity supported by the belief that ‘charity begins at home’. 
Conclusions
The history of cooperation for development and of global conservation movements 
confirms the longstanding antagonisms in the global political economy, eloquently 
described in John and Richard Toye’s, ‘The UN and Global Political Economy’ (2004). 
On one side there are forces that could be called ‘social democratic’, concerned with 
growth through full employment and also concerned with reducing social divides and 
avoiding social exclusion. These forces, embodied by Gro Harlem Brundtland in 1987, 
inspired the 1992 Earth Summit. The integration of environmental problems has even 
led to suggest ‘social ecology’.9 This social democratic (or social ecology) force seems 
to prevail in the UN with the reaffirmation of Agenda 21 in its new SDG incarnation. 
On the other side are the neo-liberal, free trade and laissez-faire forces, dominating the 
9. Eloi Laurent, ‘Le bel avenir de l’Etat providence’, Paris, Les liens qui libèrent, 2014.
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financial and banking sectors, including public financial institutions and the industrial-
ized world, as well as the OECD. These forces have inspired the MDGs and influenced 
OECD countries and the promotion of ODA. The confrontation between the two forces 
continues in the climate negotiations.
A second conclusion is that 2015 looks set to be a historic moment, announcing 
major decisions for the future of the planet. However, the comparison with 1944 
underscores the magnitude of the issues, that go beyond a mere adjustment of the 
rules of international governance, in particular in the financial sector, since these rules 
have disappeared with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 and must be 
reinvented. Aside from the ambition of the SDGs, the difficulties that lie ahead in 2015 
are increased by the multilateral nature of the negotiations. In comparison, Bretton 
Woods was essentially bilateral, between the US and the UK (Skidelsky, 2004). In 
response to the question raised at the beginning of this chapter, the comparison with 
Bretton Woods shows the difficulty involved in raising the 2015 concerns to the top of 
the global agenda. And yet, the future of humanity depends on meeting this challenge.
Finally, regarding sustainable development, as it was for economic development, two 
types of institutions remain necessary. The first are institutions that underpin the rules 
of international governance, especially in the financial arena. Comparable to the IMF,10 
the Latin American Reserve Fund and the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization, 
such institutions would be responsible for deciding the policy space necessary for the 
implementation of national sustainable development programmes, knowing that all 
countries cannot simultaneously improve their international competitiveness because 
the payment surpluses of creditor countries are the deficits of the debtor countries.
The second type of institutions would be directly responsible for financing 
development. However, according to the sustainable development concept, 
development assistance should finance equipment and infrastructure, while also 
reinforcing institutions and capacities for their operation and maintenance. As Justin 
Yifu Lin duly stresses, development finance institutions must provide physical capital 
as much as they should assist in developing human and social capital. While a road 
can be destroyed by a climatic event, it is the local capacity to maintain and rebuild the 
road that ensures its resilience. In the post-2015 development agenda, this capacity 
must remain a priority for development finance institutions. However, the two types 
of institutions – those of governance and those of development finance – should work 
together so that countries, adhering to a common set of rules, enjoy the necessary 
margins to allow their local capacities to operate and develop. ❚
10. Mentioned by the Intergovernmental Committee.
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F
ifteen years ago the gradual global extension of 
social protection began, illustrating the way that 
sustainable development is being established, 
including in the poorest countries. Although a 
matter of human rights, social protection for all 
remains far from the reality.
This article is based on a discussion between Valerie 
Schmitt and Daniel Kamelgarn. It highlights the growing 
awareness of the importance of social protection for 
sustainable development, together with concrete examples 
showing that this human right can be converted into reality.
Social protection: a human right and a social and 
economic necessity
Social protection allows for a life in dignity. However, it 
is still a privilege for far too few. Only 27% of the world 
population enjoys adequate social protection. 
The need for such protection is not new: in 1944, 
the Declaration of Philadelphia affirmed that access to 
adequate levels of social protection was a basic right for 
all individuals; and in 1948 the right to social security and 
to a standard of living adequate for health and well-being 
were enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (Articles 22 and 25).
The ILO has mobilized to enable its members to extend 
social protection to all groups of society. In June 2001 at 
the eighty ninth session of the International Labour Confer-
ence in the Palais des Nations in Geneva, delegations from 
175 states comprising representatives of governments, 
Revisiting social protection in the 
twenty-first century
Valérie Schmitt, Chief, Social Policy, Governance and Standards Branch of the Social Protection 
Department, International Labour Organization, Geneva, Switzerland
Daniel Kamelgarn, Advisor, Strategy Department, Agence française de développement (AFD), Paris, 
France
employers and workers called for the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) to launch a Global Campaign on Social 
Security and Coverage for All. The campaign was officially 
launched in 2003 (ILO, 2011).
Beyond these principles, social protection is also gradu-
ally gaining recognition as a social and economic neces-
sity; it contributes to the development of countries by 
ensuring that people receive income security and access 
to healthcare and other social services, and facilitates their 
access to training or employment opportunities. Social 
protection is a powerful tool in the fight against poverty 
and inequality and helps develop domestic demand for 
goods and services that enable an inclusive and sustain-
able growth (ILO, 2014 and AFD, 2014). In situations such 
as the 2008 financial crisis, social protection mechanisms 
served as stabilizers of the economy and society.1
The ‘social protection floor’ as a strategy for 
implementing the right to social security 
From 2009, calls for the establishment of ‘social protec-
tion floors’ began to intensify2 and their importance was 
confirmed at the G20 summits, particularly in Cannes 
in 2011. In 2012, this movement led to the unanimous 
adoption by International Labour Conference members 
1. In April 2009, the UN Secretary General stated that the 
establishment of social protection floors was one of the nine anti-crisis 
measures.
2. See in particular the report of the group chaired by Michelle 
Bachelet, OIT 2011. 
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of Recommendation No. 202 for the establishment 
and maintenance of social protection floors, which are 
nationally-defined sets of basic social security guaran-
tees, such as access to essential healthcare for all, basic 
income security for children, persons in active age who 
are unable to earn sufficient income (especially in cases of 
sickness, unemployment, maternity and disability), and for 
older persons.
The effective implementation of social protection 
Although ILO recommendations are not intended for ratifi-
cation by Member States and are not therefore system-
atically translated into national legislation, this particular 
recommendation has provided a powerful lever to promote 
social protection floors and support their implementation. 
Pioneering countries such as South Africa, Argentina, 
Brazil, China, Colombia, India, Mongolia and Thailand were 
valuable examples that helped to convince even the most 
recalcitrant governments that social protection floors were 
not only desirable but also possible.
The wide range of examples shows that there are no 
ready-made solutions and that each country must find its 
own model that is most suited to its context. For example, 
both Thailand and Colombia have successfully expanded 
health coverage by heavily subsidizing the benefit 
packages of people engaged in the informal economy. 
However, this was achieved by very different methods: 
in Thailand, a social security agency was created from 
scratch to extend health coverage to those previously 
excluded; while Colombia put existing public and private 
agencies (insurance and mutual funds) into competition 
with each other, and facilitated the organization of the 
sector through progressively demanding regulations.
In addition, a number of emblematic examples have 
made a big impression: Argentina, South Africa and 
Mongolia have all established social protection systems 
for children; and Brazil, China and Cape Verde have 
accomplished the same for senior citizens. While India 
has implemented the most well known example of an 
unemployment protection programme: the New Rural 
Employment Guarantee Scheme, which provides rural 
households with an annual guarantee of one hundred 
work days per family. This is achieved through enrolment 
in public works such as road construction and mainte-
nance, or the establishment of health centres. 
Key factors for successful social protection 
schemes
Ensuring the sustainability of social protection schemes 
requires a legal framework, adequate funding and good 
governance, while it is also necessary that all stakeholders 
are convinced of the benefits of the system. In the case of 
contributory schemes that are financed through contribu-
tions of employees and companies, the stakeholders are 
the government and the representatives of workers and 
employers. Employees often need to be convinced of the 
benefits of the implementation of a new social protection 
system. For example, when the Malaysian government 
proposed the establishment of an unemployment insur-
ance scheme, employee representatives were resistant 
due to a strong attachment to the existing compensa-
tion arrangements of substantial redundancy payments. 
Even though in practice these sums are rarely paid, since 
employers that make redundancies often do so due 
to insolvency.
In developing countries, where about 80% of the 
working age population is employed in the informal 
economy, it is difficult for social insurance mecha-
nisms to identify, register and obtain contributions from 
self-employed workers or those employed by unregis-
tered companies. Moreover, in some of these countries 
taxation is in its infancy, which complicates the imple-
mentation and sustainability of tax-funded schemes. 
Fiscal space must therefore be increased through a 
reallocation of government spending in favour of social 
protection and by the introduction of new taxes. In a 
number of middle-income countries (for example, 
Uruguay, Argentina and Brazil), significant progress has 
been made to increase the coverage of social insurance 
schemes to include more workers from the informal 
economy. These successes, however, have only been 
possible due to large subsidies and the administrative 
simplification of registration procedures and payment 
contribution systems for these workers (such as the 
‘Monotax’ mechanism in Uruguay or the ‘SIMPLES’ 
taxation scheme in Brazil).
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Difficulties in the implementation of social 
protection
The main difficulties relating to the implementation of 
social protection schemes arise when low-capacity 
administrations are involved. Establishing a new universal 
system of protection in countries such as Thailand, where 
the entire population is recorded and identified, would 
only take two to three years. Whereas a country such as 
Cambodia, where several generations of national identity 
cards coexist, the introduction of social protection requires 
the initial identification and recording of the entire target 
population. In Cambodia, the establishment of a munici-
pality-managed ‘single-window system’ for social protec-
tion would enable population data to be recorded, people to 
be informed about their rights, the improvement of access 
to various schemes managed by different ministries, and 
would support appeal procedures. Similar single-window 
systems already exist in Mongolia, India and many Latin 
American countries.
In sub-Saharan Africa, private mutual health systems 
have developed to address the lack of social protection 
schemes for workers in the informal economy. These 
systems are the main insurance providers in this territory 
for this target population, and could become one of the 
entry points for a state-guaranteed social protection floor.
Identifying actors of change
Through discussions between tripartite constituents 
(employers, employees and governments), the social 
dimension of sustainable development has progressed 
over the last fifteen years in developing countries with 
the implementation of social protection systems. This 
process takes time: for example, in the Philippines the 
social dialogue around the introduction of an unemploy-
ment insurance scheme began ten years ago and has still 
not reached a conclusion. Sometimes it takes a crisis or a 
specific event to accelerate discussions.
When a state sets up a scheme for informal economy 
workers and their families, the workers organizations are 
often not directly representative of the scheme’s benefi-
ciaries, since these workers are mostly non-unionized. 
Civil society pressure groups can then play a decisive role, 
such as in HomeNet in Thailand, WIEGO in South Africa 
and the NGO Help Age International in different regions 
of the world.
Some multinationals already offer social protection 
coverage for their employees around the world. Their 
commitment to social protection ensures the continuity 
of the company’s business and is a vector of a positive 
brand image. Some multinationals extend this commit-
ment to the workers alongside the value creation chain by 
supporting the financial initial investments that are neces-
sary for the establishment of such floors.
Change at the country level comes thanks to politi-
cians, social partners (employers and workers representa-
tives) and civil society actors with a vision for the devel-
opment of their countries and of the world in which we 
live. UN agencies and development partners influence and 
support these changes at the global, regional and country 
levels through a variety of measures stemming from the 
set-up and promotion of development goals and relevant 
standards to achieve universal social protection, capacity 
building and technical support, south-south exchanges, 
as well as proper planning and coordination of interven-
tions. Creating and expanding social protection floors will 
enable us to achieve the future that we want by leaving 
no one behind. ❚ 
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FIGURE 1. Are we moving towards a universal social security?
Social protection has continued to grow globally since the Second World War both geographically and in the number of sectors covered.
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S
ince the late 1990s, island nations have been 
sounding the alarm bells regarding the envi-
ronmental changes associated with climate 
change, including the progressive degrada-
tion of vital resources like fresh water and the 
incidence of devastating extreme weather events such as 
cyclones. These environmental impacts have raised ques-
tions regarding their viability over a time horizon of a few 
decades (Nurse et al., 2014). At the United Nations (UN), 
Island nations are challenging the major countries on their 
historical responsibility for climate change, and some-
times actions are undertaken. However, an analysis of the 
actual amounts of international funding (Buchner et al., 
2013)1 directed towards SIDS and other developing coun-
tries shows that this challenge is being largely unheeded. 
In fact, many major countries promise to donate funds but 
then frequently fail to deliver on these promises, on top of 
which they are slow to take the necessary drastic action to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Faced with this situa-
tion, SIDS are resorting to other, increasingly subtle, ave-
nues of influence. One such example of this new approach 
was the organization of the UN’s Third International Con-
ference on SIDS (1-4 September 2014, Apia, Samoa).
Three decades of effort
As early as in 1989, the UN adopted a specific resolu-
tion on the potentially negative effects of rising sea levels 
1. In 2012, funding for the fight against climate change – mitigation 
+ adaptation – was valued globally between $356 and $363 billion, 
of which only 6% was allocated to adaptation in developing countries, 
including SIDS.
International forum and national 
projects: Island states, SDGs and climate  
Alexandre Magnan,  Research Fellow Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change, Institute of 
Sustainable Development and International Relations (IDDRI), Paris, France
on islands and coastal areas, thus officially recognizing 
that these territories had a high vulnerability to climate 
change. However, it was mainly the 1992 UN Conference 
on Environment and Development (Earth Summit), held 
in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, that brought the special case of 
small islands to international attention. For the first time, 
SIDS were recognized as a specific type of country, which 
called for a dedicated type of negotiation process.
Thus, the first UN Global Conference on the Sustain-
able Development of SIDS was held in Barbados in 1994. 
It adopted a specific action programme on different themes 
for SIDS (the Barbados Programme of Action). These 
themes included climate change and rising sea levels, 
natural and environmental disasters, waste management, 
coastal and marine resources, freshwater resources, land 
resources, energy resources and biodiversity. In 2005, the 
Second Global Conference (held in Mauritius) aimed to 
evaluate a decade of efforts and was concluded with the 
adoption of the Mauritius Strategy for the Further Imple-
mentation of the Barbados Programme of Action. In 2014, 
another decade later, it was the turn of the Pacific region 
to host the event.
While in 2012, the final document of the Rio+20 Confer-
ence, entitled ‘The Future We Want’, reaffirmed that SIDS 
are a special case in terms of sustainable development 
because of their vulnerability (small size, isolation, lack of 
resources, etc.).
The Samoa Conference
Unlike its predecessors, the aim of the Samoa Conference 
was not the negotiation of new sustainable development 
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climate change and disaster risk management; social 
development, health and non-communicable diseases; 
sustainable energy; oceans, seas and biodiversity; water 
and sanitation; food safety and waste management.
After the conference, Wu Hongbo, the UN’s Under-
Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs and 
the Secretary-General of the conference, noted that the 
call for concrete action had never before been so well 
integrated into a UN conference, saying that it was ‘the 
model of the future’. 
The way forward?
Some feared that the absence of high-stakes discussions 
in Samoa would harm the success of this meeting. Yet, 
it is precisely this ‘atypical’ characteristic compared to 
the traditional UN negotiation process which has helped 
create a peaceful and conducive atmosphere for a more 
positive and constructive vision of development, an atmos-
phere that was essential to encourage discussions on 
pragmatic partnerships.
The fact that SIDS have initiated this ‘atypical’ process 
is particularly interesting. First, because it demonstrates 
that they are neither insignificant nor passive in the face of 
exogenous threats. It shows that SIDS can have a definite 
impact on the mobilization of international public opinion, 
especially on the issue of climate change. By shifting the 
focus away from the general objectives of sustainable 
development negotiations and onto the practical aspects 
of achieving such goals, SIDS could play an integral role 
in the establishment of a pragmatic approach and a more 
constructive future, something that is sorely lacking today. 
Finally, the SIDS approach could be at the origin of an 
evolution in the model of international climate negotia-
tions. Indeed, what if annual Conferences of the Parties, 
by sidelining some of the negotiations to interim meetings, 
could leave more space for discussions on the modalities 
of action, on examples of success and failure, etc.?
Evidently, this is only a hypothesis because in the real 
world, things are not so simple, especially in international 
climate negotiations. Nevertheless, through innovation in 
goals, but rather their implementation via ‘genuine and 
durable partnerships’, to use the official terms. Action 
rather than negotiation was the intention, which we can 
at least say is an original objective for a UN conference.
The Island states therefore arrived at the Samoa 
Conference with a final declaration that had already been 
drafted and adopted. This text was written on the basis of 
regional preparatory meetings in 2013 (in Jamaica for the 
Caribbean; the Seychelles for the Atlantic, Indian Ocean 
and South China Sea; and in Fiji for the Pacific). In July 
2014 it was finalized and adopted by the Preparatory 
Committee of the Conference at the UN headquarters 
in New York. This final text, entitled ‘SIDS Accelerated 
Modalities of Action (SAMOA) Pathway’, placed particular 
emphasis on the importance of recognizing that the imple-
mentation of sustainable development requires Island 
states to have their own specific tools, and that differ-
entiated partnerships should be developed. An example 
of a partnership that was discussed at the conference 
is the International Renewable Energy Agency’s ‘SIDS 
Lighthouses Initiative’, which aims to increase the use 
of renewable energy in SIDS. Another initiative that was 
well received at Samoa included a proposal for public-
private partnerships on illegal, unreported and unregu-
lated fishing (IISD, 2014).
In this way, by focusing on the achievement of past 
commitments rather than on the negotiation of new polit-
ical agreements, which could have been time consuming, 
SIDS decided to focus the conference on the creation of 
new partnerships. Thus, the Heads of State and Govern-
ment of the 39 SIDS have called upon the international 
community to ‘speed up (...) the worldwide effort to 
ensure the sustainable development of SIDS through 
concrete programmes, that are targeted and geared 
towards the future and to action’. Somehow freed from 
traditional negotiation constraints, discussions success-
fully brought together various stakeholders (local authori-
ties, civil society and NGOs, foundations, private sector 
and international financial institutions) to focus on six 
areas critical to the sustainability of island development: 
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the way of conducting multilateral discussions (negoti-
ating before, then meeting to discuss practical imple-
mentation), SIDS have contributed to a change in their 
status from that of climate change victim (being both the 
least responsible and extremely vulnerable) to a force for 
proposing action. This development began in 2009, under 
the leadership of the Maldives, Bangladesh and Kiribati, 
with the creation of the Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF). 
The CVF is a small coalition of island and continental states 
that are recognized by the UN as ‘the most vulnerable to 
climate change’. By coming together, these countries are 
showing that, despite geographical and cultural differ-
ences, they face many similar issues, which strengthens 
their overall impact, including on the issue of adaptation 
financing. The CVF provides a way for SIDS to escape from 
their status as tiny and isolated territories and enables 
them to have a greater impact in negotiations. In addition, 
several countries within the CVF, led by the Maldives, have 
declared an intention to become the world’s first ‘carbon 
neutral’ country, particularly through the use of renewable 
energy and energy efficiency technologies. In so doing, 
SIDS are taking up a position on the mitigation aspect 
of the negotiations – normally dominated by the major 
emitters such as the United States and China – and are 
attempting a coup: the idea is to highlight the unsatisfac-
tory efforts of the major emitters in reducing their green-
house gas emissions, while subtly putting the emphasis 
onto the need to increase the financing for adaptation in 
lower emitting countries. It remains to be seen whether 
this attempt will pay off.
In any event, this posture change is very interesting, 
particularly since through the Samoa Conference it has 
reached a highly operational dimension. If other countries, 
or even the entire climate negotiations process, were to 
FIGURE 2 Climate risks for Small Islands
Small island states are very aware of climate negotiations because of the importance of the impact of climate change on their environ-
ments and economies.
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follow this movement then it could engender a construc-
tive vision of the future. It could provide a way out of the 
current overly constrained situation in which there is too 
little space for ‘political courage’, which leads to national 
commitments that are insufficient for the +2°C objective, 
let alone the scientific reality of climate change.
Pioneers of adaptation?
SIDS face a number of problems inherent to their small size 
and their geographical isolation (for example, they cannot 
take advantage of many economies of scale effects, which 
affects their competitiveness, education systems, etc.). 
These states are also highly vulnerable to climate change 
and natural disasters, primarily because their structural 
make-up and certain intrinsic characteristics (for example, 
a high dependence on environmental components like coral 
reefs) quickly lead to the generation of impact sequences 
that are not dissipated in space and time as they would be 
in a continental context (Duvat et al., 2012). SIDS are there-
fore highly reactive territorial systems, which paradoxically 
and under certain conditions can be a benefit: relatively 
little action and resources are needed for the rapid imple-
mentation of effective responses. They could therefore 
become pioneers of adaptation.
In Samoa, SIDS reaffirmed that they belong to a distinct 
category of developing countries that require special atten-
tion. Given the modalities of the negotiations, they could 
also assert a leadership role in the international commu-
nity, which will meet throughout 2015 at three major 
events: the Third UN Conference on Disaster Risk Reduc-
tion in Sendai (Japan); the Third International Conference 
on Financing for Development in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia); 
and the Conference of Parties to the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change in Paris (COP 21, France).
In this busy international agenda, the results and 
dynamics of the Samoa conference should be a source 
of inspiration, positioning SIDS as examples of a desir-
able future. ❚
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quarter century’s worth of attempts to ‘sell’ sustainable development 
offer a range of lessons which, if properly incorporated, can serve as 
a guide to better success in future. Four of these lessons – all closely 
related – are explored here. Following an analysis of these four 
issues, the next section of the article discusses a number of emerging 
approaches that will be crucial to humanity in making a shift towards 
more sustainable development modes.
Fundamental contradictions at the core of the 
sustainable development narrative
THE MYTH OF MAINSTREAMING 
One of the most pervasive verbs in the sustainable development vocabulary since 
the late 1980s has been ‘mainstreaming’. The word itself, born of the US custom of 
turning nouns into verbs, was popularized by the World Bank, and quickly perme-
ated the sustainable development narrative worldwide. The notion is both convincing 
and fundamentally flawed.
We all know and accept that when policies in different areas run on separate tracks, 
the opportunities for optimization tend to be lost. The core narrative of sustainable 
development during the first twenty-five years has been articulated around the 
notion of policy alignment and policy coherence. The imagery used to illustrate it 
has followed a similar route. The sustainable development platform is supported, 
like the legs of a stool, by the three pillars of economy, society and the environment. 
If one is broken or weakened, the stool becomes unstable. More recently, preference 
has gone to the helix image of the DNA molecule. The three strands weave together 
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to provide the genetic make-up of sustainable development and in the imagery the 
strands are always equal.
In reality, unfortunately, they are not. Whatever the standard used to measure 
them – budget allocation; time dedicated to them in parliamentary debate; prestige 
of the political posts associated with them, etc. – economic policy occupies one plane, 
social policy one well below, and environmental policy a distant last place. In any 
government, the finance or economic ministry is a place of high political importance, 
whereas ministers of environment – in the company of ministers of post, or youth 
and sports – occupy the lowest planes. 
The notion of mainstreaming emerged to address this. Economic policy, realisti-
cally, represented the stream. The task for social and environmental policy was to 
flow into and mix with the stream thus ensuring that they became fully integrated 
in a single, mighty river. No more milking stools; no more strands twisting off into 
infinity without ever coming into contact. The image is the Danube, the Mississippi; 
in looking at the river downstream from the confluence, it is impossible to say that 
this cubic metre came down the Inn or the Missouri. It has all become one.
However, even from an imagery point of view, there are two major problems. 
Observe a clear, blue mountain brook flowing into a muddy river. A few kilometres 
downstream and the blue water has disappeared, leaving nothing but the muddy 
river. By this token, environmental policy flows into economic policy and quickly 
loses its identity. It has in no fundamental way changed the character or composi-
tion of the river, and it has certainly not changed its flow direction.
This leads to the other awkward aspect of the image. The call to mainstream 
assumes that the stream is the right stream, and that it is fundamentally moving in 
the right direction. It also accepts – at least passively – that the direction, speed and 
destination of the flow are determined by economic policy. Indeed, it essentially 
means that economic policy is a given – or at least that its principal characteristics 
will be set well before any contribution from the tributaries of social or environ-
mental policy will be accepted.
What the economic crisis that began in 2008 demonstrates is that we cannot accept 
the basic shape and functioning of economic policy as a ‘given’. If, as it appears at 
least conceivable for the sake of argument, the fundamentals of economic organiza-
tion are flawed, then mainstreaming is a disastrous policy. In retrospect, the enthu-
siastic way that the term was bandied about by the World Bank and other temples 
of economic orthodoxy should have been a warning.
THE DIVORCE OF ECONOMIC POLICY 
Most proponents of sustainable development bet on a strategy of seducing economic 
policy and it lost. Once economic policy is defined and set, the range of options for 
social and economic policy in a mainstreaming scenario shrinks to encompass only 
those compatible with economic policy as defined. This sealed the failure of sustain-
able development in the first two decades; to the extent that it was mainstreamed, 
it disappeared into the muddy waters of an economic paradigm that values 
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FIGURE 1 Beyond the social foundation but above the environmental ceiling
The ‘doughnut’ representation of Kate Raworth illustrates the environmental and social issues to be addressed to achieve a balanced 
form of development.
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economic growth over all other considerations – the imperative of full employ-
ment, the progress of social justice, respect for planetary boundaries or the integ-
rity of ecosystems. Far from mainstreaming, the social and environmental streams 
of sustainable development found themselves swimming against the current. Or, 
in the words of David Orr, they found themselves ‘walking north on a southbound 
train’ (Orr, 2003).
If any good came out of the economic crisis that broke in 2008, it lay in the 
beginnings of a deep reassessment of the functioning and impact of our economic 
system. Indeed, the crisis appeared to confirm the growing doubts as to whether 
the neo-liberal economic model could genuinely deliver on broadly-supported goals 
relating to social justice and inclusiveness, and on environmental responsibility. 
The ensuing debate has set sustainable development off in an entirely new direc-
tion and allowed it to find new vigour and energy. It began with the search for the 
structure and organization of the green economy (which trades under a variety of 
names – green growth, a green and inclusive economy, eco-civilization, a safe and 
just operating space for humanity, etc.). What all – or at least most – of these have 
in common is the understanding that the economy is not by any means a ‘given’, a 
set structure that social and environment policy must seek to infiltrate and infect.
Instead, the insight of the green economy is to understand that it is the organiza-
tion and functioning of the economy itself that will deliver sustainable development. 
The aim must be to design economic policy and regulation so that the economy 
can, by its very functioning, deliver on the social and environmental objectives that 
we seek to secure. A green economy is one that creates jobs and safeguards liveli-
hoods. It is one that diminishes and finally eliminates social exclusion. It is one that 
returns development within the limits set by planetary and resource boundaries 
and maintains essential ecosystem services.
In 2001, Dani Rodrik of Harvard published a report for UNDP entitled ‘The govern-
ance of global trade as if development really mattered’ (Rodrik, 2001). It looked 
at the multilateral trading system and speculated how it would be organized and 
how it would function if the alleviation of poverty were its single goal and objec-
tive. The answer, of course, is that it would look and work very differently from a 
trading system in which development is a stated goal, but where the implications 
of taking that goal seriously are never placed front and centre.
In view of its past failures, there is an urgent need seriously to ask ourselves what 
our economy would need to look like if it were designed to deliver not only economic 
growth and wealth accumulation for some, but a balanced form of development 
that is situated in the ‘doughnut’ above the social floor but under the ceiling set by 
planetary boundaries.
THE EQUITY GAP 
There is no shortage of efforts to do just that. Rio+20 has updated the global 
agenda; Sustainable Development Goals are being crafted; a High-Level Political 
Forum has been created to steer and oversee the diligent implementation of both. 
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And, sectorally, the world is creaking under the weight of solemnly-adopted goals 
and targets, few of which lead to the sort of change that would bring develop-
ment onto a sustainable path.
There are, of course, many areas where we have advanced, and many problems of 
the past have been solved or are well along the way towards a solution. Where we 
have not advanced much, however, is in respect of issues that require addressing 
the equity gap, or a shift in the way in which the economy works. So we can adopt 
a mercury convention, or repair the ozone layer, or nudge the palm oil industry 
towards sustainability. But we find it almost impossible to advance on any issue 
that requires closing the gap between the privileged and less privileged, or that 
requires an amendment of the economic framework that sets the terms of compe-
tition among states.
We will not make the shift to a green economy, much less to sustainable devel-
opment, unless and until we can do both. The chances of doing that based on 
global intergovernmental consensus-building are almost non-existent. We have 
to find other approaches.
Despite the international conspiracy to see only the rosy side of the outcome, 
Rio+20 failed in almost every respect against the very standards of measurement 
set by the international community itself. The gap between the binding agree-
ments governing climate and the needs of a 2-degree world is enormous – and 
would be even if these agreements were fully implemented. The same gap exists 
in biodiversity conservation, or fisheries management, or human rights, and the 
list goes on. A vast proportion of the time, attention and funding of governments 
goes into the formal process, even when this process fails to advance at a pace 
that would allow it properly to address the problems.
The same is true in the world of economic policy. The World Trade Organiza-
tion secured a mandate to negotiate the Doha Round (2001) only by promising 
to address the development problems caused by the Uruguay Round (concluded 
in 1994). Contrary to the promise that the Uruguay Round would benefit all 
members of the multilateral trading system many developing countries found 
that, while these benefits were there in theory, to secure them in practice would 
require human and institutional capacity that they lacked, improved governance, 
and better access to investment capital.
The intention on the part of many of the stronger trading nations in making 
these promises was no doubt to pay lip service to development, and to argue that 
trade-led economic growth was tantamount to development. Only the world has 
changed and the developing countries are now looking for real development 
concessions – such as greater development policy space; they are looking for trade 
arrangements that actually narrow the gap between the stronger and weaker 
trading nations, and for trade rules to respect the development space the latter 
need to address issues such as food security.
The world has changed, and it is idle to continue pinning our hopes on the tired 
processes of another century.
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MIGRATION OF AUTHORITY
The intergovernmental system rests still on the myth that the truly important 
decisions in society – and most especially those with impacts beyond international 
borders – can only be taken by states, and in most cases by national governments. 
This is to ignore the significant three-way migration of power over the past few 
decades.
Authority has migrated upwards – to supra-national structures such as the 
European Commission or to international organizations like the International 
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, the Bank of Inter-
national Settlements, and many more. Mostly by conscious decision, but sometimes 
by the simple reality of power, authority that was once exercised in national capitals 
is now exercised at a level beyond the individual state.
Authority has also migrated downwards. In many if not most nations, authority 
that once rested with the national government, the army or the royal family is now 
distributed to sub-national jurisdictions. Many of the decisions affecting development 
are now taken by state or provincial governments, by municipalities or communes. 
The principle of subsidiarity – which states that authority should be exercised at the 
lowest level of governance compatible with efficiency – is increasingly accepted as 
the right governance template, even if it is hard to implement in practice.
Perhaps most important, however, authority has migrated outwards, beyond the 
confines of the public sector, whatever the level of geographical organization. It is 
no secret that the market plays a far greater role in development than it did in the 
past. Whether by influencing government rule-setting, or through playing a more 
active role in delivering development benefits on behalf of the government, the 
private sector is now a far greater development actor than ever in the past. 
What is true of the for-profit sector is as well for the non-profit sector – for civil 
society broadly considered. Non-governmental organizations have stepped forward 
to offer a range of social and environmental services, sometimes on behalf of govern-
ments, and more often to step into the breach as governments cut back on what 
they are able to offer. From small community or church groups acting at the local 
level to the giants like Oxfam, Action Aid and Care, civil society is a massive part 
of the development machinery nationally and internationally.
And yet our intergovernmental system continues to act as if we had just signed 
the Treaty of Westphalia. 
Seeking a new configurations of actors
It is interesting to pose the question of which pathways, and what configurations of 
actors, offer the best prospects for progress on particular issues. An honest answer 
would rarely insist that the official intergovernmental process lies at the top of the 
list. Instead, it would more likely spell out a series of configurations that recognize 
the three-way migration of authority described above.
If, for example, the single objective of humanity were to avoid carbon entering 
the atmosphere, and a contest were mounted to choose the three sets of actions 
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that would be most likely to succeed in achieving this objective, it is likely that the 
solutions would be very creative. They might include, for example:
 m The complete removal of subsidies to production and consumption of fossil fuels.
 m Action to oblige investors to factor in and accept the carbon risk attached to 
their investments.
 m Working with the insurance industry and the public sector to ‘de-risk’ invest-
ment in renewable energy.
 m Working with fiscal authorities to introduce differential taxation for ‘clean’ versus 
‘dirty’ development.
 m Supporting the C40 network of megacities to accelerate climate action where an 
increasing proportion of the world’s populations reside.
 m Launching a global Green Bonds market to fund green infrastructure and energy 
technology transformation.
 m A global campaign to ‘strand’ coal assets at the earliest possible date.
None of these ideas (and they are selected almost at random from among many 
possible contenders) require 193 governments sitting around the same table to 
FIGURE 2 Why oil subsidies should be removed
The persistence of fossil fuel subsidies is one of the failures of the political commitment to a more sustainable form of development 
and to mobilization against climate change.
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reach a consensus. While of course it would be preferable if they did, the point is 
that a great deal can be done to address the climate challenge provided that the 
exclusive priority is not given to the tired and disappointing UNFCCC process and it 
is accepted that action can and must take place on many different levels, involving 
many different actors or combinations of actors, working in a wide spectrum of 
modes from academic research, through local action to aggressive campaigning or 
deliberately disruptive action.
Taking the first of the examples suggested above, what prospects are there for 
fossil fuel subsidies to be eliminated, and what impact would it have? First, a 
massive amount of public money is devoted to lowering the price of carbon-based 
fuels. Taking subsidies to exploration and production in combination with those 
to consumption of these fuels, estimates of public subsidy range from $550 billion 
to over $1.5 trillion per year (Clements B. et al., 2013; Arze del Granado et al., 
2010). Adopting the more conservative figures (and the difference lies largely in 
how subsidies are defined), this compares to over five times the amount targeted by 
the Green Climate Fund. Worse, it serves effectively as a massive incentive to give 
preference to carbon-based fuels over the alternatives. Through subsidizing fossil 
fuels, the same governments that have pledged to act urgently to address climate 
change are paying us royally to behave in a way that undermines the very goals they 
have set, that pushes their realization back by years if not decades, and that makes 
stabilization of global warming at 2 degrees well-nigh impossible.
We are not talking about theoretical figures. The money spent on subsidies could, 
absolutely, be placed in the Green Climate Fund. It could be invested to end the 
energy poverty of the rural poor across the developing world. It could be placed in 
a fund that serves to de-risk the clean energy transition. It could be used to repay 
some of the national debt and lower the cost of borrowing new capital. It could be 
used to retrain coal miners, or to start up small businesses in areas that will suffer 
from the death of the carbon industry. And, of course, it could be invested in health 
and education. So not only are subsidies to fossil fuels an unfortunate use of taxpayer 
money, they have an actively negative impact and represent a massive opportunity 
cost. Finally, to those who argue that they may be expensive but that they are an 
important source of support for the poor, it is important to understand that even the 
International Monetary Fund finds that some 43% of all fossil fuels subsidies benefit 
the top fifth of income earners, and only 7% the bottom fifth (Arze del Granado 
et al., 2010, p.2247, Table 12).
If there is a compelling case for phasing out subsidies to fossil fuels, nobody thinks 
it is easy. There are several reasons why it is so difficult to remove subsidies once they 
are in place. First and foremost, it is not for nothing that subsidies are sometimes 
called ‘the currency of politics’. Politicians with access to the budget allocation 
process use subsidies to reward interest groups in their constituencies on the under-
standing that this will secure their vote in the next election. Subsidies to US corn 
ethanol have little to do with climate action or lowering dependence on oil from 
the Middle East, and a great deal to do with electoral arithmetic in states like Iowa.
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Second, the political economy of subsidy reform is complex.1 Those who suffer 
from the subsidy are widespread and diverse; those who benefit are concentrated 
and organized. Interest groups will lobby fiercely to defend their subsidies while 
those for whom it is just a questionable allocation of tax money lack the motiva-
tion to go to the barricades.
Finally, it is difficult to mobilize international action on subsidy reform since 
subsidy policy is – with the exception of occasional trade impacts – domestic 
policy par excellence. The way that the French parliament allocates tax revenue 
is, with exceptions, not the business of other countries. Indeed, given the sensi-
tive and highly political nature of subsidy allocation, a great effort is made to 
ensure that subsidy allocation is poorly reported, poorly understood and, to the 
extent possible, ignored. Foreigners poking around in this dirty linen are particu-
larly unwelcome.
And yet, the question about fossil fuel subsidies – all $500 billion annually – is 
not whether we can afford to confront them given the complexities, but whether we 
can afford not to if we genuinely believe in sustainable development. But when it 
comes to deciding how they might best be confronted, it is clear that new approaches 
are needed.
NON-TRADITIONAL ALLIANCES 
The late International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) researcher 
Konrad von Moltke used to point out that many of the successes at addressing 
complex international problems could be traced back to what he called ‘non-tradi-
tional alliances’. By that he meant not just alliances involving a diversity of stake-
holder groups – government, intergovernmental organizations, local authorities, 
business, academia, civil society, the media… – but more especially alliances that 
would not otherwise get together around any other issues. Wolfgang Reinicke studied 
a range of these in his 1998 book Global Public Policy: governing without government?2 
and drew out some of the reasons for their success.
The alliance around negotiations on fish subsidies at the World Trade Organiza-
tion is an example. There are few issues that would gather as disparate a group of 
countries as the ‘Friends of Fish’, because it is difficult to imagine on what other issues 
they might find common ground. But the preparation of the negotiations required 
years of research and data gathering by FAO, OECD, UNEP, WWF and others, and 
more especially the advocacy and mobilizations skills of WWF and its network. 
Three essential elements need to come together to ensure success: a solid founda-
tion of research and data so that the facts of the case are not seriously in dispute; 
the authority of ‘officialdom’ that is vested in governments and intergovernmental 
structures; and the freedom, communications skills and mobilizing power of the 
better members of civil society.
1.  http://www.iisd.org/gsi/sites/default/files/politics_ffs.pdf
2.  http://www.brookings.edu/research/books/1998/globalpp
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Reinicke chronicles several examples – e.g. the setting of a globally-accepted 
standard for large dams, undertaken by the World Commission on Dams; or the 
successful negotiation of a treaty banning anti-personnel mines, which won the 
campaign the Nobel Peace Prize.
The world still relies far too much on formal negotiations among governments at 
a time when governments hold only some of the cards that make up a full deck. We 
need now to show a great deal more imagination in how we approach problems and 
their solution at the international level.
ACTION COALITIONS 
Returning to the reform of fossil fuel subsidies it has been established that, as 
a challenge, it is formidable. As with the examples above, success depends on a 
solid base of research and data and strong communications skills, but also on the 
mobilization of political courage among governments. In the end, only they can 
actually eliminate or restructure the subsidies. The challenge then, is to create an 
environment that lowers the political risk of subsidy reform to the government 
in question.
In some cases, what is needed is transparency – a job for civil society and the 
media. Once the public knows that the subsidies intended for the poor are going 
to the middle class and that alternatives exist, their attachment to the existing 
subsidies is loosened. Successful campaigning can change the political risk profile, 
introducing the perception that maintaining the subsidy can be more dangerous 
politically than moving towards reform.
Few organizations, however, possess the range of skills needed to undertake 
all of what is necessary – the research, the communications, the mobilization – 
successfully. Most specialize at least to some extent – they focus on research or 
analysis, or they mount public campaigns, or they lobby politically at a high level. 
The culture to do each successfully is different from that required to do the others 
and it is difficult, if not impossible, to pull all the pieces together in one organiza-
tion. It is probably not even desirable.
A new trend, therefore, is the development of purpose-built coalitions around 
specific policy targets, with all coalition members agreeing on a common agenda. 
While this is not new – note the examples above relating to fish subsidies or land 
mines – two aspects have risen to the surface in the past years. First, the nature of 
the challenges – addressing atmospheric carbon, or mismanagement of fisheries, or 
abuse of land rights, or female genital mutilation – are such that no single organi-
zation can address all the facets. Second, the risk of failure for any organization is 
so great that it would be unwise for it to venture into the dragon’s lair on its own.
Addressing fossil fuel subsidy reform in Egypt, or India, or Mexico requires the 
data available from the International Energy Agency or the World Bank and their 
official contacts at the national level. It requires the skill and experience of organi-
zations like IISD’s Global Subsidies Initiative to understand the political economy 
of reform and to draw the partners together into an action coalition; but it also 
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needs skilled players in-country, in civil society, in academia, and in the media; 
and it requires trusted spokespersons prepared to stand up and express the incon-
venient truth and offer alternatives.
Increasingly, such action coalitions are coming together around specific interna-
tional challenges, or challenges too thorny to address only at the domestic level. 
That trend can only become reinforced over the coming years. 
FURTHER AGGREGATION
For the same risk-related reasons, funders are beginning to respond in the same way 
that campaigning members of civil society have learned to do. They understand that 
the complexity and intractable nature of many of the most important issues present 
them with a risk that few would be prepared to accept on their own. So they are 
coming together in funder aggregates to take on some of the more difficult challenges. 
For example, the European Climate Foundation (ECF), along with many others, is 
increasingly convinced that none of the scenarios for stabilizing climate change within 
acceptable limits involves more than the marginal use of coal. Indeed, the Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has recently declared that all fossil fuel 
use must be phased out before the end of the century if we are to avoid catastrophic 
climate change. Clearly, even eliminating coal is a formidable challenge, especially 
since it will involve taking on powerful and well-organized lobbies, stranding inves-
tors’ assets, restructuring whole sectors of industry and the economy, and causing 
loss of employment at the local level in coal-producing areas and within derivative 
industries. At the same time, players like ECF know that this is a necessary transition 
and that, the sooner it is undertaken, the better-off society will be.
Their response and that of an increasing number of funders and foundations has 
been similar to that of civil society: band together in purpose-built coalitions. ECF 
and others are looking both for a coalition of funders able to put the necessary 
resources behind what will clearly be a Herculean effort. But they are also trying to 
identify the players they need on the field, the mix of skills, experience and reach that 
will allow them to deploy a complex and ambitious strategy with a chance of success.
In the end, most of the key issues around sustainable development share a common 
thread – they require a change in the pattern of incentives and disincentives that 
govern the consumption and lifestyle behaviour of citizens. Since most of these 
incentives are in place because they respond to the interests of individual groups 
with access to power, they are entrenched and difficult to budge. Nevertheless, 
budge they must, and one can take comfort at the long history of ‘impossible’ issues 
that have in the end been solved or are on the way to solution. Ending smoking in 
public places is a telling example. When efforts began, the first reaction was that the 
tobacco lobbies have full control over members of parliaments or national assem-
blies and are prepared to spend billions to defend their access to innocent lungs; 
and, sure enough, for years this seemed to reflect the truth. Then, in one country 
after another, public smoking was kerbed and a smoke-free environment became 
the norm rather than the exception.
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The trouble is, we no longer have the time to pick off issue after issue. Some issues, 
such as climate change and biodiversity loss, need to be addressed now.
REGULATION AND NEW INDUSTRIAL POLICY
It is striking in the above examples that the role of government – once central to 
debates on public policy – now seems secondary. Or worse, the inability of govern-
ments to act genuinely in the long-term public interest is seen to be a large part of 
the problem. Is the choice, then, between bypassing governments and forcing them 
to act through public pressure?
This would be too pessimistic a reading of present potential. However, it will be 
necessary to move past the assumptions of neo-liberal economics that government 
is necessarily a cumbersome and inefficient alternative to the market and should be 
reserved for a limited set of actions – such as ensuring national defense or conducting 
foreign policy – for which the market is ill-suited.
Together with the rethinking of sustainable development action, there is in parallel 
a deep rethinking of the role of the public sector and increasing calls for govern-
ment to regulate in the public good. This is at least in part because the market has 
proved to be such a poor mechanism to defend the public interest in a wide range of 
areas. A movement is underway not only to debate how best government might put 
in place a framework of policies and regulations that are favourable to the sustain-
ability transition; there is also the beginning of a debate on how government can go 
further, and set in place a framework that deliberately steers the economy in a desir-
able direction. This debate on a ‘Green Industrial Policy’ represents a fundamental 
shift away from thirty years of economic orthodoxy, and one that could play a major 
role in accelerating the green transition.3 Just as neo-liberal economic thinking led 
to the dismantlement of government structures and services around the world, it 
is now increasingly accepted that only government can set in place and defend the 
enabling policy and regulatory framework that will ensure that the public good is 
genuinely defended.
Just as Dani Rodrik imagined an overriding goal for the trading system and 
examined what design would be needed to reach that goal, Green Industrial Policy 
suggests that there are public goods in the form of social and natural capital every 
bit as important as economic capital and asks what actions governments should take 
to ensure that these forms of capital are generated, even if it means new restrictions 
on the search for immediate gain on the part of a few.
ADDRESSING THE EQUITY AGENDA
It has been clear for some time that we are stuck when it comes to making progress on 
issues that depend on addressing the equity gap, whether it is between rich and poor 
countries or the rich and poor within countries. Delivering a global trade deal that 
allows smaller traders to take some of the market share heretofore reserved for the 
3. See, for example: http://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2013/industrial_policy_green_economy.pdf 
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larger traders is beyond the abilities of the trading system today. Similarly, adopting 
a binding climate deal appears impossible because of fears that the action required 
would fundamentally challenge the foundation on which today’s economy is based.
And yet we will not reach sustainable development unless and until we can take on 
equity as the fundamental core of the challenge. This means conceiving of a form of 
economic organization that respects both the social floor and the planetary bounda-
ries, that situates itself in the space in between, in what Kate Raworth refers to as the 
‘safe and just operating space for humanity’4. This will not happen by citizen action 
alone (or at least not until it can change the policy and regulatory framework) and 
the last three decades have demonstrated that the market, left to its own devices, 
will not do it either. Deliberate action in the public sector, encouraged if not forced 
by citizen action and where possible recruiting the positive segments of the market 
is the only way to succeed in time.
Conclusion
We are on the cusp of a major change, and if we are able to configure the change 
elements positively, the shift to sustainable forms of development could happen 
fast. It is not inconceivable that renewable energy could become the norm in a short 
period of time, leading to a rapid end of the dominance of the fossil fuel interests. 
We have, in the past, seen many seemingly intractable issues brought to a tipping 
point and then transform fundamentally in a short period of time. We have seen 
plenty of evidence that humanity retains a strong survival instinct and that it will 
eventually choose the right course – though probably, as Winston Churchill said of 
the Americans, only after exhausting all of the alternatives! We have learned a great 
deal about how change occurs and are becoming better at replicating it.
What is needed now is a sharp acceleration of the shift to new forms of action, 
involving alliances of players from across the spectrum, coalitions of donors, and 
positive action at the public policy level. It is no longer only about what you do, but 
how and with whom you do it. Examples abound (Lovins Hunter L., Cohen B., 2011; 
Hawken P., 2008), from those supporting the proper use of free markets to those 
who believe in reversing globalization; from those who support divestment of dirty 
investments to those seeking to create new green investment vehicles; from those 
who believe in moulding personal behaviour to those who believe in changing the 
rules that govern global trade and investment. There is room for all these approaches. 
Indeed, diversity and experimentation are the most likely routes to success. 
Sufficient examples exist to suggest that this is the wave of the future, not the 
repeated and disappointing mega-summits, the pious reports of independent 
commissions, or the monotonous series of failed intergovernmental negotiations. 
In keeping with the words of American inventor Thomas Edison: ‘There is a way to 
do it better – find it!’. ❚
4. http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/dp-a-safe-and-just-space-for-humanity-130212-en.pdf
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CHAPTER 2
O
xfam is a non-governmental organization 
(NGO) that was founded in Britain in 1942. It 
began as purely an emergency relief agency 
but soon added the implementation of long-
term development programmes in vulnerable 
communities to its range of activities. As part of a global 
civil society movement, Oxfam today also campaigns 
against the causes of poverty, demanding economic 
equality and better health and education services for all. It 
strives for a fairer and more sustainable global food sys-
tem, for the rights of people living in conflicts and disas-
ters, and fights against climate change. 
By 1995, the NGO had grown into a confederation of 
eleven members – Oxfam UK and Ireland were joined by 
eight other relief and development agencies based in 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Hong Kong, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Quebec, and the United States – to form 
Oxfam International. Since then, Oxfam has welcomed 
seven new affiliates: France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, 
Mexico and Spain, further adapting to a changing interna-
tional environment and enhancing the effectiveness and 
representativeness of its action and influence. 
In 2012, Oxfam adopted its 2020 agenda, a plan that 
took into account the major ongoing changes in global 
dynamics. Oxfam set out its intention to strengthen its 
efforts to give a voice to the poorest and weakest people, 
and to lobby and educate leaders and influence policies. 
This article examines the major reforms in the 2020 
agenda and discusses how it will impact on Oxfam’s 
campaigning work and service delivery.
A need to become a truly global network
Oxfam has always taken pride in being globally oriented, 
with affiliate members and advocacy offices across the 
Redefining global solidarity
Theo Bouma, Director Confederation Development, Oxfam International, The Hague, Netherlands
world. However, until recently Oxfam had remained a 
predominantly Northern organization with a composition 
that did not reflect its global objectives. The Oxfam Inter-
national Secretariat was established in Oxford, UK, which 
has remained its base since its creation, while only three 
of its seventeen affiliates are from the South (Hong Kong, 
Mexico and India).
Global civil society and its relationships with the 
public and policymakers have now changed. There is 
an increasing level of self-awareness and profession-
alism among Southern NGOs and their networks. While 
there are substantial differences in the strength of civil 
society organizations, there are now many countries where 
national NGOs are recognized by policymakers and are 
truly part of the public debate. This is also true in interna-
tional fora. Oxfam’s 2020 agenda took this evolution into 
account and the changes will ensure that the organization 
maximizes its influence on the national, regional and inter-
national stages and that its work remains highly visible. 
It will become a truly global network that equally repre-
sents Northern and Southern concerns and strengthens 
Southern voices, enabling it to have a genuinely ‘home-
grown’ influence in all regions and places.  
Increasing the number of Southern affiliates
One of Oxfam’s major reforms is to increase its number 
of Southern affiliates to at least ten, by 2020. Oxfam has 
already started inviting organizations to become affiliates: 
Oxfam South Africa has recently joined as an observer, 
and Oxfam Brazil plans to do likewise in the near future. 
Oxfam is increasing its Southern membership to remain 
credible, legitimate and influential, not only globally but 
also regionally. Operating through local affiliates is a more 
effective way to influence local governments. In many 
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FIGURE Oxfam, a network in continual adaptation
Established in 1942 in the UK, Oxfam has become a global network that aims to expand its presence in national, regional and inter-
national decision-making spheres to carry out its lobbying action.
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countries international NGOs are seen as foreign actors, 
and this can generate resistance to their activities. By 
having more genuinely ‘home-grown’ affiliates, Oxfam will 
be able to more effectively negotiate with and influence 
national governments on a variety of issues in line with 
Oxfam’s objectives. 
Oxfam also wants to correct the bias – which many 
international NGOs suffer from – of powerful Northern 
affiliates having a bigger say in the organization’s strategic 
plans, with often only informal engagement with Southern 
actors. As Oxfam’s proposals start to take effect, the 
representation of Southern affiliates will greatly increase 
in its own decision-making processes. They will bring 
new perspectives and ideas to the table. For example, 
independent affiliates from countries such as Indonesia, 
Turkey or Columbia (countries where Oxfam is currently 
looking for new members) will be able to provide their 
own analyses about their distinct problems and the best 
ways of tackling them. They will often be in a much better 
position to engage in a more permanent manner with local 
decision-makers and opinion-leaders. 
A credible network with an influence at all levels
By 2020, Oxfam will be a different organization. It will 
have a new power balance between representatives from 
the North and South, with Southern affiliates having equal 
weight at the decision-making table. Consequently, Oxfam 
will be able to forge stronger links between its national 
and global campaigning activities. 
The interaction between international and local 
campaigning is vital. For instance, Oxfam’s advocacy for 
free access for people in poor countries to good quality 
essential services, such as education and health, is a global 
campaign. However, some affiliates, including Oxfam India, 
have developed their own agenda inside this global call. 
Oxfam India, together with local partner organizations, has 
held conversations with the Indian government, supported 
by data obtained from Oxfam’s policy research unit. It has 
had much success in pursuing Oxfam’s objectives in that 
country as a result. India’s politicians and public have 
accepted the legitimacy of Oxfam India in a way that would 
have been impossible for an organization from the UK, the 
Netherlands or elsewhere.
Another example is Oxfam’s recent inequality campaign. 
It too is a global campaign to which all Oxfam affiliates are 
committed. However, affiliates can make adjustments to 
suit their particular national circumstances. Different affili-
ates have developed national campaigns based on Oxfam’s 
globally available inequality research. For the first time 
perhaps, some Northern affiliates have used the campaign 
to discuss the impact of inequality on their own national 
populations, in the same way that Mexican and Indian 
affiliates have done. Each country has been able to frame 
its work to suit its national situation. For example, taking 
two of the Northern affiliates that have engaged in national 
campaigns, the financial crisis has had a very different 
impact on Spain than it has in the Netherlands.
In short, it is important to increase impact, to be effec-
tive, and to be a credible actor, in any particular context. As 
long as the central message is maintained – in this case 
that inequality should end and that national governments 
have a key role to play – there should be openness for 
members to adapt the campaign to local circumstances. 
More than programme delivery
Oxfam has made a conscious decision to combine 
advocacy and campaigning work with its programme 
delivery, making campaigning an essential component of 
all of its programmes. For example, in a project to estab-
lish a new school, Oxfam would not only concern itself 
with getting the school built, it would also engage with 
authorities to prioritize education in their budgets and 
development policies, and with communities to encourage 
an understanding of the importance of educating their 
children. This is a holistic approach, combining action 
against both the causes and effects of poverty.
Oxfam is acutely aware of what can be achieved by 
exerting its influence on national governments and it aims 
to increase this aspect in all of its programmes. However, 
a ‘one size fits all’ approach does not suit all countries. 
The programme delivery and campaigning components 
of each project will vary from one country to another. For 
example, in Brazil it is entirely possible to engage with 
national and state governments. The country has a fully 
functioning media, radio, TV, Internet, etc., all of which 
facilitate public advocacy, campaigning and accountability. 
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A country like Somalia on the other hand lacks a legitimate 
central government, so advocacy work here is an entirely 
different matter. In these cases Oxfam’s influencing work 
needs to be shaped differently.
The value of symbolic change
Oxfam 2020 will change the headquarters of the confed-
eration’s secretariat from its historical location in Oxford to 
Nairobi by 2017. This was a careful and strategic choice. 
By moving to Nairobi, Oxfam is not only relocating to the 
heart of Africa, it is also sending out a strong message to 
the world that it is serious about the need to give more 
voice to people in the South. The value of this symbolism 
should not be underestimated. 
There is also a cultural dimension to these reforms: by 
enlarging its Southern network of affiliates and relocating 
its headquarters, more African, Asian and Latin American 
people and organizations will join the ranks of the 
Oxfam confederation and its secretariat, strengthening 
the Southern perspectives on national, regional and 
global issues. 
Oxfam 2020 is aiming to adapt to the shifting global 
dynamics. It seeks to transform itself into a genuinely 
global organization, which shares its power more 
democratically and is more accountable to, and more in 
touch with, the people it represents. In taking these steps, 
Oxfam stands the best possible chance of remaining a 
relevant and influential organization for the future, and 
therefore of continuing its vital work in fighting poverty 
and injustice. ❚
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Reinventing modes 
of participation in UN 
negotiations
S
ince Rio+20, new direct forms of civil society participation have 
emerged in UN negotiation processes. Often internet-based, 
they aim to enhance the ability of civil society actors around the 
world, organized or not, to express their perspectives, organize 
deliberations, take action and increase their participation and 
engagement in the creation and implementation of sustainable 
development norms and agreements. The proliferation of these 
new formal participatory mechanisms, which are coordinated 
by international organizations and governments, suggests that 
sustainable development norms and agreements are likely to 
have the best results if they stem from an open, inclusive and transparent process 
with broad multi-stakeholder participation. 
While there are many channels for civil society participation in and influence on 
global policymaking structures, both official and unofficial, at international and 
national levels, this paper focuses on civil society participation during the 2012 
Rio+20 Sustainable Development Dialogues (SDD), held within the framework of 
the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD), and addresses 
three main questions: 
First, why have formal participatory processes changed over time from a 
representative form based on the ‘Major Groups model’ to a mix of a representative 
system and a new direct form of participation that includes the use of virtual 
platforms and Internet-based surveys?
Second, are the innovative forms of civil society engagement (based on direct 
Internet participation) truly open and inclusive? This article assesses one of the 
The development of information and communication technology makes 
possible a new participation of civil society in the development process 
of intergovernmental policies. What is the impact of these mechanisms 
developed in the Rio+20 framework? Do they influence the policies 
developed? Do they make them more legitimate?
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variables of legitimacy – inclusiveness – in the case of the direct formal mechanisms 
for civil society participation in the Rio+20 SDD. This evaluation is based on the 
analysis of data that reveals the levels of participation of different civil society actors 
and different countries.
Third, does the broader access of civil society to intergovernmental policymaking 
necessarily influence negotiations? The last section of this paper evaluates the effects 
of the Rio+20 Dialogues on the official part of the conference (using the indicators of 
agenda setting and position shifting), and addresses the critical issue of determining 
whether there is correlation and causality between the inclusiveness and influence 
of civil society on intergovernmental negotiation processes and outcomes.
The shortcomings of the Major Groups model 
Although the Major Groups model has been innovative in integrating civil society 
into intergovernmental processes at the UN, particularly with the Commission for 
Sustainable Development (CSD) which generated a number of good practices that 
have been tested in real life situations and have proven their value1, it also raises 
serious issues about their ability to include all stakeholders and their impact on 
policymaking. 
DYNAMICS OF EXCLUSION
As early as 2001 a UN Secretary General’s report2 on the Major Groups highlighted 
geographical imbalances in participation, stressing that the majority of stake-
holder participants in intergovernmental processes continued to be from developed 
countries, with an under-representation of participants from developing countries (E/
CN.17/2001/PC/4). In 2013, a report3 commissioned by the Division for Sustainable 
Development of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), which is 
in charge of coordinating the Major Groups, reasserted this observation. The authors 
found that the Major Groups system was often perceived as North and New York-
centric, and did not allow for a broad participation of social and people’s movements. 
These dynamics of exclusion are fuelled by various factors. First, exclusion is 
inherent to the Major Groups concept. By predefining nine categories of civil society, 
the Major Groups model has been seen by some as reductionist and exclusive: for 
instance, Foster and Anand (1999) argue that ‘the list of Major Groups is arbitrary. 
It includes women but not men, the young but not the elderly, farmers but not 
fishing communities, trade unions but not professional associations… It is repugnant 
to allocate people to pre-specified groups rather than accepting whatever manner 
people choose to organize on a voluntary basis.’ Indeed, the rigidity of the categories 
forces groups to adhere to definitions that do not correctly reflect their identity. 
1. For an assessment of the experience of Major Groups at the CSD, see Adams Barbara and Pingeot Lou. Strengthening 
public participation at the United Nations for Sustainable Development: Dialogue, Debate, Deliberation, Dissent. UNDESA/
DSD, June 2013. 
2. Report of the Secretary-General on the Major Groups, United Nations, 2001. 
3. Ibid. 1 
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Besides, the NGO Major Group is a residual category that allows for the inclusion 
of any civil society organization that could not identify with one of the eight other 
groups (Willetts, 2011). In light of its size and diversity, any consensus that stems 
from the NGO Major Group is more likely to reflect the interests of the most organized 
and powerful organizations rather than those of the most affected communities. 
Second, relying on representatives may fuel exclusion. The Major Groups system is 
based on Organizing Partners (OPs) that act as focal points for their constituencies. 
OPs are well acquainted with year-round intergovernmental policy processes and can 
help their constituencies navigate the often complicated, opaque and unwritten rules 
of the intergovernmental negotiations (Adams and Pingeot, 2013:14). However, 
such professionalization of representation can foster exclusion if a Major Group lacks 
appropriate mechanisms to promote internal transparency and accountability. As 
a result, Adams and Pingeot further argue, professionalization may lead to power 
imbalances between the insiders (OPs and civil society representatives based within 
easy range of UN Headquarters) who possess the information and can exploit it to 
their advantage, and the outsiders (grassroots organizations).   
Third, a lack of reliable funding for Major Groups is a substantial obstacle to the 
inclusiveness and participation of broad constituencies (Ibid.: 20-21). Most Major 
Groups depend on bilateral and multilateral institutions to fund their work. Yet, 
they can rarely rely on the funding granted through these institutions for their 
participation. For example, the UN services in charge of civil society, such as the 
BOX 1 THE RISE OF THE PARTICIPATORY PRINCIPLE IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
The United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Develop-
ment (UNCED) held in Rio de 
Janeiro in 1992 is often associated 
with the beginning of the partic-
ipatory turn of global sustain-
able development governance. 
It enshrines in its outcome docu-
ment, the Rio Declaration, the 
principle according to which 
‘environmental issues are best 
handled with the participation of 
all concerned citizens, at the rele-
vant level. […] States shall facili-
tate and encourage public aware-
ness and participation by making 
information widely available.’ 
The plan of action of the United 
Nations for sustainable develop-
ment, Agenda 21, underscored the 
need to gather expertise and build 
on the capacity from all group-
ings of society and institutional-
ized participation of civil society 
in intergovernmental decision-
making with the creation of nine 
Major Groups1, which comple-
mented informal (advocacy) and 
external (Peoples’ Summit and 
World Social Forum) channels for 
civil society engagement.  
While other United Nations 
processes, such as the Inter-
national Labour Organization 
(ILO), the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) and the 
Committee on World Food Secu-
rity (CFS) of the Food and Agri-
culture Organization (FAO), 
have used different frameworks 
for civil society participation, 
the Commission on Sustainable 
Development (CSD) and the 
United Nations Environmental 
Programme (UNEP) have relied 
on the Major Groups system of 
representative participation to 
engage civil society in intergov-
ernmental decision-making from 
1992 onwards. In particular, the 
CSD, which was mandated to 
implement the sustainable devel-
opment principles outlined in 
Agenda 21 through an inclusive 
process of deliberation and deci-
sion-making, integrated two-day 
multi-stakeholder dialogue 
segments into its annual sessions 
between Rio+5 and Rio+20. 
1. The Groups include Business and 
Industry, Children and Youth, Farmers, 
Indigenous Peoples, Local Authorities, 
NGOs, Scientific and Technological 
Community, Women, Workers and Trade 
Unions.
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Major Groups programme of the Division for Sustainable Development and the 
Non-Governmental Liaison Service (NGLS), are under-resourced, both financially 
and in terms of staff. 
Fourth, inclusion is also hampered by the prevalence of English as a working 
language. Documents regarding intergovernmental processes are mainly issued 
in English and not often translated into other UN languages. This makes it more 
difficult for OPs to communicate with their non-English speaking constituencies 
and disadvantages those organizations and communities for which English is not a 
working language or not used at all (Ibid.: 19). 
LIMITED IMPACT ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL PROCESSES
While Major Groups may be given the opportunity to provide input into the inter-
governmental process, they can rarely assess whether their preferences have been 
taken into consideration or have influenced the negotiations. Although the 2001 
UNSG report on Major Groups acknowledges that participation in decision-making 
goes beyond the passive exchange of information and refers to the active presence of 
Major Groups in the design, execution and monitoring of sustainable development 
activities at all levels, the authors of the 2013 report commissioned by the United 
FIGURE 1 Sustainable Development Dialogues: a timeline
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Nations Division for Sustainable Development (DSD) of the United Nations found 
that Major Groups members raised concerns about international organizations and 
member states providing many spaces for civil society participation without really 
ensuring meaningful engagement. This latest report further stressed that ‘Major 
Groups pointed out that having access to a process could not be equated with influ-
encing the process and warned against the risk of tokenism and civil society engage-
ment becoming a box-ticking exercise.’ (Adams and Pingeot, 2013:16). 
Facilitated by the development of information and communications technology 
(ICT), other practices for civil society engagement in intergovernmental policymaking 
processes have emerged and are promoting the direct participation of civil society 
actors. However, it is open to debate whether the shift to the new practices for 
civil society engagement used in the Rio+20 dialogues adequately respond to the 
pitfalls of the Major Groups model. However, it is open to debate whether these new 
practices for civil society engagement, such as those used in the Rio+20 dialogues, 
adequately respond to the pitfalls of the Major Groups model. 
The emergence of a new participatory process at Rio+20
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE RIO+20 DIALOGUES
Organized by the Government of Brazil with the support of the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and the Offices of the Executive Coordinators for 
Rio+20, the dialogues aimed at fostering discussion on ten topics related to sustain-
able development and at engaging civil society in the decision-making process of 
the Rio+20 Conference. The dialogues consisted of two phases (Figure 1). From 
16 April to the end of May 2012, they were launched through a digital platform4 
to provide individuals with a space for discussion. After filling a form, participants 
were able to enter this digital space and share experiences, express opinions, and 
contribute fresh ideas to the forum. The academic experts, in charge of facilitating 
the online discussions, and the participants then had the opportunity to present 
their own recommendations for the future they wanted. Once the recommenda-
tions were posted on the platform, members could express their support for their 
preferred recommendation(s) through the use of a ‘like’ feature similar to those avail-
able on social media. The academic experts then identified the ten most supported 
recommendations in each theme. The online discussions thus resulted in a set of 
one hundred recommendations which was submitted to the vote of a broader public 
through an open website.5 The final top ten recommendations (Figure 2) were then 
transmitted to the participants present at the conference site. 
During the second phase, between 16 and 19 June 2012, top representatives from 
civil society engaged in ‘open and action-oriented debates’ at the conference site in 
Rio de Janeiro. Facilitated by a journalist, each dialogue gathered ten panellists and a 
4. http://www.riodialogues.org 
5. The results of the final vote, including disaggregated data by continent, by human development index (HDI), by age 
and by gender, are available at http://vote.riodialogues.org 
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BOX 2 METHODOLOGY FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF PARTICIPATORY PROCESSES
The inclusiveness and influence 
of the Rio+20 Dialogues were 
assessed with several empirical 
materials. The inclusiveness of the 
online phase was assessed with 
quantitative data stemming from 
the answers to an anonymous web 
survey that was emailed to the 330 
civil society actors that partook 
in the dialogue on ‘Sustainable 
Development as an Answer to the 
Economic and Financial Crises’ to 
gather socio-demographic data, 
as well as from the results of the 
global vote on the 100 recommen-
dations that were disaggregated 
by gender, age and country.1 The 
influence of the Rio+20 Dialogues 
was assessed with qualitative data 
emanating from: (i) a review of the 
statements of member states deliv-
ered at the Rio+20 Conference 
and UN official documents related 
to the Conference (draft outcome 
document and the Rio+20 
outcome document ‘The Future 
We Want’); (ii) two open questions 
included in the web survey; and 
(iii) 22 semi-structured interviews 
with dialogue participants, organ-
izers, and official delegates.
1. The data was generously provided by Seed 
Media Group and UNDP.
FIGURE 2 Sustainable Development Dialogues and collective preferences 
The Internet consultation process has enabled the identification of the broadly-supported recommendations.
physical audience of about 1,300 people who eventually agreed on thirty recommendations (three 
for each topic): the first recommendation was taken from the open vote on the Internet, the second 
was produced by the audience present during the live dialogues, and the third was formulated by 
the panellists. 
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This final set of recommendations was directly conveyed to the Heads of State 
and Governments present at the High-Level Roundtables convened in parallel 
with the plenary meetings of the Rio+20 conference. Additionally, the thirty 
recommendations were added to the annexes of the Report of the Conference 
(A/CONF.216). 
Overall, the dialogues engaged 60,000 people from 193 countries. In particular, 
the discussions on the online platform generated over 843 recommendations which 
were submitted by more than 10,000 participants, garnering 11,842 indications of 
support. Additionally, 1.3 million votes were cast on the public website.
The emergence of direct participatory mechanisms: 
Towards enhanced legitimacy? 
INCLUSIVENESS: WHO ACTUALLY PARTICIPATED IN THE RIO+20 ONLINE DIALOGUES? 
The voting results on the one hundred recommendations, disaggregated according 
to country, gender and age, give a primary indication of the inclusiveness of the 
online dialogues. 
Participation was gender-balanced: 52% of the total 55,317 voters were women, 
and 48% were men. In terms of age categories, young adults and children were 
slightly less represented (27%) than voters from other age categories (36% and 
37% respectively for 35-54 year-old voters and <55 year-old voters). Regarding the 
countries of origin of the voters, which were classified in four groups according to 
their Human Development Index (HDI) levels (low, medium, high and very high), 
participation was sharply unbalanced: although all 193 countries were ‘represented’ 
by at least one voter, more than three voters out of four came from a country with 
a very high HDI (Figure 3). Additionally, nearly 50% of the voters came from only 
four English-speaking countries: the UK (17.5%), Canada (12%), the US (12%) 
and Australia (8%).    
Although the organizers of the consultation pointed out that the voting results 
were not intended to provide a complete representation of the world’s opinion, the 
over-representation of voters from very high HDI countries was likely to bias the 
world’s preferences. Indeed, in nine dialogues out of ten, the result of the global vote 
was convergent with the preferences of the voters from very high HDI countries, 
while this number falls to five out of ten when it comes to the preferences of voters 
from low HDI countries (Figure 3). In three dialogues in particular – related to 
Energy; Sustainable Development as an Answer to the Economic and Financial 
Crises; and the Economics of Sustainable Development – the votes from very high 
HDI countries alone determined the results, and therefore global preferences. 
Furthermore, some recommendations received a significant number of votes as soon 
as they were uploaded onto the web platform. In some cases, this can be interpreted 
as coordinated lobbying: for instance, the most voted on recommendation from 
the Energy dialogue, ‘Take concrete steps to eliminate fossil fuel subsidies’, 
which received twice as much support than any other recommendation from any 
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other dialogue, was in fact put forward by Avaaz who led an online campaign to 
encourage its network to vote. Thus, the civil society actors that were best able to 
get their preferences into the final top ten recommendations were those who were 
the most organized, that had significant financial and human resources at their 
disposal, and had communication and social mobilization strategies: participation 
from well-resourced, western and English-speaking NGOs was higher than that 
of smaller NGOs or social movements. 
The results of the online survey of the participants involved in the dialogue 
on ‘Sustainable Development as an Answer to the Economic and Financial 
Crises’ show similar trends. Participation was fairly balanced across gender 
(58% were male, while 42% were female). Participation from young adults 
(34%) was higher than participation from 55 year-old or older (18%) but still 
lower than participation from 35 to 54 year-olds (48%). Although one out of 
four participants was Brazilian, very high HDI countries were overrepresented 
(58%) compared to medium and low HDI countries, accounting for 8% and 5% 
of the respondents respectively. All respondents were highly educated, holding 
a master’s degree and in some cases a PhD, in environment and development 
FIGURE 3 Over-representation of highly developed countries
Three out of four voters were from high HDI countries, giving them a disproportional influence on decision-making: nine out of ten 
dialogues have adopted the same recommendations as the Internet voters.
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studies (29%), public administration and political science (18%) or economics 
and finance (16%). It was therefore difficult to engage with actors beyond 
those that already had the knowledge and skills to participate: participation 
from grassroots organizations and individual citizens remained low, the latter 
being the most marginalized. 
‘If you go on these online platforms, it means that you are already 
informed. If you have the motivation to contribute, it means that you 
are already involved in the process and that you are part of civil society 
networks. It’s not for the general public.’
Civil society representative
However, the organizers of the online dialogues were more successful 
in including people from outside of the UN’s institutionalized civil society 
participatory channels such as the Major Groups. This is illustrated by the 
fact that only three respondents out of ten had previously taken part in a civil 
society consultation. 
It is clear that ICT has a positive impact on inclusiveness, so long as people have 
access to the Internet and the ability to use it. The digital divide is still important 
both between and within countries. Globally, 4 billion people are not yet using 
the Internet, more than 90% of whom are from the developing world (Figure 4). 
The quality of Internet access is also unequal as differences in broadband speed 
persist between developed and developing countries. 
The impact of ICT usage in civil society consultations on inclusiveness also 
depends on the outreach policies of the organizers. In the first phase of the 
dialogues, the online platform was based on an invitation system which was not 
completely open, as UNDP staff acted as gatekeepers reviewing the registrations 
according to the instructions given by the Brazilian Government. The latter 
wanted to include in the dialogues: (i) those accredited to participate in the 
Conference, (ii) those nominated by the facilitators, (iii) those nominated by and 
affiliated to the universities that were supporting the dialogues, (iv) those with 
an email from a pre-authorized server (e.g. usp.br; oxfam.org; weforum.org), 
(v) those invited by the Brazilian Government or by the Offices of the Executive 
Coordinators of the UN for Rio+20, (vi) those nominated by a UN Major Group, 
and finally (vii) those invited by people already registered to the platform. It 
therefore seems that ICT can serve to promote inclusiveness if the organizers are 
willing to reach out beyond organized civil society networks.
ASSESSING THE IMPACTS: IS QUANTITY OF PARTICIPATION INFLUENTIAL? 
Influence on the negotiation process
The Rio+20 Dialogues took place too late into the negotiation process to influence 
either the negotiation agenda or the positions of key member states. The agendas and 
the Conference themes were defined ahead of the first preparatory committee meeting 
for the Rio+20 Conference, held in May 2010 in New York. Civil society consultations 
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and advocacy may have influenced the 
agenda setting for the negotiations when the 
preparatory committees, informal consulta-
tions, intersessionals and the UNCSD Bureau 
meetings were held in New York. However, 
given that the results of the online and onsite 
phases of the dialogues came out respec-
tively on 15 and 19 June, immediately after 
the third preparatory committee and before 
the high-level segment of the conference, 
when the negotiations and the outcome 
document were being finalized, they could 
not possibly have triggered the inclusion of 
new items for the negotiations. 
‘When Brazil announced it would hold 
the Dialogues a few months before the 
Conference, our delegation already had doubts about their potential impacts 
on the official process leading to the summit and its outcomes. We faced a 
classical pattern where an ambitious process for civil society engagement is 
organized but its results in terms of influence on the official negotiations 
are minimal.’
Member state representative
Similarly, by the time the dialogues were carried out, the positions of member states 
had already been defined and concluded, sometimes in consultation with civil society 
at the national level. In Rio de Janeiro, delegates were too deeply involved in the 
negotiations to be able to attend the dialogues and to listen and reflect on the ideas 
generated by civil society. In addition, it would be naïve to believe that the positions of 
key member states can be modified overnight, without a government consultation on 
what such position-shifting would imply for the country’s socioeconomic structures.
‘Influencing negotiators ‘on the spot’ during international conferences is very 
complicated. It’s a long-term job, and it’s not in organizing these consultations 
back-to-back with the negotiations that civil society’s voice will be heard. A 
consultation system should allow negotiators to have time to digest civil society’s 
message, because the recommendations delivered by a highly diversified civil 
society, coming from many countries, should be analysed in light of the impacts 
these recommendations have on each country’s territory. For instance on the 
recommendation on fossil fuel subsidies, it’s not by getting the information 
on Monday that we will be able to decide whether we insert it or not into the 
negotiating text on Tuesday. Because there are a lot of impact assessments that 
we need to look at closely before agreeing on incorporating civil society input 
into negotiation outcome documents.’
Member state representative
FIGURE 4 Political and digital divide
Of the 4 billion people without access to the Internet, 90% live in devel-
oping countries, limiting their participation.
BUILDING THE FUTURE WE WANT C H A P T E R  3
A PLANET FOR L IFE 71
Another indicator that further demonstrates that the dialogues had very little 
influence on the negotiating process is the reference to this mechanism in the 
statements delivered by the heads of state and government during the conference’s 
plenary meetings. Indeed, the only country that referred to the dialogues in its 
statements is Brazil, the host country and dialogue organizer. In the fourth plenary 
meeting of the conference, Brazilian Minister for the Environment Izabella Teixeira 
hailed the results of the dialogues, hoping the formula would set a path for future 
conferences, while Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, in the closing session, 
highlighted the link between the results of the conference of heads of state and 
government and the dialogues and the Peoples’ Forum. While some heads of state 
and government highlighted the importance of including civil society in decision-
making processes at all levels in their statements – 30 countries out of 1876 – only 
Brazil explicitly referred to the dialogues.  
Influence on the negotiation outcome   
Although Izabella Teixeira stated that ‘the outcome document of [the] conference 
[was] undeniably influenced by the process that allowed people from all over the 
world to have their say’, most of the civil society representatives who participated in 
the dialogues, as well as negotiators, did not feel the same way. Civil society actors 
regretted the lack of robust linkage between the dialogues and their outcomes with 
the high-level segment of the conference. A member of the team in charge of coordi-
nating the dialogues even acknowledged that ‘the dialogues and the negotiations 
were parallel processes. […] There was no time and no way that they could actually 
influence each other at that time.’ 
The results of the dialogues did not have any influence on the substance of the 
outcome document of Rio+20 simply because the final text of ‘The Future We Want’ 
was produced by Brazil during the night of 18-19 June, and agreed ad referendum 
by the delegates on 19 June, before the conclusion of the dialogues and before the 
recommendations from civil society were presented in the high-level roundtables 
(20-22 June). However, it is interesting to note that there is some congruence 
between certain recommendations from the dialogues and ‘The Future We Want’: 
for instance, the issue of fossil fuel subsidies was already mentioned in the zero draft 
of the outcome document7 and ‘The Future We Want’8, although in a less radical 
wording than the recommendation from the dialogue9. 
At the closing of the Rio+20 Dialogues, Gilberto Carvalho, the Secretary-General 
of the Presidency of Brazil, stressed the following: ‘this method of participation in the 
UN is here to stay.’ The dialogues have indeed been more successful in influencing 
6. Only 142 statements out of 187 were available. 
7.  §126: ‘We support the eventual phase out of market distorting and environmentally harmful subsidies that impede the 
transition to sustainable development, including those on fossil fuels, agriculture and fisheries.’
8. §225: ‘Countries reaffirm the commitments they have made to phase out harmful and inefficient fossil fuel subsidies 
that encourage wasteful consumption and undermine sustainable development.’
9.  ‘Take concrete steps to eliminate fossil fuel subsidies.’
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the procedures for civil society participation in subsequent intergovernmental 
policymaking processes on sustainable development issues. In particular, many civil 
society consultations carried out in the framework of the definition of sustainable 
development goals and a global development agenda beyond 2015 have built upon 
the methodology and participatory tools developed by the Rio+20 Dialogues.   
‘We have no doubt that the Rio Dialogues became the model that was 
used for the post-2015 consultations. The post-2015 consultations went even 
further in that the process was more driven by civil society, whereas the Rio 
Dialogues process was led by the Brazilian government only.’
UN officer
The UNDP for instance has used the Rio+20 Dialogues web platform as a 
basis to launch ‘The World We Want’ platform, a digital tool on which eleven 
thematic consultations were held. In co-designing the MY World Global Survey, 
the UN team on the post-2015 development agenda and the Overseas Department 
Institute (ODI) have drawn upon the voting system used for the Rio+20  
Dialogues website.
‘I think the combination of the Rio Dialogues and MY World has engendered 
a certain excitement and enthusiasm and recognition that these are valuable 
methods. For the UN it’s a way to better engage with its principal constituency, 
it’s a way for the process to genuinely be more representative, and it is without 
question forging new processes, new language and new literacy.’  
Partner organization of the Rio Dialogues and MY World 2015
Among civil society and member state representatives, opinions about the 
procedural influence of the Rio+20 Dialogues are slightly more mixed. While some 
think the dialogues have created a precedent, others do not consider them as a 
milestone for civil society engagement in intergovernmental policymaking. 
Conclusion
The Rio+20 Dialogues have complemented rather than replaced traditional forms 
of civil society engagement in the UN activities on sustainable development. 
Compared to the Major Groups, these direct participatory mechanisms theoret-
ically allow everyone to engage in intergovernmental decision-making, through 
their openness and non-hierarchical nature, and contribute with fresh and innova-
tive ideas. However, these new methods also have substantial limitations. First, 
they enhance access only for certain civil society actors, leaving the most margin-
alized behind, and may therefore favour the representation of the most powerful 
voices over those of a broader and unspecialized public. Second, when they are held 
back-to-back with intergovernmental negotiations, their influence on the process is 
minimal. It therefore makes it difficult to determine whether the lack of influence 
of the dialogues on the Rio+20 negotiation process and outcome is correlated to 
the lack of inclusiveness of the participatory mechanism.  
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To foster inclusiveness and influence, direct civil society participatory mechanisms 
should be organized at an early stage of the negotiation process. Participation 
can be further broadened and diversified by strengthening the capacities of civil 
society actors and by systematically combining web-based participatory methods 
with offline or ICT-based methods (i.e. SMS and ballot paper surveys, face-to-face 
dialogues) to bypass the digital divide. Improving the quality of participation is also 
key to more effectively influencing the negotiation process and outcome: while the 
organizers should establish a formal link to the official process and provide spaces 
for a real dialogue between civil society actors and member states representatives, 
civil society actors should refine their recommendations towards more practical 
objectives, with quantifiable targets and clear timelines. 
By promoting interaction between civil society actors, the Rio+20 Dialogues 
have allowed participants to learn about new issues and build their capacities. In 
this way, the Rio+20 Dialogues have increased mutual understanding and forged 
new partnerships between civil society actors. It is through these new partnerships 
between different constituencies that civil society actors will have more influence 
on intergovernmental negotiations. ❚
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I
n January 2013, the United Nations (UN) General 
Assembly formed a thirty member Open Working Group 
(OWG) that was tasked with preparing a proposal on the 
establishment of a landmark set of Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals (SDGs). In a departure from the way that 
earlier membership bodies of the General Assembly were 
organized, the OWG is based on an innovative, constit-
uency-based system of representation. Essentially, this 
means that several countries share most of the seats in 
the OWG. To provide a diversity of perspectives and expe-
rience, the OWG was expected to develop modalities to 
ensure the full involvement of relevant stakeholders and 
expertise from civil society, the scientific community and 
the UN system (UN-DESA, 2014).
On 10 September 2014, the UN General Assembly 
adopted the Report of the OWG on SDGs (UN, 2014). 
This package is far from perfect, for instance, the current 
draft is not well suited for mass communication. Nonethe-
less, agreement was reached in some crucial areas: the 
outcome document proposed 17 goals and 169 targets 
that covered a broad range of sustainable development 
issues, such as energy, economic growth, inequality, cities, 
sustainable consumption and sustainable production. The 
most important aspect of the SDGs is that they contain 
the key components of a major transformation. If anything 
close to these goals can be implemented by 2030, then 
nothing short of a huge reorganization will have taken 
place. The transformation potential of the SDG package is 
so great that many of the countries involved in the negotia-
tions may not even fully comprehend the possible magni-
tude, which may be similar to that of the industrial or 
digital revolutions. 
This article focuses on the mechanics of the negotia-
tion process that led to the establishment of the SDGs. A 
number of lessons on trust building, power relations and 
civil society involvement can be learnt from the experience 
and these issues are discussed below. 
The challenges of (re)building trust among 
stakeholders
Relatively weak trust existed among some member states 
at the beginning of the negotiation process. This was 
understandable as many countries had in mind previous 
frustrations, such as fights against colonialism and 
economic struggles with wealthy and powerful nations. 
Quite simply, a number of developing countries consider 
OECD countries to be unreliable because, with a few 
exceptions, they frequently fail to deliver on their promises. 
Some developing countries were also very concerned 
about the inclusion of non-governmental actors, such as 
civil society and the major groups. The inclusion of these 
groups in decision-making processes is an alien concept 
in some countries and therefore the matter of who should 
be allowed to participate in discussions was the subject 
of fierce debate.Superimposed on this mistrust was an 
ideological struggle: a number of states essentially viewed 
the discussions as an opportunity to register their opposi-
tion to capitalism or to take issue with moral and social 
values that they found unacceptable.
Politics, power relations and economic  
sticking points
Some countries involved in the SDG negotiation process 
believe that there will be different world leaders by 2030 
Negotiating a common future – what we 
have learned from the SDGs
Csaba Körösi, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Hungary to the United Nations
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and they envisage themselves as being part of this new 
leadership. For these countries the main question is 
whether sustainable development can help bring about 
this transition. The negotiations were about setting the 
rules of the game for the sustainable development path 
ahead, so for these countries it was absolutely crucial to 
see what kind of rules would be in place for a transition 
they believe to be inevitable. 
While the sustainable development negotiations 
cannot be separated from the political context, they 
should not be separated from the real economic context 
either. Changing the development trajectory basically 
means reshaping markets and reshaping market rules, 
and this causes anxiety with a number of players, and 
also enthusiasm from others.
It became apparent during the negotiations that 
several countries were seeking to change their role and 
position in the global value chain. Those who were not 
part of the chain wanted to join it, while others sought to 
upgrade their positions. These countries saw the negoti-
ations as an opportunity to expand their economies and 
GDPs and gain better market access. This made some 
member states anxious about the economic fallout of 
goal setting, because an improvement for one country’s 
position in the global value chain means taking the place 
of another. 
Another important factor that arose in the negotiations 
concerned the reduction of the growth of economic and 
social inequalities. Although all countries agreed on the 
need to achieve this goal, some considered it as primarily 
an internal task, while others viewed it as an external 
one. This made it a controversial issue since there are 
many devices to reduce internal inequalities, such as 
taxation systems, laws, social policies and incentives, 
all of which can be under the control of national govern-
ments, but there are fewer available tools to reduce 
international inequalities, and it is very difficult to make 
decisions that change the global flow of goods. 
Last but not least in relation to the economic context, 
the negotiations highlighted the need to rethink the roles 
of governments and markets. To depart from a devel-
opment mode that uses much more resources than are 
globally available requires intervention. Markets alone 
will not suffice. The transition to a sustainable economy 
will not take place without regulation, taxation, coopera-
tion, different incentives for R&D and different types of 
investment that are encouraged, and possibly initiated, 
by governments. 
Innovations in the participatory nature of the 
OWG process
At the beginning of the negotiations the aim was to get 
everyone into the same room and to assign speaking slots 
to all those who wanted to participate, including member 
states, international organizations, major groups, etc. The 
problem with this approach was that the time constraints 
of having so many participants in the same session meant 
that major groups and civil society had very little time to 
get their messages across. Therefore, groups were invited 
to attend special dedicated days to enable these important 
discussions to take place. 
The major groups were asked to organize themselves 
regarding what points they wanted to make during 
their time slots, to estimate how long this would take 
and whether or not they had internal agreement on 
these points. In addition, a website was set up to give 
everyone the opportunity to contribute at the same level 
as member states and to share their suggestions and 
notions with every stakeholder. Also, so-called ‘interses-
sional meetings’ were organized for civil society, with the 
objective of including those who were not represented 
by the major groups.
With this kind of negotiation process, only a tiny part of 
the work was done in the negotiating room. Around 80% 
of meetings and consultations took place in between 
sessions, with the majority of discussions being bilat-
eral or involving stakeholders other than member states. 
The participatory nature of the OWG was not only 
innovative, but also proved to be a valuable learning 
experience for the stakeholders. Initially, many groups 
came to the table with ‘silo’ (single issue) proposals. 
This was not a realistic approach as it was impossible to 
give a significant amount of attention to so many issues. 
Instead, the groups learned to link their main concerns 
with other issues, so they could be considered as part 
of an integrated picture.
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Looking ahead to the future
Even though the General Assembly has adopted the 
OWG’s report with its goals and targets, ensuring that it 
will become a vital part of future negotiations, this in itself 
will not generate a movement of capital and knowledge. 
Only national and local plans and projects can achieve this 
redirection of funds. Banks and institutions will not finance 
the SDGs; finances and other implementation means will 
be targeted at actual, tangible projects. On this aspect, 
there is still much work to be done. The SDGs are in place, 
but most countries do not have national plans and there 
is certainly a lack of projects. 
The implementation of pilot projects must begin as soon 
as possible so that time is not lost at this critical juncture; 
and for this to happen, support mechanisms are required. 
However, the national and international institutions that will 
support the transformation towards sustainable develop-
ment were not expressly created for this function. Instead 
they were designed for a range of different purposes, 
typically for a mono-dimensional goal such as fighting 
Ebola, malaria or HIV, or making sure that every child goes 
to primary school. While such institutions are engaged in 
work of the utmost importance, they are not well equipped 
for complex three-dimensional goals such as the SDGs.
There are three possible scenarios for the difficult negoti-
ation process ahead. The first is that agreement is reached 
on a genuinely transformative agenda, on strategic work 
and on the distribution of roles. This optimum scenario 
would set out a clear process for the future. A second 
possible scenario is that a written agreement is reached, 
but one that is not legally binding. This would be insuffi-
cient to bring about a change in the development trajectory 
FIGURE 1 From MDG to SDG
The SDGs adopted in September 2015 are not only a follow up to the Millennium Development Goals. They open new fields for coordi-
nating the international community and new transformational priorities for states. This figure shows the 17 SDGs that the open working 
group proposed to UNGA members.
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FIGURE 2 Interrelated goals
SDGs were not designed as isolated targets but to be mutually supportive. Taking action in one area will have positive repercussions 
for other objectives, thus supporting a broader overall global transformation.
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FIGURE 3  The three dimensions of sustainable development and SDGs
The three dimensions of sustainable development (economic, environmental and social) are present to varying degrees in each SDG. 
However, promoting a three-dimensional approach is indeed a challenge for most national and international bodies, which have generally 
been designed to meet a mono-dimensional objective, such as education or the fight against Ebola, malaria or HIV.
and thus would be very costly in the long term. A third 
scenario is that no agreement is reached, an outcome that 
is certainly possible. And if no agreement can be found on 
at least some basic elements, then the biggest risk is that 
the international moderator system will fall apart, and it 
will be a different world after that. ❚
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The pursuit of sustainable 
development in India
I
ndia is at the crossroads of opportunities and challenges in her pursuit of 
sustainable development. It is among the largest economies and promises to 
experience high economic growth. India is also the world’s largest democ-
racy. But at the same time, a large section of the population does not have 
access to the bare minimum of the benefits of economic development, which 
in turn also affects lower penetration of the political and economic freedoms 
that a democracy promises. Maintaining high and inclusive growth rates is 
therefore a prime political, social and economic imperative for India. The 
prospects, and need, of high economic growth however, come with a poten-
tial conflict with the global imperatives of climate change. India is one of 
the lowest emitters of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the world on a per capita basis. 
At 1.4 tCO2/person in 2010, India’s emissions were less than one third of the world 
average of 4.5 tCO2/person, less than one fourth that of China and one twelfth that 
of the US. However, India has now become the third largest GHG emitter. At the 
same time, the large demography of the country is also highly vulnerable to climate 
change. The fact that the poorest of the poor are comparatively more vulnerable 
to climate change, even if public adaptation services are available, makes it all the 
more important for India to attain a higher level of economic growth with rapid 
poverty eradication as soon as possible. Thus India is in dire need of charting out 
a new political economy of sustainable development to balance these imperatives 
that are seemingly conflictual in the short run, but certainly mutually reinforcing 
from the perspective of long-term human development. Broadly this will imply a 
development process with a deepening of economic activities at a large scale so as 
to include the entire population in the development process. Arguably, with time 
The search for sustainable development in India aims to develop not only a response 
to climate change but also more inclusive growth, effectively elevating the poorest 
populations towards better living conditions. The management of the energy sup-
ply, a critical issue for continued economic growth, as well as the control of green-
house gas emissions are essential starting points on this journey.
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the development trajectory is becoming increasingly environmentally efficient. For 
example, the emission intensity of GDP has improved in recent decades, primarily 
due to development and the deployment of efficient technologies. The concerns of 
climate change require the development process to overcome the time barrier along-
side the barriers to scale. In other words, the climate change imperatives require 
that both development and deployment of climate friendly technologies happen in 
a shorter time frame and at a global scale. In a globally integrated economic order 
faced with global environmental challenges with serious national implications, to 
what extent India can craft and pursue such a political economy of sustainable devel-
opment is the key question today, not only for India, but arguably for the world too. 
In this chapter we explore some contours of this challenge.
India’s development challenge 
The UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI) in its comprehensiveness of criteria 
capturing the aspects of economic well-being, social dignity and political freedom 
is arguably the best indicator to assess the developmental challenge a country 
faces. The 2013 Human Development Report ranks India at a low 136 out of 186 
countries in terms of its HDI, indicating that India’s development needs are still 
huge, and significant progress is needed for ensuring a better quality of life for her 
people. There is a positive relationship between HDI and per capita energy consump-
tion. A minimum per capita energy consumption of 2.3toe/year is needed today to 
achieve an HDI of 0.9 (see Figure 1). However, it has also been observed that the 
late bloomers usually achieve transition to higher levels of human development at 
lower levels of per capita energy consumption. It could reasonably be argued that 
there is a high probability that an HDI of 0.9 could be achieved in future at a per 
capita energy consumption of 1.5 toe/year. In comparison to such an optimisti-
cally reduced need for energy, per capita consumption in India was 0.4 toe/year in 
2011-12 with a corresponding HDI of ~0.5. The lower per capita consumption is 
constrained by, in addition to poverty, low levels of energy supply, which was 0.6 
toe/capita/year in 2011-12. Moreover, it is not merely about low per capita energy 
consumption but also about access to energy services. There are close to 300 million 
people in India without access to modern energy services for cooking and lighting. 
Although it is difficult to quantify sustainable development, its directional and 
procedural meaning is clear. It is progress on human welfare while maintaining 
balance between multiple social, economic and environmental concerns. Holden 
et al. (2014) have assessed the status of many countries with regard to sustainable 
development as a combination of four parameters: HDI (minimum 0.64), ecological 
footprint (maximum 2.4 global hectare/capita/year), Gini coefficient (maximum 
40), and share of renewable energy out of total energy (minimum 26%). They found 
that in terms of its welfare distribution and ecological footprint, India is very much 
within the boundaries of sustainable development. However, the overall level of 
welfare is too low to be sustainable and India’s energy system is on the boundary of 
sustainability. Hence, what India needs to move into the sustainable development 
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zone is to rapidly improve its HDI and share of renew-
able energy. Given the positive relationship between 
HDI and energy consumption, India’s HDI challenges 
can be summed up with one infrastructural goal, i.e. 
increasing the share of renewable energy at an acces-
sible price. 
India and environmental policy
The question of environmental degradation in India, 
be it at the national or global level, has always been 
understood as integral to developmental challenges. 
India articulated this view, along with other devel-
oping countries, right at the beginning of the setting 
of the global environmental policy agenda at the UN 
Conference on Human Environment, held in Stock-
holm in 1972; and restated this perspective at the 
1992 Rio negotiations. The global community has 
also accepted it in similar terms to varying degrees. 
India has been a strong advocate of Article 4.7 of 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change which recognizes 
poverty eradication and socio-economic development as an ‘overriding priority of 
developing countries’. 
India’s policy response to environmental challenges, by and large, has also been a 
response to its developmental challenges. The mainstay of India’s strategy to address 
environmental issues, particularly climate change, is to increase its share of alter-
native non-traditional energy options and promote energy efficiency. This policy 
response began in the early 1970s, driven by the then immediate vulnerability to 
energy security in the light of the 1973 oil crisis. What, however, has changed because 
of climate change is that the development benefits that have been achieved so far, 
are likely to be undermined due to the risks to the natural, physical and economic 
infrastructure. The range of vulnerabilities relating to health, nutrition, access to 
potable water, sources of traditional livelihoods, ecosystem services, and life and 
biodiversity in and around the coast leaves the existing infrastructure inadequate 
to protect the gains of progress. Hence, climate change has superimposed a time 
and magnitude constraint on India’s pursuit of development. India needs to develop 
quickly and at a higher rate, which in turn implies aggressively pursuing renewable 
energy and energy efficiency so that the necessary infrastructure can be built with 
lower GHG emissions.
Key stakeholders advocating sustainable energy
In the early 1970s it was the national government which recognized the need to 
promote new forms of energy with a view to protect the national economy from 
fluctuations in the international energy market. Being a party to the key international 
FIGURE 1 Combining human development and energy 
conservation
Ranked 136th out of 186 developing countries, India still has a long 
way to go in terms of human development. With existing technolo-
gies, it may nevertheless realistically hope to improve the living 
conditions of its population at a lower energy – and therefore 
environmental – cost. 
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environmental agreements, beginning from the Stockholm Declaration in 1972 up to 
the signing of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, India introduced legislation and policies 
to integrate environmental protection into development policies and programmes, 
specifically referring to international agreements in the preamble paragraphs 
(Atteridge et al., 2012). 
From the late 1980s with the launch of modernization and renovation programmes 
to improve efficiency in industrial units along with the liberalization of the economy, 
the private sector also emerged, albeit slowly, as an important stakeholder. With 
increasing integration into the global economy and rising competition, private sector 
companies began to realize the importance of energy efficiency, along with the 
technological and cost barriers to achieve higher efficiencies yet remain competi-
tive in the global market. Accordingly, the private sector has increasingly advocated 
policies to support energy efficiency. The success of demonstration projects with 
international support from Denmark and Germany in wind energy since the late 
1980s, along with the rise of companies like Suzlon has also given impetus to the 
demand for policies supporting renewable energy. The experience of the Clean Devel-
opment Mechanism (CDM) has been an added factor to build confidence among 
the private and public players in the economic viability of renewable and energy 
efficiency options.
During the last decade, particularly after the launch of the Fourth Assessment 
Report of the IPCC and India’s National Action Plan on Climate Change, civil 
society and state governments have also emerged as key stakeholders. Civil society 
is primarily motivated to demand more aggressive action by the national government 
due to the safety and security concerns of the vast vulnerable population in light 
of the IPCC report and increasingly lower expectations from international climate 
negotiations. The state governments, on the other hand, are required to implement 
the National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) through their respective State 
Action Plans on Climate Change (SAPCCs) as well as policy targets (such as renew-
able purchase obligations). Given the resource and capacity constraints of states, as 
well as the opportunity that the SAPCCs provide for better integration with national 
policy implementation and hence availability of resources, states too have become 
very important advocates of climate relevant energy policies. All this experience has 
also led to the emergence of a significant number of experts and policy researchers 
which proactively advocate considered climate policy and energy policy integration. 
Overall, transformation in India’s energy sector has followed a top down approach 
where the national government has played a decisive role by not only setting the 
policy direction, physical targets, building infrastructure but also providing neces-
sary incentives to other actors. The Accelerated Power Development and Reforms 
Programme (APDRP), initiated in 2002-03 to address the losses in power transmis-
sion and distribution is a good example of this approach. It resulted in a reduction 
in losses by a factor of over 9% during 2005-2014. Increasingly, the national govern-
ment has followed a consultative process of policy and programme formulation 
to address the concerns of various stakeholders. The Perform, Achieve and Trade 
FIGURE 2 Sustainable development in India
India is fully within the limits of sustainable development, but needs to improve its results in terms of energy supply and the fight 
against poverty, which are two interrelated goals. 
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(PAT) scheme under the National Mission on Enhanced Energy Efficiency (NMEEE) 
is a very good example of how a central government body, the Bureau of Energy 
Efficiency (BEE) facilitated all these stakeholders to provide broad based inputs to 
policy-making, resulting in a very specific and complex, but ambitious, climate policy 
(Nandakumar and Shrivastava, 2013). Although, in some cases the issues between 
central and state governments remain difficult to resolve due to an inadequacy of 
resources and jurisdictional issues e.g. electricity subsidies.
Context of energy supply
The imperative of increasing the energy supply poses two types of challenges for 
India. First, India’s energy supply is highly import dependent, and this dependency 
is likely to increase. According to the report of the Expert Group on Low Carbon 
and Inclusive Growth (Planning Commission, 2014), 40% of India’s commercial 
energy supply comes from imported fuel. More than 70% of the petroleum require-
ment is met by imports, which is expected to increase to more than 80% by 2027. 
Even imports of coal, the fuel that accounts for 70% of India’s electricity genera-
tion, are expected to increase from 10% in 2011-12 to 30% by 2027. Other studies 
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also conclude in the same direction (e.g. TERI, 2014). The high import intensity of 
India’s energy supply therefore not only poses concerns of energy security but also 
of the nation’s current account balance. The fossil fuel import bill as a share of total 
export earnings for India has grown from 35% in 2000-01 to 60% in 2012-13. The 
total trade deficit in 2012-13 was $190 billion.
 The second challenge relates to the contribution to CO2 emissions from the energy 
sector, in addition to the impact on air pollution and water resources that are associ-
ated with the extraction and use of these fuels, both globally and at a local level. The 
energy sector is the largest contributor to India’s total GHG emissions. In 2007, the 
energy sector contributed 1,100.06 million tons of CO2 equivalent (CO2e) emissions 
out of a total of 1,904.73 million tons. Of this, 65.4% of the emissions were from 
electricity generation, 3.1% from petroleum refining and solid fuel manufacturing, 
and 2.9% from fugitive emissions due to the handling of coal, oil and natural gas. 
About 15% of total CO2e emissions (or 128.08 million tons of CO2e) were from fossil 
fuel and biomass combustion in both rural and urban residential households. Given 
that much of the infrastructure growth across sectors, whether it is in built-up infra-
structure, power generation and transmission capacity, mobility provision, educa-
tion or health related infrastructure, still needs to happen, India must plan a new 
development model to prevent long-term lock-ins into emissions-intensive infra-
structure, fuels and technologies. 
India’s development challenge in a climate constrained world is therefore to 
enhance access to energy services for its vast population, aiming to improve HDI 
without compromising the macro-economic imperatives of a growing national 
economy as well as the ecological imperatives of global atmosphere.
Energy pathways for development till 2030 
Different modelling studies estimate that India’s energy supply requirements 
range from 1,146 million toe (Planning Commission, 2014) to 1,700 million toe 
(Government of India, IEP, 2006) by 2030, compared to 819 million toe in 2011-12. 
According to the Integrated Energy Policy (IEP), economic growth of 8% to 9% 
through to the year 2031-32 will require an increase in India’s primary energy supply 
by a factor of 4 to 5, and its electricity generation capacity by 6 to 7 (both compared 
to 2003-04 levels). While this implies a primary energy supply growth of around 
5.8% per year, commercial energy supply will need to grow at a faster rate of 6.8% 
per annum, as non-commercial energy sources will be replaced over time. According 
to the report of the Expert Committee on Low Carbon and Inclusive Growth,  in a 
‘business as usual’, or ‘baseline inclusive growth’ (BIG) scenario, the emissions inten-
sity of GDP in PPP terms falls by 22% in 2030, compared to 2007; while in the low 
carbon inclusive growth (LCIG) scenario it falls by 42%. The per capita emissions 
are expected to be 3.6 Mt of CO2 by 2030 in the BIG, but could be reduced to 2.6 
Mt of CO2 in the LCIG scenario. This is on account of: (a) a significant improvement 
in the energy intensity of GDP through demand-side measures (the energy inten-
sity of GDP falls from 0.121 kgoe/$ GDP 2007-PPP in 2007, to 0.071 kgoe/$ GDP 
FIGURE 3 The indicators of inclusive growth
BUILDING THE FUTURE WE WANT C H A P T E R  4
A PLANET FOR L IFE 89
2007-PPP, in 2030); and (b) changes in the energy mix that result in a reduction in 
demand for coal and crude oil by 20% and an increase in demand for natural gas 
by 11%, along with a six fold increase in the supply from non-fossil energy sources. 
Another source of reduced emissions however is the lower GDP that results from 
a change in the investment pattern in the LCIG scenario compared to the BIG. The 
report estimates that, compared to the BIG scenario, the LCIG will have a 0.16% 
lower GDP growth rate and a GDP of 3.33% less in 2030. Furthermore, to achieve 
a higher development indicator by 2030 compared to 2007, as shown in Figure 3, 
cumulative investments in the two scenarios are estimated to be more or less equal, 
but the LCIG scenario will require a 50% higher investment in the energy sector. This 
is on account of the fact that to generate the same amount of power from renewable 
energy sources, a comparatively larger installed capacity than from thermal sources 
is needed. This, however, also implies foregone investments in other sectors of the 
economy, particularly the social sector. 
It is important to note that out of an estimated 27% reduction in emissions in the 
LCIG compared to BIG, 24% comes from a change in the energy supply mix. Hence, 
the outlook for 2030 is highly focused on renewable energy. The studies, however, 
rely greatly on the early availability of next generation technologies particularly in 
storage, concentrated solar thermal and bio-fuels. 
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The technological predicament 
Theoretically, harnessing more and more renewable energy sources with a simul-
taneous improvement in energy efficiency can help achieve the twin objectives 
of energy security and climate change, in addition to addressing the pressure of 
India’s increasing energy imports bill. India has already realized the significance 
of promoting renewable energy and energy efficiency. Over the last two decades, 
the energy intensity of the economy (measured in terms of the total final energy 
consumption in toe per million rupees of GDP at 2005 prices) has reduced by 50%. 
The share of renewable energy (excluding large hydro) in the total installed capacity 
has increased from 0.05% in 1992 to 12.7% in 2014. The two targeted missions, 
namely the National Solar Mission and the National Mission for Enhanced Energy 
Efficiency under the NAPCC have provided further impetus to this trend. A range 
of support instruments have been introduced to accelerate the uptake of renewable 
energy including subsidies for off-grid renewables, fiscal incentives for wind and 
solar power, and renewable purchase obligations with premium tariffs. In terms of 
energy efficiency the instruments include standards and labelling for appliances 
and cars, mandatory efficiency improvement targets for energy intensive indus-
tries (including power stations), performance contract based demand management 
measures, etc. Despite this rather commendable progress in terms of efficiency 
improvement and the inclusion of renewables in the energy system, India still has 
a long way to go. There are a number of barriers that make India cautious before 
it blindly pushes ahead with a green technology transformation, even though it is 
widely recognized to be in the national interest in the long run. To be able to realize 
the transformation of the energy supply mix, in addition to the timely availability 
of alternative commercially viable technological solutions across sectors, a rapid 
scaling-up of these options together with an accelerated build-up of supporting 
infrastructure, appropriate skill-sets, regulatory and institutional frameworks, and 
adequate renewable manufacturing capacities will also be needed. The development 
experience of many developing countries over the last seven decades suggests that 
there are three types of challenges that need to be addressed:
HIGHER COSTS OF TECHNOLOGIES
Although renewable energy options have become cheaper there are still significant 
cost barriers. In particular, the initial costs of green energy are very high. There are 
three types of barriers: (a) the already high cost of capital in developing countries 
deters investors from options with high capital costs, (b) the limited ability and 
willingness to pay for high cost energy makes these options economically less attrac-
tive, and (c) the feasible electricity tariffs – due to the need to provide energy services 
at accessible rates – do not cover the costs of supply and distribution and there is a 
limit to offset the impacts of these high costs through subsidies, particularly if the 
target is high. Similar barriers are faced in promoting energy efficiency measures. 
The high costs of most efficient products often do not meet the criteria of capacity 
and willingness to pay of the consumers and the acceptable pay-back period. To put 
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the challenges posed by the costs of technology alone in perspective, at the macro 
level, the Expert Committee on LCIG estimates an additional energy investment of 
1.5 % of GDP over and above the BIG scenario. The TERI study estimates the total 
undiscounted technology investment cost for the 100% renewable (REN) scenario to 
be about 42% higher than in the Reference Energy Scenario, requiring an additional 
investment of around 4% of the cumulative GDP between 2011 and 2051. 
INNOVATION CHALLENGES 
Very often the available technologies in the global market are not suitable for use in 
the Indian context, due to the specific climatic conditions that make certain technolo-
gies less appropriate. For example, India’s high summer temperatures mean there 
would need to be a doubling of the current efficiency levels of air conditioners, while 
mantaining current prices to make an economic case for a high level of penetration. 
The full reliance on hydropower is difficult due to its dependence on the monsoon 
cycle, which requires compensatory fossil fuel-based electricity. The poor quality of 
available raw material can also offset the efficiency promises of new technologies. 
For example, the advanced clean coal technologies do not generate the same level 
of efficiency with Indian coal. Hence, green technology transformation in India 
cannot happen without research and development efforts to customize technolo-
gies to Indian conditions. With this background the transition of India’s energy 
mix towards renewable energy poses grave innovation challenges. The theoretical 
possibility of 100% renewable by 2050 relies on the uptake and scale-up of several 
options that are currently not mature enough. For example, technological break-
throughs in third generation biofuels within the next two decades are critical for 
transforming the transport sector. Similarly, the REN scenario involves meeting all 
industrial heating requirements up to 700°C through CST technologies by 2051. This 
implies that CST technologies will have to be a commercially viable option even for 
small to medium manufacturers by 2031 in order to gain popularity and become 
the prevalent option in the next two decades. Furthermore, given the large share of 
renewables in the electricity mix, apart from the development of storage technology, 
improved grid integration and load management systems would be required with 
immediate effect (TERI, 2014).
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITIES
India is a federal state and has been pursuing incremental decentralization of govern-
ance. It is necessary that institutional capacities exist at all governance levels to 
facilitate and accelerate transition. Unfortunately, there are large gaps in capaci-
ties, human as well as institutional, at these governance levels. The experience of 
designing the Perform Achieve and Trade (PAT) scheme of the National Mission 
on Enhanced Energy Efficiency revealed the capacity gaps in state agencies, finan-
cial institutions and the private sector, in relation to project evaluation and effec-
tive monitoring and verification (Nandakumar and Shrivastava, 2013). A general 
capacity gap in designing comprehensive policies and programmes has been observed 
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at the state level in the process of the development of various State Action Plans on 
Climate Change (Dubash and Jogesh, 2014; Mishra et al., 2012). Although, many 
states have introduced policies that are relevant to climate change, their implementa-
tion remains a challenge on account of the limited institutional and financial capaci-
ties of states (Srinivas, 2013). In addition, it is critical to recognize from the begin-
ning that the implementation of action happens at different levels of governance 
and at each level an issue is important for different reasons. Accordingly, challenges 
are also different. Any solution therefore must be built on this diversity of reasons 
at different levels and address the associated challenges.
India’s strategy for sustainable development
India’s Twelth Five Year Plan has sustainable development as its core focus and 
outlines various approaches to integrate sustainability into national development 
goals. It identifies economic growth, poverty eradication and employment, educa-
tion, health, infrastructure, and environment and sustainability as national develop-
ment goals. These are further unbundled into 25 specific parameters such as insti-
tutional capability, regional balance, reduction in inequality, productivity growth, 
agricultural growth, infrastructure investment, water resource management, science 
and technology, human capital and so on. These parameters can easily be mapped 
onto the various sustainable development goals being negotiated under the Rio 
process as well as the imperatives of climate change. For example, the development 
goals of energy access can be integrated into the mitigation imperative through 
efficient and clean energy technologies, along with reducing the demand for energy. 
Similarly, the goals of higher agricultural productivity and access to clean water can 
be integrated into the adaptation imperative through high yielding and heat resistant 
seed varieties, and water storage technologies and practices. Hence the Twelth Five 
Year Plan successfully integrates the imperatives of sustainable development and 
climate change in India. 
A closer look at national development goal parameters suggests that India’s road 
to sustainable development could be through the rapid and urgent deployment 
of green technologies with a view to address the issues of infrastructure devel-
opment and the enhancement of productivity and sustainability. The Plan in fact 
suggests that actions should be thoroughly informed by science and technology 
and emphasizes the promotion of technological leapfrogging. Accordingly, the Plan 
has identified twelve focus areas which in a way encapsulate the principal devel-
opment imperatives. In Figure 4, these twelve focus areas are assessed in light of 
the key challenges for transition discussed above. It is evident that except for the 
‘advanced coal technologies’ focus area, the lifetime cost for sustainable develop-
ment interventions in India is not a significant barrier. The major barriers are first 
cost and innovation capabilities. Except for the National Wind Energy Mission and 
the Vehicle Fuel Efficiency Programme, high initial costs are major impediments to 
India’s quest for sustainable development. In areas where the success is dependent 
upon a large number of participants and multiple levels of governance – such as 
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FIGURE 4 The priorities of India’s 12th Five Year Plan (2012-2017)
energy efficiency programmes, efficient faster adoption of green building codes, 
lighting, labelling and super-efficient programmes, improving the stock of forest 
and tree cover –  institutional capacities need to be built for better awareness and 
penetration of the initiatives. The need and scope of technological innovation is 
equally relevant for the identified focus areas.
Levers for sustainable development
The challenges depicted in Figure 4 for deepening sustainable development in India 
raise an important question: can India on her own, and to what extent, accelerate 
the implementation of the identified strategies? India’s experience so far suggests 
that it can certainly create positive momentum, but it may not be able to overcome 
the time barrier. For example, while the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission 
has been able to bring down the benchmark tariff for solar PV, from INR 17.91 per 
Kwh in 2010-11 to INR 8.75 in 2013-14, and for solar thermal from INR 15.31 to 
INR 11.9, it still does not make sense to go for significantly large-scale uptake until 
2030 on account of high undiscounted system costs and a high subsidy compo-
nent. Technological breakthroughs hold the key. While tariffs for wind have grown 
comparatively at a slower rate compared to thermal power during 2005-06 and 
2013-14 (39.47% compared to 97.09% in Andhra Pradesh, and 23.53% compared 
to 67.11% in Karnataka) the average tariff for wind is still marginally higher than 
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the average unit cost of thermal power. There is still a need for deployment at a 
higher scale. 
Experience suggests that a large market for products and technologies not only 
brings down costs but also encourages innovation. In the process institutional 
capacities also develop through learning by doing. What is needed therefore is to 
build institutional capacities to provide a big push to market for new technologies 
which can simultaneously address the challenges of high initial costs and innova-
tion. Such a large push to market is difficult for India to provide, particularly to 
attain the required level of penetration within a short time frame. Therefore, the 
lever to speed up sustainable development in India lies with strategic international 
cooperation to create sufficiently large markets for new technologies so that the 
economic process could gain a self-sustaining velocity for transformation. 
There are already a number of international cooperation initiatives that support 
technological interventions. A list of these initiatives within the United Nations 
system and of partnerships focused on promoting technological change highlights 
the apparent lack of support for pilot projects (O’Connor, 2014). From India’s 
perspective, it would be preferable if international support were mobilized for 
demonstration projects with considerable overlap with development and market 
formation. This could be done by undertaking large enough demonstration 
projects that send out clear signals for the private sector and to innovators on 
these ‘new markets for new products’. Large scale demonstration projects would 
necessarily involve a meaningful policy and institutional engagement which in 
turn build capacities. 
Conclusion 
Integrating concerns of climate change and sustainability into development goals 
requires addressing barriers to development processes, as well as barriers to climate-
friendly development strategies. Broadly, the barriers to the development process 
are concerned with those of a deepening of economic activities at a large scale so as 
to include the entire population in the development process. Arguably, with time the 
development trajectory has been growing in an environmentally efficient manner, 
for example there has been an overall improvement in the emission intensity of 
GDP due to the development and deployment of more efficient technologies. The 
concerns of climate change require the development process to overcome the time 
barrier alongside the barriers to scale. In other words, the climate change impera-
tives require that both development and deployment of climate-friendly technolo-
gies ,chnological options in as many places as possible with adequate participation 
of relevant stakeholders. Accordingly, one possible way forward could be to develop 
targeted business models, based on bilateral/multilateral cooperation, that address 
the challenges of high cost and institutional capacity and promote innovation and 
deployment of targeted technologies. Identification of lessons from the existing 
bilateral initiatives towards building multilateral cooperative business models may 
be a useful way forward in this direction. ❚
BUILDING THE FUTURE WE WANT C H A P T E R  4
A PLANET FOR L IFE 95
Atteridge A., Shrivastava M.K., Pahuja N. and 
Upadhyay H., 2012, Climate policy in India: what 
shapes international, national and state policy, . 
Ambio:41(Suppl 1):68-77.
Dubash N.K. and Jogesh A., 2014, From Margins to 
Mainstream: State Climate Change Planning in India 
as a ‘Door Opener’ to a Sustainable Future, Centre 
for Policy Research, New Delhi.
Holden E., Linnerud K. and Banister D., 2014,  Sus-
tainable Development: Our Common Future Revis-
ited, Global Environmental Change, 26 : 130-139
Mishra A., Pandey N., Upadhyay U., Gupta P. and 
Kumar A., 2011, Sub-national actions on climate 
change in India and implications for international 
collaboration, available on: http://www.teriin.
org/eventdocs/files/CoP17/Subnational_action.
pdf
Nandakumar J. and ShrivastavaM.K., 2012, MRV 
Challenges of Integrating National Initiatives into 
International Mechanisms: A Case of Perform, 
Achieve and Trade Mechanism in India, IGES Work-
ing Paper-CC-2012-03, IGES.  Available on: http://
enviroscope.iges.or.jp/modules/envirolib/view.
php?docid=4170
O’Connor D., 2014, Structured dialogues on a tech-
nology facilitation mechanism, UN-DESA, DSD, Dia-
logue 1, 29 April.
Planning Commission of India, 2012, The 12th Five 
Year Plan 2012–2017, Government of India, New 
Delhi.
Planning Commission, 2014, The Final Report of the 
Expert Group on Low Carbon Strategies for Inclusive 
Growth, Government of India, New Delhi.
Srinivas K. 2013, State Policies from Climate Perspec-
tive, Vasudha Foundation, New Delhi.
TERI (The Energy and Resources Institute), 2013, 
The Energy Report- India: 100% Renewable Energy 
by 2050. WWF-India, New Delhi.
REFERENCES
96 A PLANET FOR L IFE
China: its ‘ecological civilization’ 
objective for the twenty-first century
Liu Changyi, Assistant Researcher, National Climate Center, China Meteorological Administration, Beijing, China
Liu Zhe, Associate Researcher, Policy Research Center for Environment and Economy, Ministry of 
Environmental Protection of China, Beijing, China
C
hina’s development path has followed the typi-
cal route of western industrialization, but over 
a much shorter timescale. By 2011 it had 
become the world’s second largest economy, 
completing an industrialization process that 
began in 1978 with its ‘opening and reform’ policy. It con-
sumes the world’s largest share of most raw materials 
and forms of primary energy, and is the largest emitter of 
greenhouse gases (GHGs). China now faces many chal-
lenges, such as energy security, water and atmospheric 
pollution. One symptom of this situation is the deteriora-
tion of air quality in Chinese urban areas in recent years. 
This represents an unprecedented challenge for China, 
given the speed and scale of its environmental changes 
and the limited time available to tackle the issues. 
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between GDP per 
capita and SO2 and CO2 emissions from 1978 to 2013. 
This graph shows that China’s SO2 emissions peaked 
in 2006, but CO2 emissions are continuing to increase 
rapidly, despite China’s considerable efforts in the energy 
and emissions fields. Regarding the latter, GHG mitiga-
tion can provide significant co-benefits in terms of local 
pollutant control, health and energy savings, etc. 
China’s growth has been accompanied by severe pollu-
tion that is proving costly today in terms of human and 
environmental health, causing a change in the Chinese 
government’s agenda.
In environmental economics there is a hypothesized 
relationship between development and the environ-
ment known as the ‘Environmental Kuznets Curve’ 
(EKC). According to this theory, the relationship between 
economic development and environmental quality follows 
an inverted U-shape curve, i.e. as economic growth occurs 
in a country, environmental degradation tends to get worse 
until average income reaches a certain point, at which 
the environment begins to recover (GrossmaN and KrueGer, 
1995). One of the questions that must be asked is whether 
the EKC is an inevitability? And if so, how can we bring 
about the turning point sooner rather than later? Also, 
when will China reach this turning point? 
Identifying the causes
What specifically has led to the exacerbation of China’s 
problems in relation to resources and the environment in 
recent decades? Essentially, there are two types of driving 
forces: economic and political factors. The economic 
driving forces apply equally to China and to developed 
countries, these factors include rapid industrialization, 
urbanization and lifestyle change, along with the pursuit of 
a trade and export-oriented economic development path. 
However, many of the political driving forces are unique 
to China. For example, the low prices of natural resources, 
heavy subsidies for fossil fuels and lax environmental 
regulations. These problems have many deep-rooted 
historical causes, for example: resources are owned by the 
state as public properties; prices are controlled by govern-
ment rather than formed in markets; resource prices are 
kept low to subsidize state-owned enterprises (SOEs); 
and the promotion of local governors largely depends 
on delivering growth in GDP (often at the expense of the 
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environment) (Qi et al., 2009). Although many of these 
issues originated after the 1978 opening and reform policy, 
the path-dependence effect means that even today they 
remain relevant in many fields. Only by understanding this 
background can one gain a better understanding of China’s 
recent reforms in terms of resources and the environment.
Addressing the causes
In energy, environment and climate fields, political institu-
tions lie at the heart of policymaking, implementation and 
performance. There are three tiers of the political institu-
tions: the central government, the local government, and 
other stakeholders such as enterprises and societies. 
Since the Chinese government is a unitary system 
with a strong hierarchy (Qi et al., 2009), a number of 
experts regard China’s public policymaking in the fields of 
energy, the environment and climate to be an example of 
‘authoritarian environmentalism’. This means that public 
FIGURE 1 The deterioration of air quality in Chinese cities
Air quality is worsening in Chinese cities and the phenomenon continues to expand geographically.
policies tend to be led by elites within executive agencies, 
seeking to improve environmental outcomes with only 
limited public participation (BeesoN, 2010). In practice, 
this ‘command-and-control’ pattern has many pitfalls 
(it is typically rigid and cost-inefficient), although it does 
have benefits in terms of effectively mobilizing the state 
and social actors to achieve goals set by central govern-
ment (Gilley, 2012). For example, to achieve the annual 
energy intensity target, the central government divides 
the total target into secondary ones for each province and 
key state-owned enterprises; these provinces and SOEs 
then subdivide their targets to obtain goals for counties 
or affiliated enterprises, and so forth. 
In the energy, environment and climate fields, different 
institutional actors are involved. For example, in the 
National Climate Committee on Climate Change, there are 
fifteen bureaucratic units including the National Devel-
opment and Reform Committee (NDRC), the Ministry of 
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Environment Protection (MEP), the National Energy Admin-
istration (an affiliate of the NDRC), the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF), etc. All of these different bureaucracies have their 
own ideas and objectives. For example, with regard to 
future carbon policy tools, the NDRC promotes the carbon 
emissions trading scheme because the NDRC will be in 
charge of it, while the MOF prefers the carbon tax because 
its implementation would mean it would bring in more 
through tax income. 
The central government (composed of different 
bureaucratic departments) plays a decisive role in the 
policymaking process, while local governments (provin-
cial, municipal, community levels, etc.) are in charge of 
policy implementation. However, local governments at 
different levels have their own interests, which may not 
be the same as those of central government or other 
higher-level authorities. There are two main reasons for 
this disparity. The first is that there are conflicts between 
the interests of local government officials and the 
environmental targets. For example, the government’s 
promotion scheme has previously prioritized GDP as the 
most important criterion, which means that local officials 
tended to increase GDP in any way possible. However, 
on top of this there are now environmental and energy 
targets within the promotion scheme, and failure to 
achieve these new goals damages an official’s promo-
tion prospects. Officials must therefore consider these 
environmental goals while still focusing on GDP (because 
the central government has not dropped the GDP crite-
rion). The second reason is the institutional setting. At 
the central level the MEP is in charge of environmental 
issues, while at the provincial and county levels, the local 
environment agencies are subordinate to the provincial 
and county governments. Local environment agencies 
play a marginal role and usually have to adhere to the 
orders of local officials who often call for a relaxation of 
environmental regulations and for environmental agencies 
not to stand in the way of GDP growth. This situation is 
changing as the central government (MEP) is currently 
seeking more power for itself and more independence 
for local environment agencies. In 2014, in order to work 
towards clean air in Beijing, the MEP sent supervision 
teams to adjacent provinces, and the local environment 
agencies played a leading role in policymaking, coordina-
tion and implementation to tackle pollution.
China’s transformation to ecological civilization in 
the 21st century
The Chinese government has made great efforts to address 
the issues of energy, pollution and GHGs, and some signif-
icant achievements have been made under the broad 
concept of ‘ecological civilization’ (Box 1). During the period 
of China’s Eleventh Five-year Guidelines (2006-2010), the 
country’s energy intensity (energy consumption per unit of 
GDP) decreased by 19.1% (Figure 2) and the main pollut-
ants (SO2 and Chemical Oxygen Demand) decreased by 
over 10%. The Twelfth Five-year Guideline (2011-2015) 
targets include a 16% reduction in energy intensity; a 
decrease of between 8% and 10% of the main pollutants 
(including ammonia, nitrogen and NOx); an increase from 
8.3% to 11.4% in the portion of primary energy consump-
tion derived from non-fossil fuels; and a decrease in CO2 
intensity (a newly established target) of 17%. 
BOX 1: ECOLOGICAL CIVILIZATION
The concept of the ecological civilization was used 
by the former president Hu in 2005. It is now part of 
various policies and discussions that are ongoing in 
China. Ecological civilization is a new form of social 
civilization with a universal ethic and value; it is based 
on industrial civilization but with higher ambitions. 
Firstly, it emphasizes the equality and harmony of 
humans and nature, shifting away from the tradi-
tional anthropocentric view. Secondly, it calls for new 
production models and lifestyles, promoting a move 
away from traditional sources of energy and pollu-
tion-intensive modes of production towards efficient, 
low-carbon and recycling industries. The concept 
encourages the transition from extravagant, unsus-
tainable lifestyles towards greener and healthier ways 
of life. The ultimate goal of the ecological civilization 
is to follow a path towards comprehensive human 
development and sustainable development in terms 
of society, the economy and the environment. 
A PLANET FOR L IFE 99A PLANET FOR L IFE
CHAPTER 4BUILDING THE FUTURE WE WANT
FIGURE 2 Growth and pollution in China (1978 - 2013)
In 2014 the State Council released the Energy Develop-
ment Strategy Action Plan (2014-2020), which announced 
new goals and plans to curb coal consumption, increase 
natural gas supply and the use of non-fossil fuels. These 
targets are only a part of the ‘energy revolution’ that has 
been initiated by President Xi. 
China’s new Standing Committee, lead by President Xi 
Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang, is now focusing a great 
deal of attention on the ecological civilization concept, with 
greater emphasis being placed on well designed institu-
tions. For example, of the eleven top national security issues 
raised by President Xi in 2014, ecological and resource 
security matters are among them. Furthermore, in 2013 
the third plenary session of the 18th National Congress of 
the Communist Party of China plans to enhance both the 
role of government and the market in the fields of natural 
resources and the environment, for example, it will build a 
national balance sheet of natural resource assets, estab-
lish ecological and environmental carrying capacities and 
set corresponding development limits for different regions, 
implement ecological compensation mechanisms, gradu-
ally increase the prices of natural resources and the taxes 
on pollution, levy consumption tax for energy and pollution-
intensive products, and replace the current pollution fee 
with an environment tax, etc. The market policy tools, such 
as the emission trading scheme is underway and will play 
an increasingly important role in the future. 
In the new government promotion scheme, the energy 
performance (energy-intensity, and also the renewable 
energy ratio and coal-consumption quantity control) and 
pollutant targets (SO2, COD, NOX, CO2, and probably 
PM2.5) will be critical criteria to rein the performance of 
local officials. China’s strategy is to initiate an ‘energy 
revolution’, to reform its environment policies and to set 
ambitious targets for CO2 emissions. In this way, China 
hopes to speed up its transformation to an ecological civili-
zation and to reach the downward side of the EKC as 
quickly as it climbed up it. ❚
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Challenges of a turning 
point in development: 
Arab countries after the 
Spring
A
rab countries have experienced major upheavals in recent 
years. The ‘Arab Spring’ swept away the incumbent powers 
that had been exceptionally stable for several decades and 
plunged several countries into civil war. Most observers agree 
that the origin of the current turmoil is due to failures of 
governance in these countries, i.e. the rejection of dictator-
ships (Brownlee, Massoud and Reynolds, 2013, pp 29-44), 
and geostrategic elements, i.e. the transfer of the Arab world’s 
centre of gravity towards the Gulf countries (Alcaro and 
Dessi, 2013), and the increasing power of Turkey (Bank, 
Karadag, 2012) and Iran (Gause, 2007). However, very few commentators have 
focused on the demographic and socio-economic changes that are part of the cause1,2, 
although these changes are so profound that they are causing a historical rupture 
that will take time to reach a new equilibrium.
The year 2015 will be a turning point. All eyes will be on Tunisia, which completes 
its transition to democracy, but is struggling to find a new development model3 even 
though the problems it faces are much simpler than those in Egypt, Yemen and Syria. 
Furthermore, this issue of a new model of growth that could be described as inclu-
sive, concerns even those countries that have not experienced dramatic changes.
1. Chloe Mulderig, April 2013. 
2. Jahanzeb Hussein, 1 November 2013. It should be noted that the Gulf satellite channels, the various ‘think tanks’ and 
social media have played a major role in favouring the interpretation of the ‘Arab Spring’ as a quest for democracy and for 
freedom, at the expense of socio-economic (‘dignity’ in the language of the revolt) and geostrategic interpretations. 
3.  Government Presidency, Tunisia, September 2014.
The Arab Spring caused upheavals that questioned the economic devel-
opment model that Arab countries had known for over two decades. 
Another model must be reinvented in a social and political context that 
continues to be unstable. The ‘2015 juncture’ is an opportunity for these 
countries, but also for Europe.
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Models of growth challenged
THE DEMOGRAPHIC DIMENSION
The momentum of economic and social development during the period following the 
gaining of independence of many states has produced significant population growth. 
Population growth rates have increased together with the improvement of human 
development indicators, that reached high levels in the 1980s, to more than 3% 
annually for some countries. A real baby boom. These growth rates later decreased, 
in most cases to less than 2%. However, at the beginning of the third millennium 
these children of the baby boom have now reached working age. The age pyramid 
has profoundly changed: we are now seeing the so-called ‘youth bulge’ (Aita, 2011). 
This rejuvenated Arab world, which is now in crisis, has grown to a significant size. 
By 2050 its population will have reached 600 million, which is roughly the size of the 
population of the European continent, which is in population decline. Egypt alone 
will exceed 120 million inhabitants; Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Iraq will each have 
populations similar to that of France. The Mediterranean would then border two 
equally populated worlds. A situation that has not occurred for a long time in human 
history. But today there are marked differences in resources and living standards.
Some demographers (Courbage Y., Todd E., 2007) emphasize the demographic 
transition to explain the current political upheaval. But it is more at the level of the 
social transformations that are accompanying the ‘wave of youth’ that we should try 
to understand the issues and long-term developments (Mirkin, 2013). The impor-
tance of the demographics fuels the thesis of the ‘civilization clash’ (Lewis, 1993; 
Huntington, 1993), the demographic transition leads to a turning towards democ-
racy (Filiu, 2011), and the ‘wave of youth’ stimulates the need for a new develop-
ment model (Amin, 1980) and a new social contract (Aita, 2011).
THE RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION
The first period of independence brought electricity and telephony to rural areas, 
and especially education and the improvement of health and hygiene conditions. 
Also, land reforms were made, even in countries that had not adopted ‘socialist’ 
development models. These improvements had positive effects on the rural popula-
tion, but could not be maintained over the long term.
Families that gained ownership of land increased in size two generations later. The 
income derived from the land became no longer sufficient to support the descend-
ants, who were even more numerous as rural areas had experienced the highest 
population growth rates. Furthermore, the models of development and land use 
gave insufficient attention to the creation of alternative economic activities on this 
land; and it is essentially the centres of large cities that have experienced the most 
sustained economic growth. The rural exodus towards big cities therefore began, 
firstly seasonal and circular migration by men to find work, and later more permanent 
movement towards the outer suburbs of small and medium-sized cities (Aita, 2009). 
The rural exodus accelerated in the 1990s after the fall of the Berlin Wall, due 
to the entry of Arab countries into globalization and the adoption of neo-liberal 
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agricultural production modes. And it is through access to water for irrigation, a 
scarce resource in this part of the world, that the greatest transformations have 
taken place. The management and control of water resources have been gradually 
abandoned by states. The former large landowners and stakeholders with the means 
to invest in irrigation networks, in deep drilling and pumping, seized control of the 
industry. They therefore industrialized agricultural production. Smallholders lost 
their access to water resources and the title deeds of land could only be used to 
negotiate agricultural tenancies with unfavourable conditions.
In human history it was in these lands that the very concept of state was born, 
in Mesopotamia, from the need to organize irrigation for agricultural production 
and the livelihoods of its people. However, the modern Arab state has started, as in 
Africa, to offer large tracts of land for farming to large companies that come mainly 
from the Gulf region.
Thus, during the last two decades it is the agricultural sector that has become 
the economic activity that has undergone the most dramatic productivity jump in 
Arab countries. Meanwhile, peasant populations have been consigned to poverty, 
forcing them to migrate in huge numbers to the suburbs of large cities and to small 
FIGURE 1 A young and growing population
Since independence the Arab world has experienced major population growth that has led to a catching up in populations between 
the two sides of the Mediterranean. The economic context however remains very different.
BUILDING THE FUTURE WE WANT
A PLANET FOR L IFE104
and medium-sized towns that have experienced rapid and informal urbanization. 
Within twenty years the populations of some of these urban areas have increased 
from 2,000 to more than 200,000 inhabitants, the majority being young people.
With this rural-urban migration, the wave of youth has become a ‘tsunami of 
young people’ in some places, changing socio-economic data and causing significant 
challenges ranging from education to employment and urban planning, but also to 
ideological radicalization (Khashan, 2010, pp 7-18).
These issues of rural-urban migration, their socio-economic rationale, and their 
impact have received little attention in the debate on the ongoing transformations 
in the Arab world.   
THE ISSUE OF INTER-REGIONAL MIGRATION 
To these rural-urban migrations must be added other migratory phenomena, each 
having an impact on the transformations in progress.
First, there is internal migration caused by war. For example, during the civil war 
in the 1990s, one million Algerian citizens were displaced, which is about 3% of 
its population. A decade earlier, Lebanon had undergone an even more significant 
phenomenon during its own civil war. While Palestine and Syria suffered in similar 
ways following the 1967 war. Most recently, Syria is experiencing a huge scale 
internal displacement of its population, again due to civil war. Half of the country’s 
total population is affected.
In addition, several Arab countries have welcomed the refugees in large numbers. 
Initially there were two waves of Palestinian refugees that fled the Israeli invasions 
in 1948 and 1967, and who settled in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and elsewhere. They 
now form a significant proportion of the population of these countries, up to one 
third for Jordan. The second major wave was that of Iraqi refugees to Syria and 
Jordan after the US invasion and the civil war that followed. At one point, they 
made up 10% of the populations of the countries concerned. Subsequently, there 
has been a further flow of refugees following the Arab Spring upheavals: two million 
Libyans in Tunisia (20% of the population); two million Syrian refugees in Lebanon 
(30% of the population); and a million and a half in Jordan (25%). These inward 
migrations, which are huge in scale, result in shocks to societies and economies 
of the countries affected. Moreover, these migratory flows are much greater than 
those towards Europe, which raise public policy and even identity problems for 
European societies.
In addition, Arab countries are experiencing significant outward migration. Since 
independence, these migrations are mainly a result of economic causes, those from 
the Maghreb (North Africa) flow towards Europe; while those from the Mashriq 
(Arab Middle East) head into the Gulf. Twelve million first generation immigrants 
were divided between these two major destinations. These immigrants make a major 
contribution to the economic balance of their country of origin. Their financial 
transfers are much higher than the flow of foreign direct investment (FDI), making 
up a significant proportion of the gross domestic product, up to 20% for Lebanon. 
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They constitute an important ‘socio-economic safety net’, especially for the most 
disadvantaged populations. 
Outgoing immigration has remained significant in recent years, despite draco-
nian restrictions by Europe and the Gulf countries. It is estimated that of all the new 
entrants onto the labour markets of Arab Mediterranean countries, 15% emigrate 
each year. The phenomenon has even taken on a dramatic dimension with the Arab 
Spring upheavals. Everyday, the ‘boats of death’ scatter hundreds of immigrants 
onto the north Mediterranean coast, without any public policies in southern coast 
countries that can really do much to stop this happening in the medium term.
To all this must be added the seasonal or circular cross-border migrations and the 
passage of African migrants through Arab countries.
Some of these migrations have therefore become structural, and others cause major 
shocks. They represent major challenges for public policy in the countries concerned. 
Some aspects of these migrations are the subjects of intense debate. First, there is 
the attention given to Palestinian refugees, especially as the UN specialized agency 
(UNRWA) that supports these people is no longer able to deal with the totality 
of their growing needs, especially since they lack social rights in many countries. 
Also, in Europe, the focus is on cross-Mediterranean migration, leading to public 
policies of ‘cooperation’ that limit migration and which tend to erode with current 
events (Lenart, 2012). This aspect has become one of the most sensitive issues in 
the internal political debates in European countries, where civil society organiza-
tions call for an opening of borders in response to the humanitarian catastrophe 
in the South, while politicians react to the extreme right and budgetary difficul-
ties by calling for border closures. Migration will cause long-term damage to the 
Euro-Mediterranean ‘partnership’ (Eylemer and Semsit, 2007). It contributes to the 
radicalization of the South, especially since Southern countries themselves have to 
support migratory waves of an unprecedented magnitude.
Employment, particularly among young people
With the arrival of the ‘wave of young people’, the share of the population of working 
age has increased dramatically, from around 50% in the 1950s to around 70% at the 
turn of the millennium. This has resulted in a significant growth rate of the labour 
force, between 3% and 4% per year (Chaoul, 2013). These rates are even higher if 
we consider participation in non-farm work, because of the massive abandonment 
of agricultural labour. This growth would be even greater still if the participation of 
women increased significantly, as in Arab countries it is currently one of the lowest 
in the world (Aita, 2008).
However, the rate of job creation has been low in these countries, generally between 
1% and 2% annually, and therefore largely insufficient to absorb the demand for 
work. Average unemployment rates are high, and those of young people and women 
even more so: more than 20% for the former and around 50% for the latter.
Their situation is even more severe than this depiction and cannot be understood 
only through the measurement of the unemployment rate obtained through surveys 
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(because people who work at least one hour during the week preceding the survey 
are considered as non-unemployed, according to the definition adopted by the Inter-
national Labour Organization). Indeed, most of the new jobs created are informal, 
whether self-employment or non-contractual employed labour. Thus, if we exclude 
those in administration employment (the public sector generally constitutes between 
a quarter and one third of total employment), and those in agriculture, informal 
employment represents a large majority, up to 70% of the total. 
For example, between 2000 and 2007 in Syria, around 300,000 newcomers 
entered the labour market, which had a total workforce of five million people. 
Economic growth, although estimated to be between 4% and 5% per year, has 
only created 105,000 jobs per year (90,000 for men and 15,000 for women). In 
reality, much fewer jobs were created since there was simultaneously an annual 
loss of 25,000 agricultural jobs for men and 44,000 jobs for women. Among the 
employment generated, there were only 8,000 formal jobs per year. These figures 
show the seriousness of the situation that led to the Arab Spring, regardless of any 
political considerations.
The concept of employment is thereby called into question (Kadri, 2012), in 
particular in relation to salaried employment, since most informal jobs are in the 
FIGURE 2 Tomorrow’s demographic challenges
The Mediterranean will in future be dominated by demographic heavyweights (Egypt, Iran and Turkey). This evolution means that 
equivalent economic development is crucial.
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self-employment sector. It is in this context that we must remember that Mohamed 
Bouazizi, who set himself on fire in December 2010, triggering the Tunisian ‘revolu-
tion’, was not regarded as unemployed in statistical surveys. Coming from a family who 
had to stop working on the land, this young Tunisian, aged just 27, was self-employed 
as a street vendor of fruits and vegetables in a small provincial town, Sidi Bouzid.
It is young people like him that took to the streets to ignite the Arab Spring. It is 
also these young people that took up arms in Syria, Yemen and Libya, thus finding 
a means of remuneration from the war economy or external funding. The outcome 
of the upheavals that are currently underway in Arab countries will largely depend 
on the outlook that they can hope for, particularly the economic prospects. This is 
the case not only in countries where the war took hold, but also where the transi-
tion was made in a less destructive way. Indeed, young Tunisians of Sidi Bouzid live 
today, three years after the ‘revolution’, in an economic and social situation that is 
much worse than before.
It must be remembered that extremist organizations, which have led to, among 
other things, the creation of the ‘Islamic State’, have taken root within a young 
population that has been abandoned and left idle in the countryside and suburbs; 
and not only in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, but also in Tunisia, which has ‘exported’ the 
largest contingent of jihadists. This leads to the current debate on how to combat 
jihadism: through war or development?
The issue of education
Since the 1990s, all Mediterranean Arab countries had launched structural adjust-
ment policies, that aimed to control public spending. The education sector has 
suffered directly, undergoing major budget cuts.
Indeed, there has been a lively debate on education spending (World Bank, 
2008), especially regarding some of the most educated groups, which have high 
unemployment rates. Someone like Bourguiba would have replied: ‘It is better to 
have educated unemployed people rather than non-educated unemployed people.’ 
But there were strong arguments among the leaders of modernization regarding 
the value of investing in education when the best-educated people emigrate abroad 
(Lebanon is a typical example of this situation) and where unemployment is more 
prevalent amongst better-trained people. There was often a focus on the inadequacy 
of the education system to address the needs of the labour market and on ‘vocational 
training’ (Galal and Kanaan, 2010). 
However, the debate was partly misguided. It was based on global comparisons, 
without taking the two aspects of the ‘youth tsunami’ into account. The stagna-
tion of the total of investment expenditure at a time when the number of young 
people increased dramatically has had serious consequences. The wealthiest turned 
to private education, and the middle classes to private courses; all to the detriment 
of the most disadvantaged.
Moreover, the education system has struggled to follow the social transformations: 
there has been a lack of new schools in response to demographic developments and 
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rural-urban migration; and of new universities in smaller towns where the popula-
tions have increased; and insufficient modernization of education based on new 
technologies, etc.
The mismatch between training and the labour market must also be balanced by 
the major gap that has been created between the supply and demand of jobs, regard-
less of the level of training. Also, labour has to be a real market, because there is a 
severe lack of institutions that govern mechanisms. Jobs are found mostly through 
networks of friends and family, without any connection to educational structures.
In this era of the ‘youth tsunami’, the challenges of education are therefore acute 
in all Arab countries. They are even dramatic in Syria, Yemen and Libya where war 
has led to a mass exodus of young people away from education.
THE ISSUE OF THE PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN
While the human potential represented by the youth of the population struggles 
to find expression in terms of economic development, the situation is even more 
serious for the potential of women.
It has often been argued that cultural considerations, particularly those related to 
Islam, explain the low participation of women in the labour market in Arab countries. 
At around only 20%, this rate is the lowest in the world. However, this interpreta-
tion has been challenged (Aita, 2009) by the observation that participation rates 
are higher in other Muslim countries, and that the low rates were in particular 
due to rural-urban migration. Women work in the fields, especially when men are 
engaged in seasonal or circular migration, and it is not until they eventually migrate 
to the crowded suburbs and cities on a permanent basis that they no longer engage 
in economic activity. And it has often been observed that women have a greater 
propensity than men to choose administrative and public sector work. These sectors 
account for a large proportion of new job opportunities for young women, especially 
educated ones – up to 50% in some countries – although they are rare because of 
budget restrictions.
Also, the average age of those getting married for the first time has increased to 28 
in some countries. This points towards the fact that young women are being discour-
aged from working due to a lack of employment opportunities and non-compliance 
with labour rights.
URBANISM AND LAND-USE PLANNING
These major demographic and social changes have had a significant impact on the 
development of cities and territories. New migrants have crowded themselves into 
the peripheries of major cities in informal settlements that are becoming increasingly 
numerous. It has not been possible for public utilities (water supply, wastewater 
collection, electricity, telephone, etc.) to keep pace with the growth in construc-
tion, which is often illegal and lacks any master plan; giving rise to real slums. For 
example there are now twelve million people living in Cairo; around six million 
in Baghdad, Khartoum and Riyadh; three million in Sana’a in Yemen, where the 
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population is growing at 5% annually (!). Even cities like Hama (Syria), Marrakech 
(Morocco), Medina (Saudi Arabia), Dubai (United Arab Emirates) already exceed 
one million inhabitants. 
The management of urban cities as places of social and economic life has thus 
become a major issue (UN Habitat, 2012). It is noteworthy that the first Euro-
Mediterranean cooperation project, launched in the framework of the Union for 
the Mediterranean, is a wastewater treatment project in Cairo, which is an issue 
that concerns the city’s municipality. Of course, the main impact of this project is on 
public health; but all other social and economic development matters are contained 
within the issue of urban and land-use planning.
The Arab Spring has highlighted these issues. The Tunisian, Egyptian and Yemeni 
revolutions originated in the urban peripheries, which marched to occupy the public 
squares in the hearts of their capitals. The Battle of Aleppo that was waged by 
insurgents, was a military conquest of disenfranchised youth from satellite towns 
and disadvantaged districts against the metropolis of the middle and upper-classes. 
Conversely, the turmoil in Libya has seen a particularism of cities, reviving the models 
of the city-states of antiquity. Some trends in national identity have also awakened 
in Yemen, as well as in Kurdish-majority regions of Syria, raising the issue, just like 
in Iraq after the US invasion, of the internal cohesion of the Arab states derived 
after independence.
The development model of the past fifty years is highly centralized. The heart of 
economic growth is in the capital cities, along with two or three smaller cities. The 
centre is globalized. The few industries are located in the surrounding area, and 
water and energy is brought there at great cost and at subsidized prices. And as this 
is the only place of employment creation, it is the centre which attracts migration. 
Satellite cities begin to grow in its vicinity, as property in the centre is essentially 
a primary source of economic rent. But these satellite cities are rarely served by 
efficient public transportation, and utilities are often failing. The regional transpor-
tation infrastructure puts a heavy emphasis on the car; this infrastructure starts from 
the centre and spreads out in a star-shaped arrangement. This excessive centraliza-
tion is not sustainable: rampant pollution, car traffic congestion, power cuts and 
shortages of drinking water, etc. Moreover, it is contrary to the social history of these 
countries, which were built in the image of Italy or Germany: a set of city-states, 
each with its economic specialization and identity particularism. Social cohesion 
of the centre has been shaken up by recent events.
The typical example is Lebanon, a small country with a dense population. All 
development has been concentrated in Beirut. Going to Tripoli, the country’s second 
largest city, is a real adventure that first involves the negotiation of huge traffic 
jams to get out of the big metropolis. There is no public transport between the two 
cities. The development of Tripoli has been neglected; its city centre is the place of 
religious irredentism, while that of Beirut offers the image of a globalized Dubai. 
Escaping from this economic blockage, resulting from waste and inefficiency, 
and from the social one, that creates chronic instability, is a real dilemma. Should 
A PLANET FOR L IFE110
we invest primarily in urban transit networks in large cities or create efficient inter-
regional transport networks linking not only the satellite towns to cities, but also 
these satellite towns to each other? How can we move from a highly centralized, 
but failing, mode of governance to one that is more cooperative and empowers local 
communities to define their own priorities? How can we develop regional produc-
tion of goods and services to reduce inequalities that exist primarily between the 
centres and the peripheries of each country? How can decentralization, which is 
necessary today, be made to function, while keeping unity within each country?
These dilemmas are felt more acutely in the current turmoil. The transition period 
in Egypt and Tunisia has seen an explosion of informal constructions. In the advent 
of peace, should the half of the Syrian population that was displaced by the civil 
war reintegrate into the same suburbs and informal cities that have been destroyed?
Changing the development model
The upheavals of the Arab Spring have questioned the model of economic develop-
ment that Arab countries have experienced, especially over the last two decades. 
Another model must be reinvented in a social and political context that is unstable 
over the long term.
The first priority today is certainly to find ‘decent jobs’, possibly with training, 
for the millions of young men and women that arrive each year on the job market. 
Without this, no political stability can be expected in the medium term, and the flow 
of refugees will continue to pour from boats onto the north shore of the Mediter-
ranean. Everyone agrees on this priority, but not on the policies needed to achieve 
this objective.
The case of Tunisia is exemplary in this regard, because the issues are less acute 
here. The three years following the revolution were marked by a deterioration of 
the economic and therefore social situation. Private investment has stagnated. As 
for public policies, during the transition they have continued, for the most part, to 
address an old systemic problem: how can public spending be reduced in terms of 
subsidies for essential commodities, including petroleum products, in order to free 
up resources for public investment policy? This focus on a reform that is difficult 
to achieve in times of economic recession, has diverted attention away from other 
issues that would have enabled governments to have a margin of intervention. 
Thus, rentier sectors that had allowed the previous authorities to maintain their 
power have not been truly reformed. By this we essentially mean the telecommuni-
cations and real estate sectors. Moreover, Tunisian banks are in trouble, burdened 
by non-performing debts, to the tourism sector in particular. These debts, and the 
banking sector as a whole, must be restructured to free up resources for financial 
intermediation for both the private and public sectors. However, these two issues are 
determined by political economy considerations, which were difficult to address in 
the context of negotiations on the new constitution and democratic processes. Never-
theless, the focus on subsidies is particularly controversial, especially in the absence 
of economic tactics, even opportunistic ones, to take advantage of ‘opportunities’ 
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created by other Arab upheavals, for example by taking into account the fact that 
Tunisia has become a refugee country for Libyans and their funds.
There was little outside assistance for the transition process. European countries, 
while recognizing the importance of the need for a successful democratic transi-
tion in Tunisia, have not been magnanimous. It is true that the Tunisian upheaval 
has taken place in a period of economic crisis in Europe. But making a difference 
in Tunisia would have had a much lower cost than the provision of assistance to the 
democratic transition in Spain and Portugal, or lower than the cost of the current 
support for such a transition in Ukraine. Clearly, Europe still looks eastwards, 
instead of worrying about its southern Mediterranean borders. The US and Japan 
have provided some support, notably through loans to the Central Bank. While the 
assistance from Gulf countries has remained low. 
Assuming that the means exist, which public policy should be designed to address 
the first priority of youth employment? The case of the Spanish transition to democ-
racy can be an example. Two major axes were its pillars: land-use planning through 
large infrastructure projects and the reform of local governance, allowing for more 
effective decentralization. These pillars must be priorities for future development.
Land-use planning could enable the better integration of the population and 
economic production (inclusive development) by facilitating the geographical 
mobility of employment and capital within each country. Neighbourhoods and 
informal cities must become true living spaces, or more organized living spaces 
must be developed. But this major project cannot be developed today in a highly 
centralized way, as has been done since independence. It can only be negotiated 
and realized in discussion and partnership with local societies and actors, who 
must build their own local governance structures and put forward their prior-
ities. This is one of the main missing links in the development model that has 
followed independence.
But the development of decentralization is not easy in times of social and political 
turmoil. In Libya, Syria and Yemen, separatist tendencies are emerging, as well as 
movements to eradicate borders. Decentralization can only be carried out by a stable 
central government, based on a real social consensus, ensuring the cohesion of the 
country through the physical links of the infrastructure.
Thus, the decentralization reform has been established in Tunisia’s new consti-
tution. However, this reform has to wait for the end of the political negotiations in 
Tunis, the capital. The land-use planning scheme also awaits the stabilization of 
state institutions and... financial resources.
Finally, there is little chance that all this could be implemented without a regional 
integration perspective that is stabilizing and mutually beneficial. However, the 
Arab integration schemes, or even those of sub-regional cohesion (such as the 
Arab Maghreb Union) are more blocked than ever. Furthermore, differentiation is 
widening between the oil countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (that are fairly 
well integrated) and other countries that are much more populated and suffer with 
employment and development problems. In the region it is as if capital and labour 
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had been separated. New modes should be designed to encourage these elements 
to be brought together again.
Integration should be rethought between the two sides of the Mediterranean. 
Europe has a vital interest in a return to stability of the southern Mediterranean 
coast. However, in nineteen years of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, there has 
been little effort dedicated to the labour market. And it is clear that those who have 
focused on institutional reforms are now suffering the after-effects of the Spring. 
The so-called ‘neighbourhood’ policy must be rethought because Arab and European 
Mediterranean countries are not only neighbours but share a common history. A 
dimension must be integrated that fosters sub-regional cooperation in the South, 
and partnership between regions in different countries. Indeed, Europe is also a 
Europe of the regions of the countries that constitute it. And it is in this context that 
we should consider structural funds that would help decentralization in conjunc-
tion with land-use planning. Also, in the same perspective, Europe should merge 
its ‘partnerships’ between Gulf Arab countries and the others.
The Arab countries are today living through a turning point in their history and 
development. This turning point is materialized by an unprecedented crisis, which 
has not yet seen its full development. But it also presents an opportunity, for Europe 
as well. The gap cannot widen further across the Mediterranean, nor between the 
Mediterranean and the Gulf. ❚
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S
ustainable development of the Russian econ-
omy should be viewed in the context of finding 
a new growth model, based on knowledge and 
technologies. The current raw materials export-
led growth has exhausted its potential and can-
not address the social and environmental challenges of 
long-term development. Addressing climate change risks 
is essential for long-run sustainability, and consistent with 
the transition to development based on innovation.
Evolution of a model based on the export  
of natural resources
The resource-based character of Russian economic 
growth has been dominant for the last two centuries.1 
Tsarist Russia, until the 1917 revolution, was a large 
exporter of grain, seeking rent from an abundance of 
land resources and cheap labour. The entire economic 
development of Russia during the twentieth century relied 
upon the exploitation of cheap resources for the purposes 
of modernization. During the first half of the century, the 
main cheap resources were the labour of collective farmers 
and forced labour; during the second half of the century, 
new resources were discovered – the energy commodi-
ties of oil and gas.
The demand for reforms grew with the exhaustion of 
resources. In the 1960s, the former agricultural power 
became a net importer of food, which pushed forward 
economic reforms. However, as the USSR started to export 
oil and gas in the 1970s, the revenues helped to make 
up for a shortage in the domestic production of food and 
consumer goods through imports, while there were also 
1.  See Gaidar (2012).
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unsuccessful attempts at modernization. During this period 
economic reforms initially receded, to be reintroduced by 
the end of the 1980s alongside a fall in oil prices, but 
this was too late to prevent the economy from collapsing 
and the political system from radical, revolutionary trans-
formation.
The 1990s were years of deep institutional changes 
(sometimes defined as liberal reforms), during which 
revenues from the export of oil were not very high, though 
played a sizeable role. On the one hand, the inflow of 
foreign currency helped with the supply of consumer 
goods, reducing social tensions. On the other, imports 
were increasing competitive pressure while the apprecia-
tion of the rouble undermined the already weak position 
of domestic producers, which contributed to a deep drop 
in output. The dependence on the export of raw materials 
exposed the economy to external shocks, such as the 
plummeting oil prices in 1997, which triggered the large-
scale economic crisis of 1998.
Russia started the twenty-first century with a rapid 
economic recovery, backed up by several factors.2 The 
first of these was that following years of dramatic trans-
formational slowdown, Russia had a great amount of 
unused productive capacity that could now be put back 
into production. Second, the reforms that had been imple-
mented formed a platform for new businesses. Third, 
the five-fold nominal devaluation of the rouble raised a 
barrier against imports, increasing the competitiveness of 
domestic production. These positive aspects in terms of 
economic recovery and growth factors were accompanied 
2.  See Entov, Lugovoy (2013) for analysis of economic growth factors 
in Russia after 1998, including recovery component and oil prices.
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services with a relatively lower productivity growth 
potential; an appreciation of the national currency which 
compromises the competitiveness of domestic tradables 
production; delay or even deterioration in terms of institu-
tional development; inflation in public spending; inefficient 
public administration; rent-seeking behaviour; high macro-
economic risks; and a vulnerability to external shocks since 
the authorities lack control. The Russian economy has 
exhibited all of these effects, surging until 2008 when 
the global financial crisis peaked, world recession began 
and oil prices fell.
As Russia experienced the limits to its transforma-
tional growth, along with falling oil prices and economic 
stagnation, it became increasingly evident that the natural 
resource export-led model of growth was no longer viable. 
At the turn of 2010-2011 President Vladimir Putin called 
on the expert community to devise alternative strategies 
by soaring oil prices, resulting in almost a decade of 
notable growth rates from 4% to 8%. 
It is symptomatic that during the decade of impres-
sive growth, the modernization of production facilities was 
quite modest, with the exception of some export-oriented 
industries and non-tradables. The share of investment in 
GDP remained at a fairly low level, with the relatively small 
amount of private investment being offset by public invest-
ment made possible by increased revenues from oil and 
gas export. 
The negative aspects of a booming resource sector 
are well established.3 Known as the ‘resource curse’, the 
idea is that initial windfall gains and short-term revenue 
growth are accompanied by: a slowing down of long-term 
economic growth due to a higher share of consumption; 
3.  See Auty (1993), Sachs and Warner (1995).
FIGURE 1 Russian business
The attractiveness of Russia as a country for doing business with remains average, in comparison to the rest of the world. While there 
has been some slight improvement, it has recently deteriorated again.
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for the period up to 2020 since it had become clear that 
‘The Conception for Long-term Economic Development’4 
(the Concept), formerly adopted in 2008, did not meet 
the challenges that the economy faced during the crisis.
Modernization of the Russian economy:  
issues and priorities
Unlike the ministry-developed 2008 Concept which, 
rather than being a guide for action was a set of indica-
tors and targets for different growth scenarios, the 
so-called ‘Strategy’5 was developed in 2013 by a wide 
range of experts and established a blueprint for the 
required reforms. It aims to form a basis for new sources 
of long-term growth and sustainable development up to 
2020 and beyond.
The Strategy gives priority to qualitative rather than 
quantitative growth and acknowledges that the economy 
can no longer rely on the export of raw materials, the 
further expansion of which would not only create insta-
bility but would also foster technological and institutional 
backwardness. Instead, the Strategy’s new growth model 
for Russia aims to stimulate supply by improving the 
business environment and promoting investment in R&D 
and human capital.
The major barrier to Russia’s future development is 
the low quality of its economic institutions. During the 
first decade of the 2000s the country has undergone 
remarkable change: GDP grew by a factor of 1.7 and 
private disposable income increased by a factor of 2.3; 
however, the quality of institutions did not improve and by 
some indicators even deteriorated (see Figure 1). These 
circumstances can lead to the ‘middle-income trap’6, 
which is where labour costs reach the level of middle-
income countries, while the level of institutional develop-
ment remains similar to that of low-income countries. As a 
consequence, an economy loses out through competition 
for investment to both middle and low-income countries. 
Moreover, insufficient domestic demand for skilled labour 
4. http://economy.gov.ru/minec/activity/sections/strategic 
planning /concept / (in Russian).
5. See Mau, Kuzminov (2013).
6. See Gill et al. (2007), Eichengreen et al. (2011, 2013), and Mau 
(2012, 2013) relating to the Russian economy
leads to a ‘brain drain’ and the relocation of high-tech 
companies and profit-centres to other countries.7
The development of institutions and human capital must 
be prioritized in the transition to a new growth model, 
which also requires a more intensive and efficient utiliza-
tion of resources. Energy efficiency and the environment 
should also be given prominence in economic policy since 
they can become a tool to stimulate innovations, health 
improvements and living standards. This approach will 
yield a ‘double dividend’, i.e. the simultaneous solution 
to socioeconomic and ecological problems.8 The policy 
should create economic incentives for ‘green growth’, 
such as the taxation of ecologically harmful products and 
fuels, the fixing of quotas, prohibition of the import of 
obsolete technology, and support for energy-conserva-
tion programmes, energy efficiency and the development 
of renewable energy. Environmental constraints, coupled 
with a high-quality, competitive institutional environment 
will create incentives for innovative solutions.
Another feature of Russia’s growth during the 2000s 
was the slow growth of energy demand and CO2 emissions. 
Official and independent forecasts anticipated a significant 
growth in the consumption of primary and secondary energy. 
Whereas a doubling of GDP over the period 1999-2012 
was in fact only accompanied by a 30% increase in primary 
energy consumption and electricity demand.9 This decou-
pling of economic growth and energy consumption was 
due to changes in the economic structure, particularly a 
reduction in the share of energy-intensive industries, and 
also to the significant energy saving potential that began to 
be unlocked.10 Many opportunities for energy savings had, 
until then, remained mostly untapped due to institutional 
problems: a high level of investment risk, the low quality of 
the institutional environment, short-term planning horizons, 
and the inefficient organizational structure of some sectors 
of the economy (for example, the lack of incentives for 
energy-saving in the housing utilities services).
7. For further discussion see Mau (2013, 2014).
8. This idea is discussed in details in D.W. Jorgenson et al. (2013), 
Double Dividend: Environmental Taxes and Fiscal Reform in the United 
States.
9. Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, IEA, 2014
10.  See f.e. Sargsyan, Gorbatenko (2008).
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In future, growth in energy demand and greenhouse gas 
emissions will be determined by the nature of economic 
growth and the resolution of institutional problems. A 
number of forecasts11 suggest that significant growth 
should not be expected, even in the case of the exten-
sive nature of economic growth. The natural renewal of 
obsolete equipment would provide significant energy 
savings even in energy-intensive industry. International 
experience over the last decades provides real-world 
evidence that energy and ecological constrains do not 
constitute a serious obstacle to development, but rather 
encourage innovations that stimulate development.
11.  Alternative forecasts of Russian GHG emissions up to 2050 are 
summarized at Bashmakov (2014).
Energy prices and a climate change agreement: 
triggers of change? 
As Russia approaches 2015 it is entangled in a number 
of deep and unresolved problems that are holding back 
the transition to a new growth model. The growing aware-
ness of the necessity for institutional and technological 
modernization has not yet resulted in real action. In fact, 
the priority remains the resource-led development model 
and the selection of a number of ‘favourite’ industries and 
companies, rather than shifting the focus on to the devel-
opment of a high-quality business environment.
The current state of the economy is reminiscent of the 
late 1980s with low oil prices, economic slowdown and 
high macroeconomic risks. As history suggests, economic 
reforms are largely dependent upon conditions in the inter-
national energy markets. The most likely scenario favouring 
modernization and innovation would involve low prices for 
FIGURE 2 Reducing CO2 emissions: an environmental and economic objective
Russia has a real potential to reduce its CO2 emissions. Moreover, improving its energy efficiency and modernizing its production facili-
ties would be beneficial for the whole economy.
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primary energy resources. The current decline in oil prices 
might be another such trigger.
Another factor that could facilitate a transition is the 
adoption of a new international agreement on climate 
change commitments, to succeed the Kyoto Protocol. 
The EU, the US, China and a number of other countries 
have already pledged to make major efforts towards the 
mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions. While the Kyoto 
agreement may once have been seen as a burden that 
limits economic growth, today many countries consider 
carbon emission reduction targets as an opportunity for 
modernization and innovation. The Russian Federation 
has declared that it will limit greenhouse gas emissions 
to 75% of the 1990 level by 2020, with a stabilization 
of energy consumption of between 70% and 75% by 
2030.12 This certainly represents a positive step towards 
the decarbonization of the economy, although it remains a 
net increase since current emissions are about 35% less 
than the 1990 level.
Russia has significant potential to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions (see Figure 2), particularly through improve-
ment in energy efficiency and the upgrading of equip-
ment (shown by the difference between the BAU and BASE 
scenarios in Figure 2). Furthermore, Russian business is 
fully aware of the risks of doing nothing and the govern-
ment must take the necessary steps to minimize risks and 
to allow the country to benefit from taking early action. The 
significant potential of renewable energy, including tidal, 
geothermal, hydro and bioenergy, will not be developed 
without appropriate regulation and international coopera-
tion. Capitalizing on this potential is consistent with the 
transition to the new long term and sustainable path of 
growth.
The adoption of real measures for limiting greenhouse 
gas emissions, and participation in new international 
agreements could greatly strengthen Russia’s position in 
global competition for investment, provide incentives for 
modernization, and unlock opportunities for cooperation 
in clean energy. ❚
12. http://eng.state.kremlin.ru/face/23006
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S
trong ruptures have marked the Brazilian model of agricultural 
development since independence. Sustainability has been a 
salient issue, especially since the Rio Earth Summit in 1992. 
For over twenty years, significant progress has been made on 
the environmental and social agendas. The significant decline 
in deforestation rates, the development of a diversified energy 
matrix, and the sharp decline in poverty rates are all undeniable 
achievements of public and private actors. However, do these 
advances allow one to say that Brazil is on the path of ‘sustain-
ability’? Moreover, what does sustainable mean? 
To provide some answers to these questions, we initially trace the major changes 
in the Brazilian development model. Then we discuss how Brazil took up the thorny 
issue of Amazon deforestation, through effective public action. In a third step, we 
analyse the consequences of the model of ‘sustainable agro-industrial growth’ imple-
mented by Brazil, highlighting some key challenges it will have to face. We then show 
that this model cannot be taken for granted. Its ‘success’ is conditioned by tensions 
existing at the national level, between socio-environmental forces and the ‘ruralists’ 
who are pushing to develop Brazilian agribusiness; and at the international level 
between the Brazilian government and developed countries. Finally, we conclude by 
pointing out the limitations of this model and the transformations that seem neces-
sary if Brazilian agriculture is to commit to the path of sustainable development.
In response to international agreements and the influence of environ-
mental movements, Brazil has implemented measures to protect the 
Amazon rainforest including the regulation of logging and the pursuit 
of a ‘sustainable agricultural growth model’. This chapter examines 
whether Brazil is now on a pathway to sustainable development.
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Colonizing and developing the Amazon  
in the 20th century 
Historically, agricultural development in Brazil has been largely based on policies 
aimed at occupying sparsely populated areas and promoting the exploitation of their 
rich natural resources. From the late 1930s, the ‘march to the west’ was the guide-
line of the Getulio Vargas government, leading to the boom in rubber cultivation in 
the Amazon. But it was really from the mid-1960s, under President Kubitchek that 
this strong desire to promote the settlement of the Brazilian backlands has material-
ized, the most striking symbol being the creation of the capital Brasília in the heart 
of the Cerrado. 
Before the 1960s, the Brazilian Amazon was relatively well protected because 
of its isolation. The settlement of this vast inaccessible territory, which represents 
40% of Brazil, was underdeveloped, and logging and agriculture was limited to the 
immediate vicinity of waterways. The project to colonize and develop the North, 
especially to consolidate Brazilian sovereignty over that territory led the govern-
ment to implement a comprehensive plan for infrastructure construction. In 1958, 
the launch of the construction of the road connecting the port city of Belém to the 
new capital, Brasília, and that connecting Cuiabá, Porto Velho and Rio Branco in 
the Southern Amazon, as well as the construction of hydroelectric dams and finally 
the construction of regional airports, has gradually had the effect of opening up the 
Amazon forest area (Kirby et al., 2006). 
From the mid-1960s, the military government’s efforts to occupy the Amazon 
rainforest primarily for geostrategic reasons – an objective that was encapsulated 
by the famous slogan ‘Integrar para não entregar’ (integrate not to surrender) (de 
Mello and Thery, 2003) – took place through the deployment of economic instru-
ments, such as subsidized loans or tax exemptions granted to investors, through the 
allocation of plots of 100 hectares to families with a temporary title of ownership, 
and through the construction of new infrastructure. In 1967, the city of Manaus, in 
the heart of the forest, was awarded the special tax status of ‘free zone’. 
The colonization was organized by the National Institute of Colonization and 
Agrarian Reform (INCRA) that was created in 1970 as part of land reform, based 
on the slogan ‘a land without people for the people without land’, supported by the 
military regime until 1985 (Eloy et al., 2009). Colonization was therefore consid-
ered a conservative way to alleviate land concentration. It avoided land redistribu-
tion where concentration was high, and focused on the agricultural colonization of 
the sparsely populated Amazon rainforest (Young, 1998). 
This policy has had the effect of quickly attracting migrants, mostly landless 
peasants from the Northeast and smallholders from the South, who sold their lands 
due to the pressure from agricultural modernization and the spread of large-scale 
soybean plantations. Twenty years after its construction, two million settlers had 
settled along the Belem-Brasília highway (Kirby et al., 2006). The INCRA reserved 
plots in the Amazon region for private agricultural projects for small poor farmers. 
But much of the spontaneous settlements occurred without any formal titles, which 
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led INCRA, from the mid-1990s, to increase the number of assentamentos1 projects. 
Between 1994 and 2002, the number of families who received land from the state 
grew by just over 160,000 to over 750,000 in 2003 (Fearnside, 2005). 
In the early settlement movement, land clearings were made in small areas mainly 
around roads to establish subsistence crops. However, the occupation of the Amazon 
rainforest was quickly extended by the arrival of wealthier settlers who did not 
hesitate to occupy the land of the early settlers who lacked property titles, through 
widespread illegal practices known as grilagem.2 Then, these new farmers slashed 
and burned large parcels of forest of more than one hundred hectares to convert it 
into pastures (Nepstad et al., 1999). A spontaneous colonization of land by large 
soybean farmers has also changed the landscape on the Amazon frontier. Between 
1990 and 1999, the planted area increased by 129% in the northern part of Mato-
Grosso state, exceeding 1.8 million hectares in 2000 in this region. This movement 
is particularly linked to land speculation on cheap Amazonian land. Some cities 
like Sinop and Alta Floresta emerged following this private settlement movement. 
Radical land-use change truly began in the 1970s (Fearnside, 2005) and within three 
decades, an area of  rainforest higher than the French metropolitan territory was gone. 
From the 1990s, the low cost of land, the creation of new cultivars better adapted 
to soil and climatic conditions by the Brazilian Corporation of Agricultural Research 
(EMBRAPA3), and new financial incentives for the agribusiness sector were the basis 
for a new phase of large-scale soybean cultivation on the Amazonian pioneer front. 
The growing global demand and attractive prices pushed Brazilian farmers to seek 
cheap new land to extend this crop (Nepstad et al., 2006). 
Generally, soybean farmers bought land previously cleared by small farmers, who 
moved to urban areas, or occupied forest areas to establish properties on unclaimed 
public lands (Kirby et al., 2006). 
This phase of recent colonization in the Brazilian Amazon, largely driven by growth 
in global markets, was nevertheless supported by public policy. The government plan 
Avança Brasil launched in the early 2000s has allocated over $40 billion to strengthen 
and modernize the Amazon territory infrastructure (Fearnside, 2002). This plan 
aimed to pave existing roads, to build new ones and to develop new energy sources 
such as gas exploitation and hydroelectric dams. The expansion of the road network 
has linked the ports of Amazonian rivers to major centres of agro-industrial produc-
tion, including the complex of soybean production in the southern Amazon basin. 
Thus, for the Brazilian authorities, the colonization of the Amazon is no longer 
about occupying an empty territory, but rather to ensure that it becomes an engine 
for export-oriented farming and ranching. 
1. Plots located on public lands or expropriated lands for the installation of family farmers. 
2. Public lands and settlements were occupied illegally by new capitalized settlers who created fake ownership documents. 
The term Grilagem describes the common practice of printing fake title deeds and then putting them into a box of crickets 
for several weeks. This gives the papers an aged and genuine appearance.
3. EMBRAPA is the acronym for the Empresa Brasilieira de Pesquisa Agropecuariá, the Brazilian Corporation of Agricul-
tural Research.
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Fighting deforestation in the Amazon  
over the last 20 years 
Until the end of the military regime in 1985, conservation measures for the Amazon 
rainforest were mainly related to considerations of state control over the territory 
and the integration into the nation of large areas with low population densities. 
It was only after the emergence of democracy that true environmental measures 
have been implemented. These were closely related to the mobilization of Brazilian 
social movements and the activism of international environmental non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), which together formed a broad coalition to fight against the 
advancing agricultural frontier in the Amazon. 
The most emblematic example of the influence of this non-governmental coali-
tion is the fight of the National Council of Rubber Tappers under the leadership of 
Chico Mendes (Smouts, 2001). The movement became famous worldwide for its 
struggle against ranchers who acquired large tracts of forest that were tradition-
ally occupied by rubber tappers. Mendes’s murder in 1988 raised a huge wave of 
protest around the world. The mobilization of national and international NGOs led 
the Brazilian government to take measures to protect traditional and indigenous 
populations. Arguably, the most important of these measures was the creation of 
special status protected areas (extractive reserves, known as Reserva Extrativista 
or RESEX) where local communities can live and develop their traditional farming 
systems. RESEX are a particular type of agrarian reform designed to solve a set of 
problems related to land use, the reduction of social inequalities and environmental 
sustainability. They are part of the Brazilian ‘socio-environmentalist’ paradigm that 
promotes an alternative model of development (Santilli, 2005).
However, the main protective measure for the Amazon rainforest was the decision 
in 1996 to reform the 1965 Forest Code. Following the announcement of an all-time 
high deforestation record of 29,000 km2 in 1995, President Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso increased the legal reserve (LR), which is the share of native vegetation 
that landowners must maintain on their properties, from 50% to 80% in Amazonia. 
This measure, however, was difficult to enforce and therefore had only a tempo-
rary effect on the rate of deforestation, which increased again to reach more than 
27,000 km2 in 2004. 
From that date, the federal government has intensified its efforts to protect the 
Amazon rainforest through the Action Plan for Prevention and Control of Deforesta-
tion in the Amazon (PPCDAM). New forest conservation areas have been created, 
bringing the total protected area to two million square kilometres, or 46% of the 
Brazilian Amazon biome forest areas, which corresponds to more than 50% of the 
remaining forests (Soares-Filho et al., 2010). Meanwhile, the federal government 
has strengthened control measures, land regulation and punishment. There have 
been many police operations against environmental crimes, leading to the impris-
onment of hundreds of people, including some IBAMA (Brazilian Institute for the 
Environment) officials, and the seizure of hundreds of thousands of cubic metres 
of illegally harvested timber. 
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The involvement of NGOs has also contributed to the strengthening of public 
action for the preservation of the Amazon rainforest. The soybean sector was partic-
ularly targeted in the mid-2000s. Following actions of civil resistance, such as the 
blocking of the Cargill port in Santarem, in the Brazilian State of Pará, and the 
occupation of McDonald’s restaurants in Europe, ecologists put pressure onto the 
Brazilian Association of Vegetable Oil Industries (ABIOVE) – which includes the 
major soybean exporter groups. On 24 July 2006, they announced a moratorium 
on the commercialization of soybean planted in deforested rainforest plots from 
October 2006 (Guéneau, 2006). 
A return to higher rates of deforestation between 2007 and 2008 led the federal 
government to strengthen its policy for the preservation of the Amazon rainforest. A 
second phase of the PPCDAM was launched. Due to advances in satellite communi-
cation techniques, which allow very accurate real-time data to be obtained on areas 
where forests are converted into pasture or crops, the government is now able to 
take action to control and sanction operators who do not comply with regulations. 
In December 2007, President Lula issued a decree calling on the Ministry of the 
Environment to develop an annual list of municipalities most affected by deforest-
ation in the Amazon and to impose public policy measures that focused on these 
areas. In 2008, the 36 worst hit municipalities were specifically covered by enhanced 
IBAMA control measures. These operations led to the closure of wood production 
units, the confiscation of production equipment (vehicles, etc.) and the seizure of 
20,000 cubic metres of timber and 3,000 heads of cattle from illegal exploitations 
and farms on protected areas. In addition, the Federal Public Ministry of the State of 
Pará has arrested dozens of farmers and managers of processing and meat packing 
plants (Arima et al., 2014). 
In addition to enforcement actions, the federal government has issued measures 
to restrict access to credit for the farmers in municipalities that are facing charges. 
One of the conditions necessary for the removal of a municipality from the defor-
estation blacklist is the requirement to prepare an environmental cadastre of agricul-
tural plots that clearly indicates the areas of LRs and Permanent Preservation Areas 
(PPAs) where deforestation is prohibited because of their ecological value, such 
as pirarian areas and steep slopes. The government of the State of Pará, where 
producers were particularly affected by this measure, has developed a programme 
of ‘green municipalities’ (municipios verdes) to help affected municipalities to ensure 
compliance with legislation. Some NGOs have been involved in the programme 
through the provision of technical support to landowners to develop the environ-
mental cadastre. The programme has had some success in a few municipalities, such 
as Paragominas where illegal deforestation has decreased by 80% between 2007 
and 2010 (Carneiro, 2013), paving the way for its replication at a broader scale. 
However, according to some authors, the success of these credit-related measures 
must be put into perspective because the total amount of credit has risen sharply 
between 2007 and 2011 in the Amazon, while the number of credit agreements has 
remained constant (Arima et al., 2014).  
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In addition to enforcement actions, the federal public prosecutors and leading 
environmental NGOs have increased their pressure on the main meat distribution 
chains. For example, Greenpeace launched a boycott of beef from ranches that do 
not respect the law (Greenpeace, 2009). The federal Public Attorney Office has 
conditioned the withdrawal of lawsuits against slaughterhouses and meatpacking 
companies to an obligation to verify that their suppliers are not in contravention 
of the law. 
Finally, in 2009 the federal government set a target of reducing annual Amazon 
deforestation by 80% by 2020, compared to a baseline historical average annual 
loss of 19,500 km2 between 1996 and 2005. This target falls within the general 
framework of the international debate on reducing emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation (REDD). As a major contributor to the loss of global forest, 
Brazil has been blacklisted for its major contribution to forest carbon emissions. 
Between 2011 and 2012, 4,571 km2 of the Amazon rainforest has been lost, which 
is in fact the lowest level since 1988, which was the year when systematic measure-
ments of annual deforestation were started by the Brazilian Institute of Space 
Research (INPE) using remote sensing techniques. The deforestation reduction that 
FIGURE 1 Land Use and Protection in Brazil
Twenty years of public action against deforestation have created a mosaic of forest and agricultural statutes, each with specific charac-
teristics in terms of conservation, farming methods or funding.
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occurred between 2004 and 2007 is due in part to the overall decline in agricul-
tural commodity prices, the correlation between the evolution of the loss of forests 
and the prices of beef and soybean being relatively strong (Arima et al., 2014). In 
contrast, during the next phase of reduced deforestation (2008-2012), this causal 
link is no longer seen, leading to the conclusion that the implemented public action 
measures have been effective (Arima et al, 2014; Nepstad et al, 2014). 
After a temporary increase in the rate of deforestation between 2012 and 2013 
(over 28% compared to the previous year), it seems to have started declining again 
(-18% between 2013 and 2014), although the latest estimates are tentative and 
controversial.4 In addition, nearly a quarter of the forest area that has been lost 
since the late 1980s is currently in a reforestation phase. Ultimately, through the 
strengthening of public policies since 2004, Amazon deforestation appears to have 
reached its turning point, which suggests a forest transition now in its recovery phase.
The evolution of the agribusiness model and its 
consequences
Brazil’s efforts to fight against Amazon deforestation have had encouraging successes. 
However, Brazil will have to intensify its efforts in the fight against deforestation if it 
is to achieve the goal set out in the national plan of action against climate change. In 
terms of environmental effectiveness, the question for the future is that of sustain-
ability and of the strengthening of actions undertaken since 2004 to bring an end 
to deforestation. 
THE IMPACT OF THE AMAZON FOREST PROTECTION POLICIES ON THE CERRADO BIODI-
VERSITY HOTSPOT
To increase its supply of agricultural products without further extending its utiliza-
tion of the Amazon rainforest, Brazil will have to rely on available land. However, 
the Cerrado, a vast area of wooded savannah in the centre of the country which 
has served for several years as a ‘safety valve’ to the deforestation restrictions in the 
Amazon (Sawyer, 2008), is becoming steadily more degraded and is increasingly 
the subject of national and international attention. 
Conservation biologists consider the Cerrado biome to be one of the world’s 
34 biodiversity hotspots (Mittermeier et al., 1999). However, it has experi-
enced profound changes related to the conversion of half of its original vegeta-
tion into agricultural monocultures, fast-growing tree plantations and pastures. 
(Aubertin and Pinton, 2013). While deforestation in the Amazon has been 
declining since 2004, it is growing in the Cerrado to the extent that since 2011 
the loss through conversion of forest area in this biome is greater than the loss of 
Amazonian rainforest. 
4. Data collected by INPE are subject to certain adjustments, but these adjustments should not affect the results by more 
than 10%. These data are inconsistent with those collected by the NGO Imazon, which showed a deforestation increase 
of 9% using a different satellite data collection system
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Half of the Cerrado biome has already been colonized by crops and pasture, well 
above the 18% of Amazon forest converted to other uses in relative terms. In addition, 
while protected areas cover about half of the Amazon, they represent only 8% of 
the Cerrado biome.
Like the Amazon a few years ago, the Cerrado is becoming an international issue5, 
especially since 2009 when Brazil pledged in Copenhagen to reduce the rate of 
deforestation of this biome by 40% by 2022, compared with the average deforesta-
tion over the period 1999-2005. 
THE NECESSARY INTENSIFICATION OF LIVESTOCK FARMING
There is still a large area of land in Brazil that is available for agriculture, including 
abandoned or underutilized degraded pastures, which represent about 12 million 
hectares. According to some estimates, only a quarter of this available area would 
be needed to meet the demand for meat until 2022 with no further contribution to 
5. http://epoca.globo.com/colunas-e-blogs/blog-do-planeta/noticia/2014/10/bdesmatamento-do-cerradob-o-novo-
vilao-ambiental-do-brasil.html
FIGURE 2 Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon and Cerrado
While Amazon deforestation now seems to have reached a turning point, other agricultural pioneer fronts such as the Cerrado are 
currently undergoing significant forest conversion.
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deforestation (Barreto and Silva, 2013). However, this would require an adapta-
tion of the technical model, particularly with respect to cattle breeding. 
With a stocking rate of about one animal per hectare, livestock farming is consid-
ered to be the main cause of recent deforestation (Walker et al., 2013) with about 
210 million head of cattle at present (IBGE, 2014). Cattle ranching has colonized 
the largest areas of the Brazilian territory: pastures cover about 20% the country’s 
area, while agriculture and forest plantations cover only 7%. 
Indeed, the potential productivity gains are much greater in this sector than 
in highly mechanized agricultural sectors such as soybean. Livestock farming is 
still currently a predominantly extensive activity, which has developed histori-
cally through an unconstrained and under-regulated access to land, although this 
situation is changing gradually with the professionalization of the entire industry, 
upstream (genetic improvement, nutrition, safety...) and downstream (slaughter, 
preservation, processing, distribution...) (Ruviaro et al., 2014). 
Some models show that the productivity of Brazilian pastures reaches only 
32-34% of its potential. If this could be increased to 49-52%, it would be sufficient 
to meet the future demand (including both internal consumption and exports) for 
meat, agricultural products, plantations timber and biofuels at least until 2040, 
without the need for new conversions of natural areas (Strassburg et al., 2014).
For government, the challenge is therefore to show that it is possible to develop 
a competitive and intensive farming activity, which would no longer encroach on 
the forest. The intensification of livestock production is part of a strategy that 
shows the continued efforts of Brazil in the fight against climate change, but also 
in a strategy to respond to the requirements of certain markets. 
Through the ‘avoided deforestation’ made  possible by the intensification of 
livestock production, and through the recovery of degraded pastures, Brazil intends 
to continue its agro-exporter development model while responding to criticism from 
environmental NGOs. Some studies show that by 2030, targeted public policies 
focused on the livestock sector, through instruments such as taxes and subsidies, 
would enable significant reductions in CO2 emissions (Cohn et al., 2014). 
THE FOCUS ON LARGE AND MEDIUM SIZED HOLDINGS: A PRAGMATIC OR RESTRICTIVE 
APPROACH? 
The ‘sustainable agro-industrial model’ that the Brazilian government intends to 
promote is based on action that has focused primarily on large and medium-sized 
holdings. Such a focus may be relevant, insofar as these holdings are responsible 
for the bulk of the loss of Brazilian rainforest. Only about 12% of deforestation 
in the 2004-2011 period resulted from smallholders with less than 100 hectares 
(Godar et al., 2014). 
Subsequent to this strategy, the size of the forest polygons converted to agricul-
tural uses had significantly decreased: according to INPE data, cleared plots of 
more than 25 hectares accounted for 70% of deforestation in 2003, compared 
to less than 30% in 2012. In other words, the rate of decline of deforestation has 
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been much faster in capitalized large rural holdings than in small ones. Thus, over 
time, areas where small land settlement projects predominated became the ones 
with the highest deforestation rates in the Brazilian Amazon (Godar et al., 2014). 
The future of small family farmers remains at present a subject that is rarely taken 
into account in Amazon development policies. However, these actors play a signifi-
cant role in the implementation of a strategy for the sustainable development of the 
Amazon (Pokorny and Pacheco, 2014). Family farms are established according to a 
well-known procedure that involves burning the forest to plant food crops. However, 
the organic input to the soil derived from fire has a limited duration and the soil 
productivity decreases rapidly, which encourages farmers to convert these plots into 
pastures and to move on to new forest areas that they burn as before. Brazilian legis-
lation authorizes the clearing of areas smaller than three hectares per year. There-
fore, given that 460,000 small farmer families are present in the Amazon, this could 
have a major impact on deforestation. An agreement authorizing the transformation 
of one hectare of forest into farmland per family would involve the deforestation of 
4,600 km², an area that is larger than Brazil’s unilateral commitment that it aims 
to achieve by 2020 as part of its fight against climate change (Sist et al., 2012). It 
is therefore necessary to consider these family farms in the region’s strategies for 
sustainable development. 
Technical models combining agriculture, livestock farming and forestry could 
be implemented to ensure the sustainability of smallholder agriculture (Sist et al., 
2012). But it is also important to consider the changes in the balance between rural 
and urban that results from the gradual introduction of the sustainable agro-indus-
trial model of growth in the Amazon. At present less than 30% of the population 
of the northern region live in rural areas, and migration from the countryside to 
cities is increasingly common, especially family farmers (Lapola et al., 2014). For 
the Brazilian government, sustainable urban development is also becoming a key 
issue, even in the remotest areas of the Amazon. 
A model under domestic and international pressure 
There have been significant successes in the fight against deforestation. The 
continuing forest conservation efforts undertaken by successive governments for 
over a decade rest however on a very fragile balance of power, both internally 
and externally. 
On the domestic front, the discussions seem to be turning in favour of the so-called 
‘ruralists’ in Congress6 who are gradually rolling out a set of environmental measures, 
while lobbying the government to strengthen its agribusiness development policy. 
Faced with the strong growth in domestic and international demand for Brazilian 
agricultural products (Garrett et al., 2013) advocates of a ‘hard’ development 
6. The recent elections (2014) have strengthened the Bancada ruralista, a majority group of Congressmen that supports 
the agribusiness sector; some elected members of this group are part of the major Union boards and/or large farm owners 
and producers.
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focused on production are indeed trying to remove a number of obstacles blocking 
the revival of agribusiness based on the under-regulated exploitation of the country’s 
natural resources. The pressure they impose on the government is particularly strong 
in the context of the reduction in the growth rate currently plaguing Brazil. 
Following the recent elections, the ruralist parliamentary front is more powerful 
than ever before, now representing the majority in Congress. There is a risk that the 
balance of power, which is already very much in favour of agricultural interests, could 
be shifted, leading to the challenging of the socio-environmental progress made so 
far. The Growth Acceleration Programme (PAC) initiated by President Dilma Rousseff 
will direct investment towards the construction of infrastructure (roads, ports, hydro-
electric dams...) to facilitate the flow of Amazonian agro-industrial products to the 
south of the country and abroad. Pressures to reduce conservation areas and limit 
the rights of indigenous peoples are also increasing (Arima et al., 2014). 
The reform of the 1965 Forest Code is also part of this ruralist pressure on the 
federal government. For several years, the ruralists sought to reduce the environ-
mental constraints to agricultural development in the northern region of Brazil, in 
particular through a more flexible implementation of forest conservation public 
policies. Passed by Congress in 2012, the reform was initiated by the widespread 
non-compliance of the Forest Code, particularly with regard to the LR and PPAs. 
Some observers point out that the Forest Code was so rarely respected that it 
became unworkable (Nepstad et al., 2014). The new Forest Code provides amnesty 
for landowners whose crimes predate 22 July 2008. In other words, deforestation in 
the LR and PPAs is now legalized provided that landowners commit to the regulariza-
tion of their status register and to the restoration of degraded areas. This restoration 
can be considered as part of a compensation system, whereby landowners maintain 
more than the legally authorized percentages of forest cover7 on other rural proper-
ties that they own. Through this reform, the government demonstrates its will to 
maintain the agro-exporter model, which satisfies the demands of reducing defor-
estation and CO2 emissions by making the Forest Code more flexible. 
Environmental NGOs are particularly concerned about the potential environmental 
and social impacts of these developments, particularly with regard to the new Forest 
Code and major projects such as the Belo Monte hydroelectric dam in the heart of 
the Amazon. 
Despite these objections, Brazil does not intend to allow NGOs and foreign govern-
ments to dictate its development model. Instead, its status as an emerging power 
puts it in a position of strength in multilateral discussions. The country aims to show 
that its development choices are sound, despite the uncertainties still surrounding 
its ability to further reduce deforestation. Brazil has also refused to sign the agree-
ment reached in September in New York at the UN summit on climate that was 
7. The legislative provisions relating to the LR have also been made more flexible: in the Federated States which have 
more than 65% of the territory occupied by conservation units and/or indigenous territories, and in the municipalities 
(municipios) where these protected areas occupy 50% of the territory, the LR percentage may now be reduced from 80% 
to 50% by local authorities.
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adopted by more than 130 governments, businesses, civil society organizations 
and indigenous peoples, including some Amazonian state governments (Amapa, 
Amazonas and Acre). This agreement, which aims to halve deforestation by 2020 
and then bring it to an end in 2030, has no binding commitment. It is a simple 
statement of intent, one that the Brazilian government has rejected on the grounds 
that it was not involved in the negotiations that led to the text of the agreement. 
This refusal also comes from the fact that the Brazilian legislation allows a certain 
level of deforestation on private property, as long as the LR thresholds are met (in 
the Amazon, 50% to 80%).
It is getting more difficult for international cooperation to influence the direction 
of Brazilian development. This is partly because Brazil no longer relies on interna-
tional funding programmes that can be unlocked through devices like REDD that 
are negotiated in multilateral environmental agreements (Aubertin, 2012), but also 
because exports of Brazilian agricultural products are less dependent on European 
and North American countries, which are the most sensitive to environmental issues. 
This is particularly true for the Brazilian beef and soybean sectors, which have an 
FIGURE 3 Brazilian agriculture remains export-oriented
Cattle rearing and soybean production are the two activities historically responsible for deforestation in Brazil. Both activities are 
strongly driven by exports, increasingly towards external markets that are more dynamic and less sensitive to environmental issues 
than Western markets.
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increasing number of opportunities in emerging countries (China for soybean, Russia 
and the Middle East for meat).
Finally, the ruralists are influential on matters of external intervention that they 
regard as similar to new forms of ‘green’ colonialism. This sovereignist position, 
which regularly enters the internal debate8, considers environmental NGOs as agents 
of Northern governments, trying to wrap the Amazon in cotton wool to limit growth 
opportunities for the supply of Brazilian agricultural products that compete directly 
with the subsidized agricultural products from rich countries. This is the sentiment 
expressed by MP Aldo Rebelo9, the rapporteur of the Parliamentary Committee that 
is examining the relevance of a forestry code reform (Rebelo, 2010). 
Conclusion 
Brazil has been subjected to a great deal of pressure regarding the Amazon, but today 
the public action that has been carried out for over a decade is often presented as a 
success story. Obviously, the strengthening of control policies has greatly reduced 
the loss of Amazonian forests over the last ten years. However, this is nuanced by 
the relocation of deforestation to the Cerrado. 
The rise of the ruralists and the very unequal treatment of players is questioning 
Brazil’s ability to meet its medium and long-term commitments. In addition, the 
slowdown in economic growth leads to lower fiscal revenues dedicated to expensive 
operations to control illegal deforestation.
Despite these uncertainties, the return to deforestation levels close to those 
observed in 2004 seems unlikely. However, the consolidation and continued efforts 
made so far require real changes in strategy, particularly with regard to changing the 
practices of small-scale and poorly-capitalized rural actors. Public policy has so far 
mainly sought to accommodate a development model that is based on the growth 
of agribusiness, without fundamentally challenging this model.
Brazil’s transformation towards sustainable development also needs to be based on 
the sustainable use of its rich biodiversity and the valuation of ecosystem services, 
which has been demanded by Brazil’s social and environmental forces. ❚
8. In 1960 Arthur Cezar Ferreira Reis published A Amazônia e a Cobiça Internacional (Amazon and the international covet-
ousness) and then various theses were later taken up by the ruralists, including Mafia verde o ambientalismo ao Serviço 
do Governo Mundial (Carrasco, 2006), published in 2001, and Mafia Verde 2: ambientalismo, novo colonialismo (Carrasco 
et al., 2005).
9. The discourse on sovereignty and development is based on broad ideological foundations that transcend political 
parties, which is demonstrated by the alliance between Aldo Rebelo, a member of the Brazilian Communist Party, and 
the conservative Bancada ruralista.
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CHAPTER 6
A 
characteristic of the 2015 juncture is that 
sustainable development is becoming the 
paradigm of international cooperation. For the 
first time, targets will apply to all countries 
of the world. There are several uncertainties 
that concern public health actors in developing countries: 
(i) after the political attention given to health issues, in 
particular the fight against AIDS, in the framework of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), what will be their 
status after 2015? (ii) how will the specific health situ-
ation of poor countries, particularly African populations, 
be encompassed by a universal format? These issues are 
acute, particularly because it appears that there are no 
prospective studies that would enable policy makers, from 
the African continent or from international cooperation 
organizations, to understand and anticipate what will be in 
the coming years the health effects of dramatic economic 
and social changes that Africa is undergoing as a result 
of the dual demographic and epidemiological transition, 
where the population growth is the fastest ever known 
in the history of mankind. The future of West and Cen-
tral Africa is key: these regions are the furthest behind in 
achieving the MDGs and also the most politically unsta-
ble. The countries in these regions are either entering into 
armed conflict one after another (Ivory Coast, Mali, Central 
African Republic, Nigeria, etc.) or into a long-term mixture 
of post-conflict and development situations (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo).
Sub-Saharan Africa: making health 
sustainable
Dominique Kerouedan, Founder and Scientific Adviser for Concentration in Global Health at 
Sciences Po’s Paris School of International Affairs, Paris, France 
The perception of pandemic risks  
and the notion of ‘global health’
From the beginning of 2000, the fight against AIDS, 
rather than health strategies as a whole, benefited from 
the largest amounts of funding, through the Global Fund 
and the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 
(PEPFAR). AIDS was included, for the first time in its history 
in January 2000, in the agenda of the UN Security Council 
meetings, because the African pandemic was perceived 
by the US government as a threat to national, and even 
global, security, which was relayed by the Secretary-
General Kofi Annan in his speech at the G8 in Genoa and 
Okinawa (KeroueDaN D., 2013). During the creation of the 
world initiatives or innovative funding mechanisms such as 
UNITAID, patient associations and pharmaceutical compa-
nies formed an unlikely alliance to demand respectively 
access to treatment and the creation of a solvent market 
to reassure the industry. This public private advocacy was 
keen to perpetuate and export a treatment model, particu-
larly as this is the dominant model in the health sectors of 
rich countries, which place little importance on prevention 
and health promotion.
In 2011, the debates of the UN General Assembly (GA) 
on chronic diseases did not end up with any pledges of 
funding from the international community. These scourges 
of the modern world, because they are not communi-
cable, do not induce a major global response. It is low and 
middle-income countries that carry more than 80% of the 
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FIGURE 1  African challenges related to access to health 
Rapid and uncontrolled urbanization, a severe lack of health personnel, coverage of medical costs still in its infancy... West Africa needs 
specific intervention to sustainably meet the needs of its population.
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attributable burden of these diseases (WHO, 2010). At the 
2011 GA, there was no mention of alcohol abuse, which 
ranks as one of the most alarming risk factors for cancer. 
Other industrial lobbies are also in action. Thus, is the 
willingness to fund health on a global scale directly related 
to the pandemic risk, or to the perception of a health threat, 
as we have observed during the emergence of episodes 
of SARS, H5N1 and H1N1, or the Ebola outbreak in West 
Africa in 2014?
These phenomena, which were regarded as potentially 
destabilizing in political and security terms, helped estab-
lish the definition of the concept of ‘global health’, which 
appeared for the first time in 1997 in a publication of the 
US Institute of Medicine, America's Vital Interest in Global 
Health, in which chapter 2 states the following: ‘the world’s 
nations, the US included, now have too much in common 
to consider health as a merely a national issue. Instead, 
a new concept of “global health” is required to deal with 
health problems that transcend national boundaries, that 
may be influenced by circumstances and experiences in 
other countries, and that are best addressed by coopera-
tive actions and solutions’ (…) ‘The risks are being trans-
ferred too, HIV is by far the most important of the new 
infections, both globally and in the United States.’1
An alternative model of ‘sustainable health’
This global health perspective is relatively recent. Since 
the origin of the 'development' concept2, it is the economic 
argument, followed by the fight against poverty, which 
1.  Institute of Medicine, 1997, in the Chapter ‘The globalization of health: 
common problems, common needs’.
2. Founded by the American President Harry Truman in his Inaugural Address 
in 1949: ‘We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of 
our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement 
and growth of underdeveloped areas. More than half the people of the world 
are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are 
victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty 
is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas.’.
FIGURE 2 International assistance out of step with need
. Development assistance is only rarely appropriate 
to the health needs of developing countries. The 
most funded countries are not those where the need 
for medical treatment, expressed in lost years of life 
in full health, is greatest. 
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underlie the concept of ‘health and development’. This 
concept is a dimension of development policies rather than 
sustainable development, the latter having long favoured 
environmental issues, ‘the recommendation for social 
justice being forgotten in the discourse’ [le moNDe, 2013]. 
The challenge of sustainable development after 2015 will 
be to keep the promise to grant an equal amount of polit-
ical attention to the three pillars of sustainable develop-
ment, including that of social justice, both thematically 
and geographically. 
The 2012 Rio Summit Resolution states that: ‘health 
is a precondition for, an outcome of, and an indicator of 
all three dimensions of sustainable development’ (GA/UN, 
Resolution 66/288). Indeed, health is among the listed 
sustainable development goals after 2015: ‘Ensure healthy 
life and promote well-being for all at all ages’.3 Neverthe-
less, the stakes are high and the trade-offs are uncer-
tain between priorities and countries. Social and health 
inequalities stem from policies and structural sources 
(CommissioN oN GloBal GoverNaNCe for HealtH, 2014). African 
economic growth is not accompanied by poverty reduc-
tion and job creation.4 The poorest countries are also the 
orphans of aid (KeroueDaN D., 2014). Some health problems 
that are not common from the point of view of their scale 
and their nature have not, so far, fallen under the paradigm 
of sustainable development: the intellectual and mental 
development of children with malnutrition or malaria, the 
death of pregnant women, all forms of violence against 
girls and women, the security of the civilian population 
and care providers in war zones, deaths outside hospitals 
in the absence of health insurance, inequity in the distri-
bution of global aid, health inequalities that are trans-
mitted over generations, etc. These unique situations call 
for specific answers.
Universal health coverage (UHC) appears as a solution 
for a world that is expected to ‘converge’ from a health 
point of view (tHe laNCet CommissioN oN iNvestiNG iN HealtH, 
2013). While UHC can help reduce poverty, health improve-
ment is more a result of policies that enhance, rather than 
3. Goal 3. Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals, Outcome 
document, p. 7, New York, 19th July 2015. http://sustainabledevelopment.
un.org/focussdgs.html 
4.  See B. Arma., 2013 and V. Ramachandran, 2014.
frustrate, the right to health and a vision of life and the 
world that establishes a model of ‘sustainable health’, 
which inspires democratic debate involving people and 
patients striving for ‘the health we want’. Amartya Sen was 
already suggesting this approach in the late 1990s: ‘The 
public has to see itself not merely as a patient, but also 
as an agent of change. The penalty of inaction and apathy 
can be illness and death’ (seN A., 2000). By refocusing the 
debate on human health policy, rather than relentlessly 
reducing it to that of the financing of the systems or the 
sector, societies will be prepared, not to have to deal with 
an increasing number of patients, but to build societies 
producing fewer sick people. The sustainable preserva-
tion of health could possibly be the only common ground, 
which is hopefully universally shared.
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California plans for its 
2050 climate future
C
alifornia has been a leader on environmental policy since the 
1960s, when it adopted the first-ever regulations to control 
automotive emissions in an effort to combat the state’s air pollu-
tion problems. In the 1970s, California led the nation in efforts 
to increase energy efficiency. Since that time, California has 
continued to lead in these efforts, and to build on them to combat 
global climate change. While the state has taken its position as a 
forerunner, the state’s economy has continued to grow and the 
state has reaped economic and environmental benefits.
The state has taken a comprehensive approach to addressing 
climate change, leading efforts to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, to prepare 
for unavoidable climate impacts, and to support research into climate change, options 
to reduce emissions, and to safeguard the state from unavoidable climate impacts, 
which are already being experienced across California. The state’s leadership has also 
led to the development of several interstate and international agreements for cooper-
ation on climate change policy. California is working, on a global scale, to demon-
strate the important and meaningful impact that subnational entities are having in 
addressing global climate change. This chapter outlines the evolution of California’s 
climate change programme, progress to date, and next steps for the state as it looks 
to achieve deep emission reduction by the middle of this century.
A brief history – California’s environmental leadership
California has been an environmental leader for many years. Two key areas of leader-
ship include improving air quality and increasing energy efficiency. Work in these 
California is a pioneer state in terms of environmental protection 
and also for specific action on climate and the promotion of the 
green economy. Its choices have been a lever for changing national 
and regional policies in this area. The Brown administration that 
is currently in power is working to define and implement a climate 
trajectory for 2050, the influence of which should go beyond state 
borders.
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areas has been underway for several decades 
and has resulted in significant benefits for the 
state, while serving as the foundation for the 
state’s actions on climate change. 
TACKLING AIR POLLUTION 
In 1960, California established a board to test 
and certify emission control devices for motor 
vehicles as a response to the state’s unhealthy 
and severe air pollution problems in the Los 
Angeles area. Following that, the state estab-
lished a series of vehicle technology require-
ments and tailpipe emission regulations. 
These regulations preceded any action on the 
federal level by several years. This leadership 
was ultimately reflected in the first federal 
Clean Air Act, which granted California the 
ability to establish its own, more stringent standards for passenger vehicle emissions 
control. The Clean Air Act also allows other states to opt to follow California’s stand-
ards instead of federal standards, a choice that many, particularly northeastern, 
states have made. California’s special status was granted because of the state’s 
‘unique’ air quality challenges and ‘pioneering efforts’ (Clean Air Act of 1967 as 
cited in Hanemann, 2008). Each time California establishes new vehicle emission 
standards, the US Environmental Protection Agency grants the state a waiver that 
allows the state to implement the rules.  
With this authority, California has designed increasingly stringent requirements 
for reductions of smog-forming emissions through emissions control technology and 
advanced vehicle technology, including strict tailpipe standards and requirements 
to limit evaporative emissions from vehicles. As part of its low emission vehicle 
programme, the state also developed a zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) programme. 
Most recently, the state has combined its programmes into an Advanced Clean Cars 
programme, which focuses on reducing smog-forming and GHG emissions from 
the passenger vehicle fleet and to promote broader dissemination and adoption of 
advanced vehicle technologies.
IMPROVING ENERGY EFFICIENCY
During the Energy Crisis of the 1970s, California led the way in establishing energy 
efficiency standards for buildings and appliances. California has remained out in 
front on energy efficiency, setting standards that are models for other states, the 
federal government, and other countries. As a result of these standards, Califor-
nia’s per capita electricity consumption has remained nearly constant since 1975 
and well below the national average since 1990. One study has estimated that the 
energy savings that have resulted from California’s energy efficiency policies have 
FIGURE 1 A pioneer in electricity efficiency
For over twenty years the electricity consumption per person in 
California has been stable and is less than half the average per 
capita consumption of the United States.
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added approximately $40 billion to the economy from 1972 to 2007 (Roland-
Holst, 2008).
California’s continued efforts to improve energy efficiency are reflected in its 
loading order, or the order in which the state dispatches resources to meet electricity 
demand. The state’s loading order places energy efficiency in the first priority, 
meaning that energy efficiency measures including efficiency standards and demand 
side management will be the first methods deployed to meet increasing demand. 
Following energy efficiency, the state prioritizes renewable electricity sources, 
followed by clean, efficient natural gas. The loading order has been in place for 
several decades and was reaffirmed in the 2003 Energy Action Plan (State of 
California, 2003).
To facilitate its efforts to increase energy efficiency, the state’s electricity rate 
structure also benefits from decoupling, which is a structure designed to alleviate 
the disincentive that utilities have to promote energy efficiency. Under this struc-
ture, a utility’s profits are not tied to the amount of electricity sold, but rather rates 
are adjusted to meet specific revenue targets. These revenue targets are set to allow 
utilities to recover their fixed costs and are periodically reviewed to ensure cost 
recovery (for more information on decoupling, see NARUC, 2007). California has 
the longest experience of any state with decoupling, since it adopted the approach 
in the early 1980s.
TAKING ON CLIMATE CHANGE
Climate change has been a part of California’s policy landscape since the late 1980s, 
when the State Legislature requested the first assessment of climate change impacts 
on the state and assessment of options for reducing GHG emissions (Franco et al., 
2008). Following that legislation, two reports were issued that outlined climate 
impacts and options for reducing GHG emissions in 1989 and 1991 (Franco et al., 
2008). However, it was several years until the state took formal steps to address 
climate change. 
From these initial steps, California’s climate change programme has evolved into 
sector-specific emission reduction programmes and then into the comprehensive 
climate policy that is in place today. The state began its climate activities building on 
its leadership in transportation and energy (Hanemann, 2008). From here, the state’s 
policy has further evolved and developed, leading to stronger regulations to reduce 
emissions and greater investments in research to support climate policies. Building 
on these focused successes, the state then adopted a comprehensive, economy-wide 
GHG emission reduction target.
ASSEMBLY BILL 1493: CONTROLLING VEHICLE EMISSIONS
In 2002, California adopted Assembly Bill (AB) 1493, a law directing the California 
Air Resources Board to set tailpipe emission standards to limit GHG emissions 
from passenger vehicles (California State Assembly, 2002). These regulations 
were developed and adopted using California’s special status under the Clean Air 
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Act, which had enabled decades of strong standards to control passenger vehicle 
emissions of so-called ‘criteria air pollutants’, which are a set of pollutants for which 
the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sets national limits.
These regulations were the first of their kind in the world. The regulations set 
fleet average standards for passenger cars and light trucks, starting with the 2009 
model year. The standards are designed to be phased in and become increasingly 
stringent, to achieve a 30% reduction in GHG emissions from new cars by 2016. 
Despite a lawsuit by the automobile industry and initial delays from the US EPA in 
granting California the waiver needed to implement the standards, the regulations 
have been adopted by a number of other states. 
California’s motor vehicle emissions standards demonstrate the far-reaching effect 
of the state’s environmental leadership. While the Clean Air Act only gives special 
authority to California, other states are able to choose to follow California’s vehicle 
standards instead of the federal ones. Shortly after their adoption, enough states had 
opted for the Californian regulations (including the GHG standards) to account for 
about one third of the US vehicle market. Ultimately, the US government established 
fuel economy standards for new vehicles that harmonized with California’s rules 
and now all new vehicles sold in the US achieve the GHG emission targets that were 
set in California. 
Building a market for renewable energy
In addition to pushing for increased energy efficiency, California also established a 
programme to encourage the production of clean, renewable sources of electricity. 
In 2002, California adopted its first Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS). The RPS 
required all investor-owned utilities, electric service providers, and community 
choice aggregators1 to procure 20% of their electricity from renewable sources by 
2020. The 2003 State Energy Action Plan accelerated this timeline, calling for 20% 
renewables by 2010 (State of California, 2003). This more aggressive target was 
codified into law in 2006 (California State Senate, 2006a). More recently, the 
state has adopted stronger goals, which are discussed below.
Alongside its goals for renewable energy, California also established an emissions 
performance standard for long-term contracts for baseload power (California State 
Senate, 2006b). Under these rules, utilities cannot enter into contracts with entities 
that exceed the state’s performance standard. The guidelines are set at a level that 
will eventually result in the phase-out of electricity from coal (California Energy 
Commission, 2014). 
California has also taken a comprehensive, multi-stakeholder approach to siting 
large renewable energy projects in the state’s desert region. The Desert Renewable 
Energy Conservation Plan (DRECP) includes state, federal, and local governments 
1. Community choice aggregators (CCAs) are cities or counties that buy power on behalf of an aggregated group of 
customers. Residents can opt out of participation. CCAs enable communities to purchase contracts for alternative energy 
supplies.
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as well as conservation groups. The plan has identified areas for renewable energy 
development and priority areas for species and habitat conservation. The goal of 
the plan is to enhance and restore natural ecosystems, while also providing renew-
able energy developers with more predictable and certain permit timing and costs 
(DRECP, 2014). 
Bringing it together: adopting a GHG emission target
California’s vehicle and energy policies laid strong groundwork for the adoption 
of a comprehensive climate mitigation programme. In 2005, then-Governor Arnold 
Schwarzenegger announced that California would take steps to reduce GHG emissions 
economy-wide. Through Executive Order (EO) S-03-05, Governor Schwarzenegger 
established emission reduction targets for the state. This included a directive to reduce 
statewide GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020 and to reduce emissions to 80% 
below 1990 levels by 2050 (EO S-03-05).2 These deep emission reductions by the 
middle of the century are on the order of those believed to be necessary to achieve 
climate stabilization and limit the impacts of global warming.
ASSEMBLY BILL 32: THE GLOBAL WARMING SOLUTIONS ACT OF 2006
In 2006, California took steps to codify the 2020 emission reduction target into law. 
AB 32, The Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, established the 2020 emission 
target to reduce GHG emissions to 1990 levels. The bill placed the responsibility and 
authority for implementing AB 32 with the California Air Resources Board (CARB), 
the agency that has led California in its efforts to address air pollution. The bill 
also included a ‘safety valve’, which allowed for a delay in meeting the target under 
specific circumstances. The safety valve was included as part of the negotiation of 
the legislative language (Hanemann, 2008). AB 32 also included language that 
allowed for the use of market mechanisms (e.g., cap and trade or a carbon tax) as 
part of the state’s effort to reduce emissions. The law directed CARB to develop a 
Scoping Plan, outlining how the state would achieve the 2020 emission reduction 
target (California State Assembly, 2006)
CARB adopted the first Scoping Plan in 2008, outlining the programmes that 
would be implemented to meet the 2020 target. The foundation for the state’s 
emission reductions lay in its well-established programmes, including the state’s 
vehicle emissions standards, the renewable portfolio standard, and energy 
efficiency measures. The Scoping Plan also included a number of new programmes, 
including a low carbon fuel standard for transportation fuels, programmes to 
reduce GHG emissions from medium- and heavy-duty vehicles, and programmes 
to reduce high global warming potential gases. The Scoping Plan also called 
for the development and implementation of a cap and trade programme to be 
implemented to reduce a portion of the state’s GHG emissions (California Air 
Resources Board, 2008). 
2.  Text of the Executive Order is available here: http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=1861
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Following the passage of AB 32, CARB adopted a series of regulations to limit 
GHG emissions. In addition several new laws were enacted to reduce GHG emissions 
from several sources. 
LAND USE AND TRANSPORTATION
In 2008, California adopted a law to require the reduction of per capita GHG 
emissions through the integration of land use and transportation planning at a 
regional scale. Senate Bill (SB) 375 directed CARB to develop regional GHG emission 
reduction targets (California State Senate, 2008). Regions demonstrate compli-
ance with these targets through the preparation of sustainable communities strat-
egies. These strategies include efforts to reduce vehicle miles travelled through a 
combination of efficient land use and investments in transit and other alternatives 
to driving such as biking and walking. 
RENEWABLE ENERGY 
When Governor Brown took office in 2010, he reaffirmed the state’s commitment to 
reduce GHG emissions and adopted several additional laws and goals to achieve this 
objective. This includes a bill that increases the state’s renewable portfolio standard 
to 33% by 2020 (California State Senate, 2011). Governor Brown also set a goal 
to encourage the deployment of zero emission vehicles (ZEVs), setting a goal of 
reaching 1.5 million ZEVs on the road by 2025 (EO B-16-2012, for more details see 
Governor’s Office, 2013). He also set goals for distributed generation (i.e., rooftop 
photovoltaics and small renewable systems) and combined heat and power. The state 
also aims to increase building energy efficiency in new buildings to reach a zero-net-
energy standard by 2020 in residential buildings and by 2030 in commercial build-
ings (California Energy Commission, 2007), which has been reaffirmed in recent 
energy planning exercises. 
As the state increases its reliance on intermittent renewable sources of electricity, 
it is developing a programme to procure and install energy storage technology. The 
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) was instructed to set a target for energy 
storage (California State Assembly, 2010). In 2013, the CPUC adopted an energy 
storage procurement target of 1,325 megawatts by 2020 for the state’s three investor-
owned utilities. The storage is to be installed by 2024 (CPUC, 2013). California’s plan 
for energy storage is the first of its kind in the US. 
CAP AND TRADE
AB 32 gave CARB the authority to use market mechanisms to reduce GHG emissions. 
As a result, California has developed a cap and trade programme. The cap covers 
about 85% of the state’s emissions and is responsible for about 15% of the emissions 
reductions necessary to meet the AB 32 target. The emissions cap was set in 2013 and 
declines annually from that initial point. The programme began with the free alloca-
tion of emissions allowances, but subsequent allowances have had to be purchased by 
auction. The state held its first cap and trade auction in 2012. In its first two years, the 
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programme covered electric utilities and large industrial customers. In 2015, transpor-
tation fuels will be included under the cap (California Air Resources Board, 2011). 
Revenues from the cap and trade auctions are used to support programmes to 
reduce GHG emissions. To identify potential areas where this income can be invested, 
the state has developed a cap and trade investment plan. Auction proceeds must 
be invested in projects that will lead to demonstrable GHG emission reductions. In 
addition, state law requires that 25% of auction proceeds be invested in projects that 
benefit disadvantaged communities and that 10% be invested in projects located in 
disadvantaged communities (California State Senate, 2012). 
INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT
California has long partnered with other states and countries to share information, 
coordinate programmes, and advance environmental goals; and climate change has 
been no exception. These agreements span broad geographic scales and include 
a range of elements. One of the most recent and complex agreements is between 
California and the Canadian province of Quebec. In January 2014, California and 
Quebec linked their cap and trade systems, enabling allowances from both jurisdic-
tions to be used in either programme. The two governments held their first joint 
auction in 2014.
In addition, California has agreements with several other US states and Canadian 
provinces through the Pacific Coast Collaborative. Through this agreement, the states 
of Washington, Oregon, and California, along with the Canadian province of British 
Columbia have committed to accounting for the cost of carbon pollution and adopting 
and maintaining low carbon fuel standards. Where feasible and appropriate, the 
signatories will link programmes. 
California also has agreements with a number of Chinese government entities. 
These include agreements with the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, the National 
Ministry of Environmental Protection, the provinces of Jiangsu and Guangdong, 
and the Beijing Ministry of Environmental Protection. The Memorandums of Under-
standing include cooperation on addressing air pollution, low-carbon development, 
clean transportation, and investment in clean energy technologies. 
California has also developed agreements with the government of Mexico that 
address energy, climate change, air pollution, and carbon pricing. These agreements 
were signed in July 2014. California has additional agreements with numerous 
other states and regions throughout the world, including several countries in South 
America, India, Japan, and Israel.3
OPPOSITION TO AB 32
When the law was passed in 2006, California had a strong economy with low 
unemployment (below 5%) and a steady, but slowing real estate market (California 
3.  A full list of California’s current Memorandums of Understanding can be found here: http://climatechange.ca.gov/
climate_action_team/intergovernmental.html
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Department of Finance, 2006). AB 32 was supported by all major environmental 
groups in California, as well as many local governments, industrial leaders, several 
labour organizations, and members of California’s congressional delegation, 
including the US Senators Boxer and Feinstein. It also received the editorial support 
of the state’s major newspapers and the New York Times. On the other side, the largest 
opponents were generally those with the most to lose – oil companies.4 However, 
some companies that were also greatly affected by the bill, including Pacific Gas 
and Electric, one of the state’s largest investor-owned utilities, supported the passage 
of AB 32.
Opposition to AB 32 has manifested in several ways. The most public being a 2010 
ballot measure that would have delayed the implementation of AB 32 until Califor-
nia’s unemployment level remained at or below 5.5% for four consecutive quarters. 
Most viewed this to be an indefinite suspension of the law and the proposition, which 
was supported by two large oil companies and several individuals, was soundly 
defeated by California voters, with nearly 62% of voters opposing the proposition. 
Many oil companies, led by the Western States Petroleum Association (WSPA), 
continue to wage an ongoing campaign against AB 32 and many elements of its imple-
mentation. For example, the oil companies have supported an economic analysis, 
prepared by the Boston Consulting Group (BCG), of the fuel provisions under AB 32. 
The BCG study, which has become the focus of the debate for opponents, argues that 
AB 32 will result in increasing fuel prices, refinery closures and the loss of jobs, and 
a large wealth transfer (Boston Consulting Group, 2012). In 2013, the University 
of California, Davis was engaged by WSPA, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and the 
Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers to review the BCG study. The peer review 
group, led by academic experts in economics, climate policy, and refineries found that 
the report was based on a set of unlikely assumptions and scenarios, but that policy-
makers should remain on alert for signals that the costs of compliance are too high 
(UC Davis Policy Institute for Energy, Environment, and the Economy, 2013). 
Without doubt, this debate will continue alongside California’s implementation of 
AB 32 and the steps the state takes to achieve GHG emission reductions beyond 2020. 
In fact, these arguments have been in full force as the state is expanding its cap and 
trade programme to include transportation fuels under the cap beginning in January 
2015. Furthermore, it is not likely that this debate will be confined to California’s 
policies, but will take place on a global scale. Achieving deep emission reductions 
will require fundamental shifts in global energy supplies away from high-carbon 
energy sources. Businesses who choose not to engage in that transition stand to lose. 
Nonetheless, even as this debate continues, California has proceeded with the 
implementation of AB 32 and is seeing progress in many arenas, including in the 
development of clean energy businesses and jobs. 
4.  A list of supporting and opposing parties can be seen here: http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.
xhtml
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Progress: implementing California’s Global Warming 
Solutions Act: AB 32
Since California’s adoption of AB 32, the state has updated its policies and made 
significant progress. An updated Scoping Plan was adopted in 2014, showing that 
the state is on track to meet its 2020 target (CARB, 2014). The state’s emissions have 
declined and the economy has rebounded from the recession, while much success 
has been achieved in areas such as renewable energy and investment in clean energy. 
GHG EMISSIONS IN CALIFORNIA
AB 32 sets a target for emissions to reach 1990 levels by 2020. Considerable progress 
has been made on this front with California’s GHG emissions currently falling below 
the 2000 level and moving closer to the 1990 figure (Figure 2). The transportation 
sector remains the largest source of emission reductions in the state, accounting for 
37% of emissions in 2012. 
Per capita GHG emissions have also declined over the same time period and are 
well below the national average. However, California’s per capita emissions remain 
higher than countries with a similar standard of living (Figure 3).
RENEWABLE ENERGY, CLEAN TRANSPORTATION, AND ENERGY EFFICIENCY
In 2013, California’s three largest investor-owned utilities procured nearly 23% of 
their electricity from renewable sources (California Public Utilities Commission, 
2014) and these sources are accounting for an increasingly large share of the state’s 
power mix. The generating capacity from renewable energy sources in California 
has increased dramatically over the past ten years and almost doubled in 2013. By 
the end of 2013, over 8,000 MW of generating capacity was commercially available 
from renewable sources.5 Utilities report that they are on track to meet the 33% RPS 
target in 2020 and the state is actively exploring options to set goals beyond 2020.
There has also been significant progress in the deployment of distributed renew-
able energy systems. The California Solar Initiative began in 2007 with the goal 
of encouraging widespread installation of rooftop solar systems. The programme 
provided financial incentives through utilities for installation. Since then, the 
programme has seen a tremendous success in the number of systems installed, in 
an increase in the generating capacity, and a decrease in the operating costs of the 
systems. California leads the nation with over 240,000 solar systems installed, which 
accounts for almost 2,300 MW of installed capacity. Since 2007, the operating cost 
for these systems has declined by half, from close to $11/Watt down to just over 
$5/Watt (all data from CA Solar Statistics, 2014).
ECONOMIC IMPACTS: INNOVATION AND INVESTMENT 
Due at least in part to its environmental leadership, California continues to lead 
5. Generation Capacity from Renewable Sources from the California Public Utilities Commission: http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/
NR/rdonlyres/384E3432-6EAB-4492-BF88-992874A7B978/0/2013_Q1RPSReportFINAL.pdf
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the US and the world in attracting private 
investment in clean energy technologies, 
with more than double the number of clean 
energy patents than the next most-innovative 
state (Next10, 2014). The state’s core clean 
economy, which includes private-sector jobs 
in clean energy fields, has grown faster than 
the economy as a whole, with a 20% increase 
in the number of jobs between January 2002 
and January 2012 (Next10, 2014). While 
definitions and methodologies vary, all 
analyses show that California has the largest 
number of clean economy jobs in the country 
(Next10, 2014; Brookings, 2010; and Pew 
Charitable Trusts, 2009).
Continuing the journey: 
achieving deep emission 
reductions
California is on track to meet its 2020 GHG emission goal, but that is only one stop on 
the way to achieving deep emission reductions by the middle of this century. Scien-
tists estimate that emission reductions of around 80% to 90% below 1990 levels are 
needed to stabilize the climate and minimize the disruptions caused by the emissions 
in the atmosphere. Reductions of this magnitude are needed on a global scale in the 
developed world but even with these reductions, many impacts of climate change 
are already underway and are unavoidable and irreversible. 
ACHIEVING DEEP EMISSION REDUCTIONS IN CALIFORNIA 
California already has many programmes in place that will be needed to achieve 
its 2050 goal of 80% below 1990 levels by 2050, but it will need to ramp up the 
rate of implementation and the pace of emission reductions. The state will need to 
continue to reduce emissions from transportation and electricity generation and 
increase energy efficiency. In addition, the state will need to manage natural systems 
in a manner to maximize carbon storage potential in forests, wetlands, and other 
natural areas.
To further reduce GHG emissions the state needs to decarbonize its electricity 
supply. This means increasing the amount of clean and renewable sources of energy 
and drastically reducing the use of carbon-emitting fossil fuels. At the same time, the 
state must reduce the energy demand through efficiency measures and by shifting as 
many direct fuel uses from fossil fuels to electricity as soon as possible. This requires a 
transition to electric vehicles and hydrogen fuel cells powered by low-carbon sources. 
To meet its long-term GHG target the state will need to generate nearly three-quarters 
of its electricity from non-GHG producing sources – meaning renewable sources or, 
FIGURE 2 California: A pioneer in reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions
GHG emissions in California have declined since 2000 and are 
approaching 1990 levels, while remaining above the targets set 
by the AB 32 and the emissions of many countries with similar 
living standards. 
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potentially, nuclear power or fossil fuel combined with carbon capture and seques-
tration (Williams et al., 2012).  
Massive and sustained energy efficiency measures – amounting to 1.3% per year 
– will also be critical for transforming the state’s energy and transportation systems 
to enable the long-term target to be reached (Williams et al., 2012). These energy 
efficiency improvements will be particularly needed in the state’s existing building 
stock and also in relation to water usage, since nearly 20% of California’s electricity 
consumption is devoted to water-related energy use.6 These reductions will also go 
a long way to boosting the state’s resilience in the face of climate change. 
Efficiencies in transportation infrastructure and land use planning will also be 
important for reducing emissions. Investments in public transit and communities 
are needed to provide viable alternatives to driving. Diversifying land use, designing 
neighbourhoods that are easier to walk in, and creating closer proximity between 
housing and jobs all have a significant effect on travel behaviour and can reduce 
the distances people drive (Ewing and Cervero, 2001). In addition to building 
communities that make it easier for people to use alternatives to single-occupant 
6. http://www.energy.ca.gov/research/iaw/water.html
FIGURE 3 California in the international climate race
California aims to reduce the state’s GHG emissions to those of the European Union by 2020.
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vehicles, major investments are needed in how we move between the state’s regions. 
Investment in the state’s high-speed rail system combined with advancements in 
vehicle technology and efficiency will reduce the environmental impact of the 
state’s transportation system. The state’s high-speed rail will connect the state’s 
regions, providing alternatives to highway travel and interregional air trips. Tying 
these investments to robust local transportation networks will be key for realizing 
their maximum environmental benefits. However, this is contingent upon efforts to 
ensure clean electricity generation to power the high-speed rail system (Chester 
and Hovarth, 2012).
The order in which the state makes these investments and transforms the energy 
and transportation systems is important from both an economic and environmental 
perspective. Therefore, it is essential that the state is taking steps to continue this 
transition and to set the direction for future investments and programmes. Setting in 
place goals for energy and water efficiency improvements will help to avoid an over-
investment in new, clean electricity generation to meet energy demands. Cleaning 
up the state’s energy generation mix is key for insuring that increased electrifica-
tion, especially in the transportation sector, does not result in an increase in GHG 
or air pollution emissions. 
CHARTING A PATH TO 2050
Meeting the state’s 2050 GHG emission goal will require a pace of reduction of 
around 11.4 million metric tons CO2-equivalent per year, which is nearly two and a 
half times the pace of reductions required to meet the 2020 AB 32 target (California 
Air Resources Board, 2014). 
California has committed itself to making these emission reductions and doing 
so in the most cost-effective manner. Getting the state onto this path is certain to 
continue the debate and conversation around the costs and benefits of making this 
transition and the impacts on California’s economy. As discussed earlier, oil compa-
nies have been active and vocal opponents of California’s GHG emission reduc-
tion policies, which is sure to continue. Public support for AB 32 and its associated 
policies has generally been very high among likely voters in California. However, 
it is unclear how this support will fare as the public experiences both the benefits 
and costs associated with emission reduction efforts. These are factors that the state 
will have to consider and address internally as it moves forward to tackle climate 
change. However, considering these factors in state policy efforts is just part of 
a calculus that includes working with other regions and countries worldwide. By 
broadening its efforts, California is demonstrating that subnational actions can make 
a big contribution towards the fight against global climate change, to the promotion 
of low-carbon development and the encouragement of the international community 
to take similarly aggressive steps. ❚
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T
he seventh World Urban Forum (WUF) held in 
Medellin, Colombia in April 2014 helped to 
showcase the social issues of urban develop-
ment within a particularly full international urban 
agenda, which will culminate in 2016 with the 
third UN Conference on housing and sustainable urban 
development (Habitat III). The WUF took place in a city 
that has made ‘social planning’ the guiding principle of 
its urban development. This innovative vision has allowed 
Medellin, a city that is facing increasing territorial frag-
mentation, to escape from two dark decades in which it 
had become one of the most dangerous cities in the world.
The numerous actors present at the WUF shared a 
conviction that cities that are accessible to all and that 
promote social cohesion are a necessity to enable sustain-
able development over the coming decades in a context 
of growing urbanization. Indeed, projections of UN-Habitat 
show that cities will need to accommodate an additional 
2.5 billion people by 2050, 90% of which will be in Asia 
and Africa. Given that this trend reflects the attractiveness 
of cities for people that aspire to find work and better living 
conditions, how can rapid population growth and social 
inclusion be reconciled? The example of Medellin, which 
has become internationally well known, shows that an 
ambitious social policy at the heart of an urban develop-
ment strategy can enhance the attractiveness of a city. 
It also reflects the fact that urban fragmentation is not 
inevitable and can be, if not eliminated, at least reduced. 
Other cities are responding to this challenge and are also 
making social priorities the engine of their development 
strategies: Johannesburg is one example. 
The city as an actor in social 
development: Johannesburg  
Anne Odic, Head of Local Authorities and Urban Development division, Agence française  
de développement (AFD), Paris, France
The regeneration of the city centre as an engine  
of urban development in Johannesburg
With 4.4 million inhabitants, Johannesburg is the economic 
heart of South Africa and a magnet for the sub-region. 
Historically, it is also one of the most unequal cities in the 
world in terms of income distribution. Spatial segrega-
tion, consolidated by apartheid, was accompanied from 
the 1960s onwards by a broader phenomenon of urban 
sprawl, based on the North American automobile depend-
ency model. This was subsequently exacerbated by the 
development of new economic centres in the 1970s and 
the post-apartheid policy of the mass construction of 
social housing in low quality, single function estates in 
the remotest suburbs. Today, these large social housing 
districts, which are remote and isolated, exist alongside 
locked and secure gated communities, with no possible 
transition between the different areas. With the excep-
tion of the city centre, public areas are almost exclusively 
transit areas. Soweto, for example, exists as an island in 
the middle of the metropolis. Sprawl and spatial fragmen-
tation of the city have led to the maintenance of the various 
forms of exclusion.
Since 1994, more than 2.7 million houses have been 
built, which is enough to provide homes for 15% of South 
African families. However, this policy has failed to take into 
account the growing demand for housing that is estimated 
to be in the region of 2.1 million homes. Moreover, half 
the population of the city lives in substandard housing, 
and nearly half of this group live in precarious neighbour-
hoods. Today, the most marginalized people have three 
options for accommodation: (i) the social home ownership 
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eradication of poverty through a better integration into the 
city of deprived populations (access to services, housing, 
employment, skills development, etc.). In addition, for 
the first time in the city’s history, this strategy aims to 
meet the challenge of spatial transformation towards 
a more compact city, supported by an economy that is 
more competitive, inclusive and consumes less natural 
resources.
These objectives may seem ambitious given the severity 
of the population’s vulnerability and the difficulty entailed 
in the restructuring effort. However, the two initiatives that 
define the strategy – the inner city roadmap (regeneration 
of the city centre) and the ‘Corridors of Freedom’ (densi-
fication around public transport corridors) – demonstrate 
that the city is willing and able to achieve these objectives. 
The initiatives indeed aim to concentrate city development 
(prioritizing municipal investment in transport, infrastruc-
ture, public facilities, public services and social housing) in 
a clearly defined zone that has the city centre at its heart 
and encompasses the townships of Soweto and Alexandra. 
These two townships are home to almost half the city’s 
population and more than two-thirds of the poor.
Beyond the social priorities at its core, the value of 
Johannesburg’s urban restructuration strategy is that it 
is part of a wider objective to reduce natural resource 
consumption and the carbon footprint of this high 
emissions city (estimated at 6.4t CO2/capita
1). It has the 
advantage of combining emissions reduction with local 
public policies that target social priorities.
The promotion of public transport (Bus Rapid Transit) 
and the urban nodes densification strategy along trans-
port corridors aim to facilitate mobility for disadvantaged 
populations but also to limit travel by private cars or vans 
and therefore to reduce emissions. It is attached to a 
housing supply policy that includes social housing and 
activities that target the functional diversity of these urban 
nodes.
City centre regeneration projects, such as the AFHCO-
led example, can also have a real impact on greenhouse 
gas emissions by reducing the distance between people’s 
1. For comparison, CO2 emissions per capita is 4.2 for Barcelona, 4.9 for Tokyo, 
10.5 for New York, 1.4 for Sao Paulo and 1.5 for Delhi.
programmes in the remote outskirts of the city, where 
land is available and inexpensive but entails very high 
transport costs (more than a third of their budget); (ii) 
informal housing in shantytowns or backyard townships; 
(iii) ‘hijacked buildings’, which are city centre buildings 
taken over by gang leaders who charge extortionate rents 
for very small living spaces that lack privacy and have 
disastrous sanitation and safety conditions.
Successive attempts by local authorities to regen-
erate the city centre have not always had the desired 
results, but they have enabled the launch of private initia-
tives such as those of housing operators, associations 
or private, that have supported city centre restructuring. 
One such example is the Affordable Housing Company 
(AFHCO), a private social housing operator that manages 
an estate of more than 4,000 apartments and commercial 
premises. Its first operations were carried out in 1996, at 
a time when the city centre was crime-ridden and many 
homeowners wanted to sell their properties at any price. 
AFHCO’s innovative approach has enabled it to provide 
social housing on a large scale: this approach involves the 
progressive rehabilitation of abandoned office buildings 
while promoting the functional diversity of these rehabili-
tated areas. Indeed, AFCHO almost always provides ground 
floor shops in its buildings and promotes the rehabilitation 
of public facilities in restructured districts, either directly 
(construction and management of schools, nurseries and 
parks) or through interaction with the municipality.
AFD supported AFHCO by funding two communal 
housing projects that have been recently completed in 
the city centre (for more than 2,000 tenants). These social 
rental homes, which have shared bedrooms and sanita-
tion facilities, are aimed at vulnerable low-skilled workers 
that are eligible for social housing (approximately 85% 
of the South African population). These people can thus 
access secure and good quality housing that is close to 
their place of work.
A comprehensive long-term strategy targeting 
inclusive access to the city   
Beyond these initiatives, Johannesburg is building an 
ambitious long-term strategy known as the Growth and 
Development Strategy 2040. Its primary objective is the 
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homes and their places of work, thus limiting travel. Such 
projects participate in the reconstruction of the city on 
the land it already occupies, rather than contributing 
to urban sprawl, especially because its various actions 
enhance functional diversity and make neighbourhoods 
more dynamic. Other associations and public operators, 
including JOSCHO, the city’s social housing subsidiary, 
conduct similar actions at various scales.
The challenge of maintaining cities as places of 
opportunity
Today, the challenge facing the city of Johannesburg is 
to integrate and coordinate over a long time scale these 
different initiatives that are implemented in various distinct 
sites into an overall spatial transformation strategy. There 
is also a need to apply the overall objectives to the opera-
tional level of the district: the coherence of the various 
interventions will be crucial to ensure a real effect on the 
city scale. The difficulty here is to bring together major 
planned public investment, to target this investment so 
as not to dilute it, and to ensure that is has a leverage 
effect on private action. It is only under these conditions 
that the city will manage to ‘patch up’ some areas of 
its territory, through ‘catalyst’ districts that will trigger a 
dynamic to enable the city to switch to an optimized urban 
morphology. It is with this objective that AFD provides 
support to the city. To do so, its financing is backed by 
the organization of exchanges with French cities that have 
completed transformations of similar magnitude (contacts 
with local elected officials, public and private partners such 
as planning agencies, development corporations, public 
land management institutions, etc.). 
A sustainable urban development strategy based 
on social priorities with climate co-benefits
Similarly to Medellin and Johannesburg, other emerging 
and developing cities are currently facing the challenge 
of carrying out a spatial transformation to relocate their 
inhabitants to the heart of a more sustainable city: Porto 
Novo, Antananarivo, Casablanca and Izmir are also 
pioneers of this path to a more environmentally-friendly 
development trajectory and the integration of vulnerable 
populations.
Many experiments show that densification and urban 
restructuring, combined with effective public transit 
projects and favourable policies for social housing, 
promote both social inclusion and urban development 
that produces less emissions and is more sustainable.
AFD is convinced that social priorities and climate issues 
must be combined as part of an integrated approach 
to urban development. Through the proliferation of the 
financing of projects that combine these two objectives (i.e. 
public transport that provides disadvantaged populations 
with access to employment areas, social housing that is 
integrated into an urban restructuration strategy, etc.), AFD 
wishes to capitalize on these experiences and to enrich 
the debate by showing that projects with a primarily social 
focus also produce climate co-benefits. Through its current 
support for Johannesburg, and tomorrow for other cities, 
AFD puts this principle into practice with spatial transfor-
mation projects that provide compactness and diversity. ❚
. The dual strategy of regenerating 
the city centre and the densification 
of public transport aims to fight against 
the persistent spatial segregation in 
Johannesburg. Infrastructure invest-
ments thus aim at improving the living 
conditions of the poorest populations.
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FIGURE  Johannesburg: Targeting investments based on household income 
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Japan: from frugal 
production to an 
anthropogenetic regime
T
his decade has been marked by the emergence of new questions. 
Is the European Union at risk of falling into deflation and a long 
period of virtual stagnation? Is an economy without growth 
compatible with an era of prosperity in which the improvement 
of well-being is the central purpose of governments? What would 
the complete abandonment of nuclear power mean in terms of 
a reorganization of the energy system: an acceleration of the 
transition to renewable energies or a return to old techniques 
that contribute to global warming? Will population ageing bring 
about a crisis in public financing and result in a drying up of the 
sources of innovation, thus jeopardizing long-term growth? Is inequality in terms 
of income, wealth and the capacity to influence public decisions, an inevitability?
For over two decades, although not quite providing definite answers, Japanese 
society has delivered many insights into these various questions. This chapter offers 
some important lessons that can be drawn from the analysis of a trajectory that 
was once regarded as fairly unusual, but that is today proving to be an illuminating 
model for many countries. In the 1980s Japan served as a reference for new indus-
trial models, but the country is enlightening in many other respects, in particular for 
the exploration of a socioeconomic system that is more in harmony with nature and 
takes into account the preservation of the social fabric to which education, culture 
and health especially contribute. This regime, which can be described as anthropo-
genetic, is not the result of the implementation of a theoretical model but the result 
of a series of adjustments in response to internal economic, social and demographic 
changes, but also of changes in the global economy over the decades since World 
For two decades, Japan has been seeking answers to questions raised 
by an increasing number of European countries in terms of economic 
growth, energy choices and adaptation to an ageing society. Japan aims 
to be anthropogenetic by 2030, combining societal needs, innovation 
and education objectives.
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War II. This chapter explains the main stages of its emergence by highlighting the 
components of the regime. Such an analysis would be incomplete without a discus-
sion on the diffusion capacity of the Japanese configuration and an examination of 
the possibility that the anthropogenetic regime is one of the options for the reorgani-
zation of development models.
Accelerated modernization raises ecological issues at 
an early stage
After World War II, the Japanese authorities instigated a catch-up process in the 
country with a focus on imports, followed by a hybridization of the techniques of 
mass production. It was also an era of a great transformation in Japanese society 
(Sabouret, 2004). As a result, Japan grew rapidly which, however, led to consid-
erable environmental damage. Such damage was all the more acute given the 
country’s small size, making the coexistence of industrial facilities and cities diffi-
cult to organize. It was in this context that Minamata disease was discovered in 
1953, a neurological syndrome caused by mercury poisoning that leads to the degen-
eration of the nervous system. With its striking although geographically-limited 
nature, this ecological disaster was one of the earliest factors that raised awareness 
on the relationship between human activity and the environment. Similarly, the 
demonstration of the link between increased asthma-related diseases and air pollu-
tion triggered the implementation of a protective law as early as 1968. Equivalent 
movements were observed in other countries, but the specificity of the Japanese 
geographical environment along with a vision of the world that links human and 
environmental processes, led to the threat being taken seriously, as demonstrated by 
the creation of an institute, then an agency, followed by a ministry, with a dedicated 
responsibility for the environment. The Japanese authorities were also aware of 
regional, and even global, interdependence in this field, as shown by the negotiation 
of the Kyoto Protocol (Okuma, 2013). Finally, accidents involving radioactivity also 
contributed to this awareness, not forgetting the way in which the recent tsunami 
and the Fukushima incident has brought environmental risks to the fore (Figure 1). 
The lack of natural resources encouraged energy 
frugality and technological innovation
A second step in the development of the Japanese economy came in response to the 
two oil shocks of 1973 and 1979. Firstly, at the global scale, the analysis of the Club 
of Rome pointed strongly to a long-term incompatibility between the finiteness of 
natural resources and the possibility of unlimited growth. This message was particu-
larly apt for Japan as the country has virtually no energy resources or raw materials. 
Secondly, Japan’s public authorities reached the conclusion that it was important 
to redirect technical change towards greater frugality, and from this date onwards 
increased efforts to make more efficient use of natural resources and to recycle. At 
the macroeconomic level it was therefore important to aim for a strong external 
trade surplus for industrial products, to offset a structural deficit in energy products 
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and raw materials. In essence, the Japanese economy is the antithesis of ‘rentier 
regimes’ which not only produce but also consume energy because its price is kept 
low, helping to contract the industrial productive base of those countries. Japan has 
taken the opposite direction and this is what has guided its overall growth strategy.
Therefore, considering its high standard of living, Japan is one of the world’s 
most efficient countries in terms of energy intensity (OECD, 2014). In this way, 
the technological footprint is reduced for a variety of components: environmental 
damage grows at a significantly slower rate than production. 
Thus it can be said that a complementarity existed between innovation, energy 
policy and a limitation of environmental damage. This represented the beginnings of 
a shift away from the American model of mass production and consumption. Indus-
trial organization experts then diagnosed the emergence of an original production 
model that became known as ‘frugal’ insofar as it was based on a continual search 
for economies in all areas. This corresponded to an original configuration of the 
manufacturing sector in terms of incentive and remuneration and also of informa-
tion flow and decision-making (Aoki, 1988). It was at this time that Japan was said 
to have explored an alternative path to that of a deepening of Fordism. What was 
FIGURE 1 Awareness and Japanese environmental policy
Three out of four voters were from high HDI countries, giving them a disproportional influence on decision-making: nine out of ten 
dialogues have adopted the same recommendations as the Internet voters.
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the result of a series of pragmatic adjustments became a model that many other 
countries tried to emulate. In retrospect, several production models coexisted in 
Japan and their diversity is an enduring feature of industrial history (Boyer and 
Freyssenet, 2000). This point deserves attention because it is also likely to be 
relevant for emerging development models.
Financialization, a major crisis and a long stagnation
This enthusiasm was short-lived. Indeed, given the accumulation of major trade 
surpluses, the Japanese authorities were forced to open the country’s economy 
and to liberalize the financial system. Thus, liberalization and international finan-
cial openness in the 1980s precipitated a speculative bubble in property (Aveline, 
1995) and the stock exchange, of such a magnitude that the economy underwent a 
major crisis due to excess credit that could only be absorbed through a long period 
of restructuring of the balance sheets of banks and companies (Koo, 2009). This 
resulted in a loss of competence and legitimacy of the Japanese government, a govern-
ment that blocked a quick exit from the crisis through recapitalization and restruc-
turation of the banking and financial system (Boyer, Yamada, 2000). In addition, 
the increasing heterogeneity of the Japanese economy made it difficult for new 
coordination mechanisms to emerge (Lechevalier, 2011).
In the 1990s, two lessons were drawn about possible successors to the post-World 
War II growth regime. Firstly, it was during these years that the corrosive nature of 
financial liberalization was highlighted: enabling the possibility of indebtedness 
created a succession of speculative bubbles, which destabilized Japan’s dynamic 
regime. Secondly, the disarray of the authorities responsible for economic policy, as 
well as the magnitude of the imbalances accumulated during the expansion period, 
led to a long period of quasi-stagnation. Japan was the first of the old industrial-
ized countries to involuntarily experience an economy without growth. For over 
two decades, social and economic actors developed an original configuration that 
in some ways achieved the transition to an economy of prosperity.
Slow growth and the preservation of the social fabric
Following the rationale of the post-World War II model, the widespread access to educa-
tion and the extension of social security coverage were seen as the result of dynamic 
growth, the benefits of which could be distributed between direct wages and the contri-
bution to the financing of public goods and services. Indeed, when growth considerably 
slowed down, deficits in the public budget and the social security coverage accounts 
appeared and have accumulated until the present day. One of the peculiarities of the 
Japanese trajectory is that the cumulative growth of the public debt to GDP ratio has 
been acknowledged to be a result of a strategy based on two pillars. The first being 
that the continuity of the innovation strategies of companies is promoted by the state 
because it is the condition for sustainable integration into the world economy without 
reducing the standard of living, which is the most satisfactory definition of the concept 
of competitiveness. The second pillar is the importance of meeting the needs of society, 
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first through a widely accessible education system: in fact, Japan is very well positioned 
in the international student performance ranking, not only when looking at the average 
but also when considering the low number of poor performing students (OECD, 2013); 
and also through a rise in expenditure on health, pensions and more recently those 
related to dependency. It is worth noting that these types of spending are continuing 
to represent an increasing share of total public expenditure (Figure 2).
Social fabric is preserved due to the originality of the Japanese wage labour nexus. 
Indeed, large companies exposed to international competition maintain the stability 
of the employment relationship: facing a reduction in the order books, they reduce 
hiring, working hours, bonuses and eventually the base salary, with redundancies 
being an instrument of last resort. In addition, the service sector has implemented 
a variety of employment contracts, including part-time and fixed-term, and the 
corresponding flexibility has avoided the explosion of mass unemployment. This 
configuration is the antithesis of the American-style model in which downsizing is 
the first tool in defence of profitability and for company survival.
Since the 1990s, inequality has increased significantly in Japan, prompting many 
analyses from researchers and causing public concern (Tachibanaki, 2009). Yet, 
FIGURE 2 Education, science and above all social security are the Japanese priorities
The Japanese government carried on accruing debt to continue to ensure access to quality education, investment in research and to 
maintain extensive social security coverage, including for the elderly.
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in international comparisons, Japan, together with the Nordic countries, are the 
ones in which the growth of inequality has been contained (Piketty, 2013, Figure 
9.3). One of the reasons for this is that the return on capital and the growth of 
inheritance are far from being major sources of rising inequality, even if they pose 
a threat for the future (Hayashi, 2014). Thus, during this period, the public budget 
has shown a dual priority: strong incentives for innovation to ensure competitive-
ness; and steady growth of social spending to safeguard the well-being of an ageing 
population. Quality of life can thus be maintained despite the absence of growth, 
on the condition, of course, that the deficit would be financed by the savings, that 
are essentially domestic, and that such savings would have a low return. However, 
this inability to curb the growth of public debt undermines the long-term viability 
of this original regime. This explains the reasoning behind Prime Minister Abe’s 
government’s attempts to revive the economy to better ensure the financing of social 
security. This can be interpreted as a defence of a socioeconomic system that favours 
well-being ahead of economic orthodoxy (Wolf, 2013).
Synergy between innovation and anthropogenetic 
rationale
Does Japan’s current configuration define a transient regime specific to this country? 
Or is it part of a general movement aiming to account for the historic characteristic 
of the post-World War II growth regime and for indicators aiming at measuring the 
performance of each economy? Many indices argue for the generality of this trans-
formation of representations and the recognition of emerging economic systems 
based on a better integration of welfare objectives. Improving health and efforts 
to universalize the provision of education are increasingly considered as vectors of 
development and not merely its consequences, especially given that the analysis in 
terms of human capital has been overtaken by approaches equating economic devel-
opment and capacity building through the provision of basic goods such as access 
to education and health (Sen, 1999). The human development indicators that are 
regularly published by international organizations (UNDP, 2014), including the 
World Bank, demonstrate this evolution. These indicators are no longer simply a 
reflection of the success achieved in terms of the acceleration of growth, they can 
instead reflect the conditions of a better quality of development. This paradigm shift 
is not only true for emerging countries, it applies equally if not more so, to the more 
advanced countries for which the pursuit of prosperity could gradually replace that 
of growth (Cassiers, 2011).
Conceptually, these considerations may be the basis for a new representation of 
the economic circuit in contemporary societies: shouldn’t they aim for the mobiliza-
tion of human capabilities in order to reach a higher level of development, according 
to a recurrent and cumulative process? Natural resources, technology, products, 
services, capital and credit, namely the central concepts of economics, would only 
constitute intermediates in this ongoing process of creation and regeneration of 
modern society. To highlight its originality, namely the creation of humanity by 
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human labour, it has been proposed to classify such a rationale as anthropogenetic 
(Boyer, 2002), in line with the founding intuition of Bruno Théret (Théret, 2011), 
who called it anthroponomic.
In a more analytical way, we can also show that the economics of innovation 
is itself a component of the corresponding process, by incorporating logically the 
demographic phenomena and highlighting the synergy between education, culture 
and health. The consideration of innovation is important as it stimulates produc-
tion and provides funding for public services and social security, which are at the 
basis of the model (Figure 3). Its success is no longer measured in terms of the GDP 
growth rate, but of the observation of improved well-being as perceived by members 
of society. It does not prejudge the end of growth or the need for degrowth: it will 
be a result of a specific institutional configuration.
A change of society and era 
Japan’s situation is characterized by an ageing population, the beginnings of a slow 
population decline and almost flat economic growth. As a result, most institutional 
FIGURE 3 Health, education and culture at the heart of the anthropogenetic development model 
The anthropogenetic system is based on the synergies between education, culture and health to support innovation, which itself stimu-
lates the production and mobilization of the necessary financial resources.
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forms and policies have to adapt (Matsutani, 2006). In the past, the benefits of 
growth were fairly evenly distributed and while the social protection was relatively 
limited, public infrastructure works allowed the homogenization of the evolution 
of the different regions and consequently of the various social groups: this is how 
solidarity was expressed. The 2000s marked a breakdown, the use of public works 
decreased while spending on social coverage accelerated (see Figure 3). This era is 
now over for a variety of reasons. 
“Japan’s GDP will no longer be in itself the foundation that is able to maintain a 
sense of national unity (...). However, even in the absence of economic growth, Japan 
will have another asset in increasing quantities. This asset is leisure time. (...) This 
additional leisure will give more opportunities for individuals to pursue their interests 
and a new individualism will emerge. While the common pursuit of economic growth 
implied shared values, pleasure related to leisure will develop a wider range of values. 
The reference to “I” will replace the perspective of “We the Japanese”. People will begin to 
see themselves more as members of their communities than as citizens of a nation. (...) 
To maximize the benefits of increased leisure requires the organization of appropriate 
spaces. Urban planning will have to take into account the local culture and traditions 
FIGURE 4 Designing an anthropogenetic city
The anthropogenetic matrix enables the city to be designed as a meeting place for different generations of inhabitants, while devel-
oping specific services for senior citizens.
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and different types of recreation. (...) The reduction of the Japanese population opens 
an interesting promise of richer and more fulfilling lives.” (Matsutani, 2006, 186-187).
This vision is already at work in some local experiments such as in the Toyoshi-
kidai district in Kashiva city in the Chiba prefecture (Technology.org, 2013). It 
aims at organizing a community designed for senior citizens including not only 
medical and care services, but also employment opportunities, while ensuring that 
different generations of residents are able to meet, for example through a commu-
nity restaurant (Figure 4). In 2009, the Institute of Gerontology at the University of 
Tokyo, which supervises this project, launched a consortium on gerontology bringing 
together universities and industry, in which are involved most of the major compa-
nies from all sectors of the Japanese economy. These companies perceive an old age 
society as an opportunity for new activities and they anticipate that the knowledge 
acquired in Japan will be exported to other Asian countries that will experience 
their own period of rapid population ageing, soon after Japan. 
This example highlights three features of the emerging regime. Firstly, it does 
not only involve costs to the public budget and social security because it can be an 
opportunity for new sources of innovation, in biotechnology and health, but also 
in all other sectors (home automation, transport, urban development and recrea-
tion). Secondly, it carries the potential of the local integration of policies previously 
conceived as sectoral actions derived from central government, the interdependen-
cies of which could have appeared in the field as malfunctions. Finally, in seeking 
to integrate various activities (work, consumption and leisure) at the local level, 
this strategy may be efficient in terms of energy and the environmental footprint. 
The anthropological rationale is not contradictory with the search for ecological 
sustainability. Thus Japan, although often blamed for its delay in implementing 
economic policies to exit the crisis, may in fact be exploring a possible route for the 
future (Sabouret, 2011).
From a series of adaptations to a reflexivity effort: 
what are the vectors of this emerging model?
The analysis of changes in Japanese society since World War II brought forward an 
overall reorganization which distances the country from the typical industrialist 
model of Toyotism. To a theoretician, these transformations are likely to define 
a system and an original socioeconomic regime. However, what about collective 
actors and individuals who shape the daily transformation of organization forms: 
do they adhere to such a perspective and do they adapt their behaviours and strat-
egies accordingly?
If the vision of a society without significant social tensions is adopted, in which 
most people recognize themselves as belonging to a large middle class that relies on 
the political and economic elite, then piloting such a transition is, a priori, easy. This 
is because it would be a reiteration of the modernization strategies of the post-World 
War II era. In fact, success has gradually transformed Japan’s social structure into 
one where the interests of various social groups are no longer necessarily convergent.
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Given the economic downturn and the drop in job creation, it is more difficult for 
the younger generation to gain access to the wage/social status of their parents: 
the university system delivers more graduates than the corporate sector can recruit 
under the privileged status of ‘salarymen’. The proliferation of non-standard employ-
ment is causing a fragmentation of employees and, in some cases, the few who are 
left behind by the education system reject the status of employee. This, a priori, 
goes against the anthropogenetic model. However, the cultural component of this 
model contains a corrective factor, since a proportion of the young people who reject 
the old model may serve as the vector of the new one in the cultural field (design, 
publishing, music, performing arts, gastronomy, etc.). We refer here to some of the 
successful diffusions of Japanese innovation (manga, karaoke, cinema...).
The status of women is a second major issue. Indeed, Japanese society does not 
make the most of female expertise because, despite performing better at univer-
sity than their male counterparts, the traditional social norm prevails over gender 
equality, even though this equality is inscribed in law. Indeed many women have to 
choose between pursuing a professional activity and the education of their children. 
The insufficiency of public nursery systems and the lack of funds dedicated to family 
policy largely explain the low Japanese birth rate of about 1.3 children per woman. 
A declining population goes hand in hand with an ageing one, therefore the problem 
lies in the purely demographic component of the anthropogenetic model in the 
strictest sense.
Pensioners are theoretically the beneficiaries of a system in which life cycle is 
integrated into the organization of social security coverage. Two other favourable 
factors for senior citizens are the Confucian philosophy of respect for elders, and 
secondly that the rural population (which is relatively large and ageing) has a signifi-
cant impact on the electoral process. However, other factors are obstacles: given the 
increase in life expectancy, the retirement age has had to be raised and low pensions 
mean that some must continue working, while others fall into poverty if they have not 
had a salaryman career. Given that beyond a certain threshold health expenditure 
grows very rapidly with age, those responsible for economic policy are concerned 
that ageing is a major cost to public finance.
Large Japanese companies specializing in the production of manufactured goods 
that are typical of modern lifestyles continue to play a key role in the macroeco-
nomic regime: the surplus of the trade balance that they allow provides the neces-
sary funds for the importation of natural resources and agricultural products, a 
dependency that the shutdown of nuclear power plants has increased. Therefore, 
the stepping up of social security coverage should go side by side with the preserva-
tion of an export sector that is structurally competitive beyond short-term exchange 
rate fluctuations. This sector can continue to benefit from the spillovers resulting 
from the dynamism of innovation in mature industries, favoured by the adapta-
tion of the school and university system, which can also be extended to innova-
tions derived from the establishment of the anthropogenetic model (biotechnology, 
automation, urban planning and the network organization of healthcare services). 
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The objective is to somehow disseminate and generalize the experiences mentioned 
above (Figure 4) and to bring about a system of innovation and production that is 
consistent with extensive insurance coverage. This is, it seems, the recipe for success 
in social-democratic societies (Boyer, 2015).
The task of researchers is to unravel the multiple causalities inherent to this new 
regime. While the most important work relates to the capacity of politicians to 
arbitrate between contradictory interests and to attempt to reach a consensus that 
can guide actor strategies and social groups.
The dynamics of local solidarity and the loss of trust in 
politicians
Between World War II and the 1980s, Japan had a reputation for high quality manage-
ment assured by the trinity of competent bureaucracy, political stability ensured by 
the continuous leadership of the same political party and powerful industrial groups 
supporting technological modernization. In view of Japan’s remarkable economic 
performance, public opinion was generally convinced that these elites were working 
for the good of the majority of the Japanese population. If this remained true today, it 
would be sufficient to update this configuration to establish a new mode of develop-
ment. Research on social movement in Japan provides a somewhat different picture: 
at the local level, new demands have periodically emerged, which have been incon-
sistently dealt with over time (Buissou, 1997; 2012; chan-Tiberghen, 2008). They 
have led today to a loss of confidence that is particularly focused on the ability of 
governments to meet the expectations of citizens.
A first breach of confidence occurred when the property bubble burst in 1990: not 
only did citizens question the competence of the public authorities to overcome the 
crisis, but they suspected that collusion between banks and the government had been 
instrumental in the genesis of the problem. In 1995, the Kobe earthquake dramati-
cally highlighted the disorganization of the public authorities, given that most of the 
emergency assistance was provided by a local solidarity movement. The readiness 
to pass laws promoting the solvency of insurance companies and the slow pace of 
reconstruction suggested that the government did not defend the general interest 
of the population. In March 2011, the nuclear accident in Fukushima once more 
revealed the weakness of government control over large companies for electricity 
generation and the difficulty to define and fund a reconstruction programme to 
address the challenge posed. On the other hand, this government weakness led to 
a new anti-nuclear movement of unprecedented proportions, which itself is part of 
a long history.
Opinion polls revealed a collapse in the credibility of government spokespersons 
that was even more dramatic than the falling trust in media or energy producing 
companies. International comparisons show that a similar trend has been observed in 
most countries, but it is especially marked in Japan (Edelman, 2014; World value 
Survey, 2014). This is of course a handicap for the exploration of a development path 
that requires coordination around expectations shared by a large number of actors.
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In contrast, sociological analyses confirm the resilience of a high degree of trust 
and solidarity at local and sectoral levels, which allows social experimentation to 
be carried out in response to the demands and aspirations of citizens. It is currently 
difficult to scale these experiments up into a national strategy, but they are one of 
the two components of the processes which, in the past, have led to the emergence 
of new development modes (Boyer, 2014).
Making the best use of models
Is the Japanese trajectory general? A priori, it is close to the design implemented 
by the social democratic Nordic economies, given that social security coverage has 
for a long time been thought to be a possible contribution to a growth regime that 
makes equity and efficiency compatible (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997). In fact, 
many statistical analyses confirm this similarity: Japan and the Nordic countries 
are the most advanced in ecological terms and also show the lowest economic and 
social inequalities). However, institutional analysis confirms they do not belong 
to the same variant of capitalism (Amable, 2004; Harada and Tohyama, 2011). 
For some reason there is no canonical configuration of anthropogenetic regimes. 
Is this assumption called into question if one takes the United States into account? 
FIGURE 5 The anthropogenetic regime: Japan better than the US
The results of Japan in terms of well-being are much better than the results of the US at lower costs.
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Indeed, the United States is at the technological frontier in most areas: education 
and university system, health and leisure industry. However, the response is largely 
negative (Figure 5). 
The life expectancy of Japanese people is significantly higher on average than that 
of Americans, health spending appears lower by nearly 40% compared to those of the 
United States, even though the proportion of the elderly population is much higher. 
In Japan, the share of public expenditure on education is lower, but access to higher 
education is better than in the United States. A comparison of the incidence of crime 
and homicide shows that Japanese society is more peaceful than that of the United 
States. Finally, inequality is much lower in Japan. As noted earlier, the only area 
where Japan falls short, which is an important one, is the low Japanese fertility rate 
that leads to an ageing and declining population. This trend derives largely from the 
unequal economic status between men and women (Lechevalier and Arai, 2005), 
and feminist movements have not been able to eradicate this inequality (Fujimura 
and Kameda, 1995). This is one of the weaknesses of this version of the anthropo-
genetic model. However, given that the return to rapid growth seems unattainable, 
why couldn’t a prosperity economy be organized that centred on the pursuit of the 
quality of life? It is possible that this strategy could be applied to Europe in its present 
and future state. However, it must be remembered that those who tried to import 
the Japanese model of production in the 1980s encountered many problems. This 
difficulty is even greater when considering a complex socioeconomic system, which 
should be part of every national trajectory, because it requires the reconfiguration 
of a large number of institutions and organizational forms that have been inherited 
from a past that is no longer with us today. ❚
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CHAPTER 8
South Korea: green growth as a 
development strategy
Jae-Seung Lee, Professor of international studies, Korea University, Seoul, South Korea
S
purred on by the strong momentum created by 
a presidential initiative, an ambitious plan of 
green growth has been underway in South 
Korea since 2008. The Green Growth Strat-
egy aimed to shift the development paradigm 
from fossil fuel dependent growth to a more environ-
mentally-friendly one, utilizing low-carbon and renew-
able energy resources. South Korea tried to reach its 
energy security by increasing the supply of low-carbon 
energy resources, including nuclear energy, and boost-
ing the green energy industry. While emphasizing the 
synergy between low-carbon measures and economic 
competitiveness, green growth strategies also triggered 
a strong industrial boost in the renewable energy sec-
tor, which showed a particular focus on the ‘growth’ 
side in addition to the ‘protection’ side of sustainable 
development.
However, South Korea’s Green Growth Strategy is 
also facing a number of challenges. The ‘top-down’ 
strategies of green growth have had to be readjusted 
according to changing administrations and policy priori-
ties. Furthermore, moving from the policy vision to 
actual policy implementation also brought challenges, 
both to the government and to the related industries. 
Nuclear energy, one of the key pillars of South Korea’s 
low-carbon measures, began to be discussed more 
cautiously under a new socio-political atmosphere in 
the Post-Fukushima era.
This chapter surveys the evolution of South Korea’s 
green growth policies since 2008 and discusses the 
challenges and tasks of its implementation. This study 
also explores the recently announced ‘Second Five-Year 
Plan for Green Growth (2014-2018)’ and concludes with 
perspectives for a more coherent implementation of the 
Green Growth Strategy in South Korea. 
The evolution of the Green Growth Strategy  
(2008-2013)
South Korea’s Green Growth Strategy has multiple policy 
objectives to address the issues of climate change, 
energy-import dependency, fossil fuel depletion and global 
economic slowdown. It was also designed as a devel-
opment paradigm to create a new engine for economic 
growth beyond the ICT industry through green technology 
and renewable energy. The transition to a low-carbon 
economy implies a transformation of key economic 
sectors, the deployment of new technologies, as well as 
many lifestyle changes throughout society (lee, 2013b). 
In compliance with the new paradigm of green growth, 
the government also announced the ‘Green New Deal’, 
an economic stimulus package to cope with the global 
financial crisis by making use of green technology and 
investing in environmental industries (lee, 2013a).1 
Driven by a strong political initiative, South Korea’s Green 
Growth Strategy made noticeable progress in building up its 
legal base and institutional structure. The Framework Act 
on Low Carbon Green Growth provided an overarching legal 
base, while more professional government agencies such 
as the Presidential Committee on Green Growth (PCGG) 
enabled more systematic green-growth policymaking. 
Regarding the energy mix, the first National Basic Energy 
1. Green New Deal Project targeted at creating 956,420 jobs. Presidential 
Committee on Green Growth, ‘2008-2009 Progress Report,’ p.9. 
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Plan (NBEP, 2008) set a renewable energy target of 11% 
of the primary energy supply in 2030, a sharp increase 
from the previous target of 2.14% in 2006 (lee and yu, 
2012; lee, 2013b). In the second NBEP (2013), this 11% 
target for renewable energy remained unchanged in the 
new plan for 2035 (MOTIE, 2014).
As a key instrument for renewable energy develop-
ment, the government introduced the Renewable Portfolio 
Standard (RPS) in 2012, replacing the existing feed-in-
tariff system.2 The RPS target would be increased from 2% 
in 2012 up to 10% by 2020. It was expected to provide a 
stable framework for domestic market expansion together 
with a number of green growth policies such as the 
Emissions Trading System (ETS), Green Home Project, etc.
The nation’s well-developed industrial infrastructure 
was regarded as an advantage that could nurture green 
energy industries. South Korea’s leading heavy industry 
companies entered the wind power business, while major 
electronic companies announced their participation in the 
photovoltaic (PV) cell industry. Furthermore, South Korea’s 
advanced IT and electronic technology capabilities were 
able to galvanize the projects in the smart-grid field. In 
addition, the government’s R&D investment plan was 
expected to play an important role in filling a technological 
gap between South Korea and the world’s leading green 
energy countries (lee and yu, 2012).3 
As part of its national contribution to combat climate 
change ahead of the Copenhagen COP in 2009, the South 
Korean government confirmed a commitment to low-carbon 
green growth by announcing a midterm target of a 30% 
GHG reduction by 2020 (according to the business as 
usual (BAU) scenario). In addition, national GHG reduction 
targets were established for specific sectors, including 
transportation (26.7%), buildings (26.9%) and the power 
generation sectors (34.3%) – again compared to 2020 
BAU levels – while the industry sector as a whole was 
given an 18.2% reduction obligation (lee and yu, 2012).
2.  The South Korean RPS mandates power generators operating at over 500 MW 
to produce a certain amount of their electricity from new and renewable sources.
3.  Key energy technologies of green growth include: new and renewable energy 
(PV, wind, fuel cell, IGCC, biofuel); energy efficiency/carbon reducing technologies 
(clean fuels, energy storage, efficient lighting, green cars, energy efficient buildings, 
heat pumps); and electricity/nuclear (nuclear, smart grid, clean thermal power) (lee 
and yu, 1012).
Since the introduction of green growth, there has 
been a notable development in solar PV and wind 
energy in South Korea. However, the contribution of 
wind and solar energy is currently not significant, 
accounting for 2.2% (wind), 2.7% (solar PV) and 0.3% 
(solar thermal) of the total new and renewable energy 
supply (KEMCO, 2014).
The challenges to the Green Growth Strategy in an 
uncertain environment
The Green Growth Strategy has largely evolved as a new 
vision and a policy paradigm. As a strong top-down initi-
ative, the idea of green growth has rapidly established 
itself as a ‘sacrosanct’ political doctrine, serving as a 
representative symbol of the Lee Myung Bak admin-
istration. Low-carbon schemes and the promotion of 
clean and renewable energy are now widely accepted as 
best practice in government, business and civil society. 
Furthermore, a generous budget allocation has broad-
ened the platform of R&D and policy discussion. The 
Green Growth Strategy has also resulted in the establish-
ment of the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) and the 
Green Technology Center (GTC), while South Korea has 
also hosted the Green Climate Fund (GCF) – all of which 
are regarded as major institutional achievements at the 
global level.
However, South Korea’s Green Growth Strategy has 
also faced growing challenges, especially in the after-
math of the end of the Lee Myung Bak administration. 
These challenges lie in the management of the transition 
from a fossil fuel-based energy structure to a greener 
one, which often bear a huge economic and social cost. A 
series of external variables, such as the global economic 
downturn and an overall recession in global renewable 
energy industries, has also affected the progress of green 
growth in South Korea. 
Much of the criticism has centred on the overblown 
expectations of the outcomes. For example, the Four River 
Revitalization Project, to which the largest share of the 
Green New Deal budget has been allocated,4 has often 
4.  Under the Green New Deal, the Four Major River Revitalization project comprises 
28.9% of the total budget. 
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FIGURE 1 South Korea’s Green Growth Strategy
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FIGURE 2 Ongoing energy diversification
been criticized for its adverse effects on the environment. 
In addition, nuclear energy was included in the Green 
Growth Strategy as one of the most important low-carbon 
measures, but the government’s commitment to nuclear 
expansion is now facing increasing challenges on safety 
grounds in the wake of the Fukushima nuclear accident. 
From an industrial viewpoint, the structure of South 
Korea’s economy remains unfavourable to low-carbon 
growth given that the country’s main industrial sectors 
are energy intensive and export-oriented. On top of this, 
there are concerns about the effectiveness of the ETS 
and on the shale gas boom in North America which is 
forcing renewable energy sectors to compete with the 
growing use of natural gas. It seems that the ride along 
the greener path may not be as easy and smooth as we 
might have hoped.
Reshaping the framework of the green path 
The Park Geun Hye administration has reaffirmed on 
several occasions its continued support for the green 
growth paradigm in South Korea. The government adopted 
the Second Five Year Plan for Green Growth (2014-18) in 
July 2014, announcing three policy objectives: 1) estab-
lishing a low-carbon economy and social structure; 2) 
realizing a creative economy through the convergence of 
green technology and ICT; and 3) constructing living condi-
tions that are clean and resilient to climate change. The 
key contents of the Second Five Year Plan are summarized 
in Figure 3. Furthermore, it is intended that the ETS will 
be introduced in January 2015.
However, the perceived priority of green growth policies 
seems to have decreased and the government appears 
to have cooled down on the ambitions of the previous 
The Green Growth Strategy has enabled a significant development of renewable energy in South Korea, but without totally changing 
the country’s energy landscape.
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administration. The government agency in charge of 
green growth has been transferred from the Presidential 
Committee on Green Growth (PEGG) to the Prime Minis-
ter’s Office; while, among some policy actors, the nuance 
of green growth has shifted implicitly from being regarded 
as a ‘sacrosanct doctrine’ to that of a ‘political taboo’. The 
politically overstated nature of the green growth framework 
has led to negative repercussions, with the consequence 
that the remobilization of political, industrial and social 
stakeholders has, for the time being at least, become 
another priority for the continued implementation of the 
Green Growth Strategy. 
The uncertainties regarding global climate change 
negotiations present an additional external challenge. 
South Korea has taken a proactive stance in the discus-
sions on the post-Kyoto Protocol mechanism. In her 
address at the UN Climate Change Summit in September 
FIGURE 3 Green growth: the second five-year plan
2014, President Park announced South Korea’s contri-
bution of $100 million to the GCF and underlined the 
country’s active role in global cooperation to tackle climate 
change. However, the specific scope and terms of South 
Korea’s participation in the post-2020 climate change 
regime have not yet been fixed and the country’s position 
will be significantly affected by the stances of other major 
industrial countries. 
South Korea’s Green Growth Strategy is still undergoing 
a process of consolidation and at this stage it is too prema-
ture to make judgments on whether it has been an overall 
success or failure. In terms of a paradigm shift, the idea 
of green growth has certainly built a solid platform as a 
new growth model in South Korean society. Faced with a 
dual challenge of a high dependence on imported fossil 
fuel and increasing GHG emissions, the Green Growth 
Strategy remains a valid policy framework. The successful 
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pursuit of the Strategy will depend on reconfirming the 
social consensus and political momentum to implement 
the action plans raised in the Second Five Year Plan. 
The politically overblown expectations of previous years 
are being scaled down as South Korea’s Green Growth 
Strategy currently faces a moment of truth, undergoing 
a reshaping in terms of its contents and scope so that it 
can become a more durable long-term national agenda.  ❚
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Financing the post-2015 
sustainable development 
agenda
I
n 2015 the United Nations General Assembly is expected to propose a new 
development cooperation framework and to draw up a list of universal 
sustainable development goals (SDGs) to be achieved by the year 2030. 
This event is a unique occasion to put environmental challenges at the heart 
of a universal agenda of development model transformation. It offers the 
opportunity to re-open discussions on the socio-economic trajectories of 
countries and their environmental impacts. 
The SDGs will dramatically change the international official development 
assistance (ODA) agenda. They cover many more topics than the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) that were established in 2000. The SDGs 
are more ambitious – for example they include ‘zero poverty’ and ‘zero hunger’1 
objectives – and they are placed within a universal perspective. The widening and 
deepening of the development agenda raises specific questions on implementation, 
particularly regarding funding. 
The issue of development financing has been the subject of a separate report 
(United Nations, 2014), in which an intergovernmental committee of experts 
(ICESDF) examined the issue and drew up an inventory of funding needs and 
sources. In the report’s final section it outlines some options for an integrated 
strategy. The ICESDF report is relatively consensual and draws to a close the cycle 
of discussions between finance experts on what we might call ‘technical’ issues; 
while it opens a cycle of a different nature – a political one, punctuated by the Addis 
Ababa conference in July 2015 and by the discussions on the financing of climate 
1.  The list of SDGs is not fixed; we therefore refer here to the most recent document produced by the Open Working Group, 
dated 12 August 2014: http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/focussdgs.html
Financing for sustainable development is one of the major subjects 
of negotiation on the ‘post-2015’ agenda and a key to its imple-
mentation. The most commonly proposed technical options are 
presented here, and their relevance discussed in relation to the 
constraints specific to certain sectors and countries – particularly 
the least developed countries.
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policies ahead of the COP 21 in Paris, and the finalization of the list of SDGs and 
the resources required with respect to those goals. 
During this pivotal period that is now opening, the purpose of this article is to 
present the technical elements that make up the major reports on development 
financing, and to consider them in a political perspective that is relevant for the 
planning of ODA within the global development financing ecosystem. 
Framing the financial debate: what the recent studies 
tell us
The ICESDF report should be understood as a common and solid working basis from 
which to expect all cooperation actors to produce a number of concrete proposals in 
terms of resource mobilization and efficiency. In view of the adoption of the SDGs 
and the Addis Ababa conference, the works of the committee have resulted in the 
production of a set of intellectual outputs that have recently enriched the discus-
sions through complementary reports and accounts.2 
All highlight that the funding issue is not limited to a quantitative assessment 
of the needs and resources that are available, or are potentially available. Most of 
the major reports do not, however, resist the tempting and yet perilous exercise of 
carrying out such a quantification; and many find that the issue is not so much about 
‘how much’ or ‘why’, but more to do with ‘how’.
They place particular importance on the mobilization and utilization of domestic 
public resources through the identification of specific needs in terms of efficiency 
(capacity building of tax administrations, fighting against corruption) and/or the 
tax base (the ICESDF especially encourages the taxation of CO2 emissions). The 
focus is then put onto the strengthening of local tax administrations and the fight 
against the illicit funding flows out of developing countries.
These resources should encourage local public authorities to mobilize private 
resources for the financing of long-term sustainable development, in particular 
by improving access to financial services and the promotion of business loans to 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SME). The complexity of the issue is not so 
much related to the recommended ‘recipes’, but more to do with the conditions of 
application to difficult environments. In countries with the least well-established 
banking sectors one solution consists of promoting the development of innovative 
payment systems such as mobile banking (Guillaumont-Jeanneney/Kpodar, 
FERDI, forthcoming).
The same applies for private external resources, including foreign direct 
investments (FDI). Here the central question concerns how to direct these funds 
to finance sustainable development. In the absence of a real response, the various 
reports identify the necessary conditions, as well as the potential sources of financing 
2. See OECD (2014), SDSN (2014), the European Report on development (Financing and other means of implementation 
in the post-2015 context, forthcoming) and FERDI (Financing sustainable development by addressing vulnerabilities, 
forthcoming).
BUILDING THE FUTURE WE WANT C H A P T E R  9
A PLANET FOR L IFE 181
for sustainable development and global public goods: pension funds, insurance 
companies, sovereign wealth funds (OECD, 2014), or for the IMF to finance the 
Green Climate Fund through the creation of annual reserve assets in the form of 
additional Special Drawing Rights (Giraud, FERDI, forthcoming). The remittances 
of migrants are often mentioned as an underutilized resource that international 
cooperation should promote through addressing transfer costs and by providing 
suitable financial innovations to direct these funds effectively.3 
Most reports recognize that ODA still has an important role as long as concessional 
public resources are used where most needed, especially in favour of the least 
developed countries (LDCs).4 At the same time, the question of how to ensure that 
the funding effort is fairly distributed between public stakeholders naturally arises. 
While most reports only mention a ‘need for all stakeholders to take responsibility’ 
in the financing of SDGs, the OECD (2014) proposes to increase the effort of each 
country to 2% of GDP (ODA included) and the Sustainable Development Solutions 
Network proposes a formula to determine the distribution of contributions to fight 
against climate change (Sachs and Schmidt-Traub, forthcoming).
Beyond the discussion on the amount of financing, the debate on development 
financing offers an opportunity to observe the progress of the construction of 
international cooperation efficiency, South-South and triangular in particular. 
While the ICESDF mentions the invitation from the United Nations to its General 
Secretary to take ‘concrete actions’ to strengthen this type of collaboration, the 
differences in the design of international cooperation between traditional and 
emerging donors may be an obstacle: while the former cooperate according to rules 
that are common to Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members, a sort of 
‘gentlemen’s agreement’ on development5, the latter see international cooperation 
through the prism of the comparative advantages of each partner (Lin, CCER Beijing, 
FERDI, forthcoming).  
The accounting equation and its limitations
The ICESDF has evaluated the financing needs to be between $135 billion and $195 
billion per year to eradicate extreme poverty, between $5 trillion and $7 trillion to 
cover investment needs in infrastructure, to which is added $2.5 trillion to $3.5 
trillion for the development of SMEs (United Nations, 2014, p. 10).
This raises at least three types of questions: 
 m What is the scientific value of the measurement of these ‘needs’? What method of 
calculation and what economic rationality underlie them? Does the measurement 
3.  Docquier (FERDI, forthcoming) estimates that the proportion of migrant remittances in the GDP of low-income countries 
is already significant and – at the very least – should not decrease. Depending on the international migration scenario, 
this amount could be multiplied by four by 2100, or perhaps even by ten in an optimistic scenario.
4.  The OECD proposes to target LDCs and fragile states with funding of up to 0.25% of the GDP of each donor state; Serge 
Tomasi proposes to allocate between 50% and 70% of ODA to the poorest countries (FERDI, forthcoming).
5.  Hiroshi Kato (JICA, FERDI, forthcoming) emphasizes the importance of knowledge sharing between actors and the 
potential role of traditional donors in a triangular scheme of cooperation, including on the basis of the experience of their 
development practitioners.  
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of financing needs – for roads, schools, vaccines, salaries, risk premiums, etc. – 
have any relevance on a global level? 
 m Assuming that such a measurement gives us relevant and useful information, 
how can such a financial windfall be mobilized and channelled into projects or 
policies for poverty reduction, access to care, sustainable economic growth… (to 
mention only a few of the SDGs, the negotiation of which continues), given that 
such projects and policies (which although have high social returns) are weak 
and uncertain in terms of the returns on private investment?
 m Finally, how can we ensure that the use of these funds is focused on long-term 
sustainable development?
The usefulness of such evaluations is questionable, firstly from a scientific 
point of view. Methodologies are unclear or approximate because they are based 
on assumptions that consider the future as a continuation of the present, even 
though recent crises have shown that changes in current trends are both likely 
and unpredictable. From a political perspective, some consider the results to be 
counterproductive because the financial sums arrived at are huge. While for others 
these figures enable the manoeuvre room and necessary changes to be put into 
perspective, along with the allocation criteria for loans and grants, and public and 
private funding, which depend on the extent of local or global public goods that 
make up each basket of needs (Figure 1).
Estimates of the order of magnitude found in the literature and compiled by the 
ICESDF are that the annual needs are at least twenty times higher than the annual 
ODA amount, which reached a record level in 2013 of $134 billion. This ODA will 
grow only slightly – due to the current and future burden on the public finances of 
donor countries – and will never equate to the financing needs in the broadest sense. 
It is possible that the announcement of the new goals will have a mobilization effect 
– such an effect occurred between 2000 and 2005 following the launch of the MDGs 
and the implementation of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative – 
but it is unlikely to cause a bifurcation or a profound change in the long-term trend 
of net ODA, which follows a very steady trajectory.
One of the possible options to increase the amount of international public funding 
is the use of innovative financing mechanisms focused on international taxation. 
Although the idea of using such mechanisms is often raised during discussions, there 
have not yet been any significant developments in this field. The airline ticket tax, 
which remains national but involves several countries, is a step in this direction, 
but its magnitude is limited. Similarly, the tax on financial transactions proposed 
by the European Commission that will come into force in January 2016, part of the 
revenue of which must be allocated to assistance, lost even more of its ambition at a 
recent meeting of Finance Ministers of the eleven European countries that support 
the initiative. The revenue generated will therefore be limited, as will no doubt the 
proportion allocated to assistance.
The bulk of the additional funds required to cover the financing needs of the 
post-2015 agenda must therefore come from other sources of long-term financing 
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– pension funds, insurance companies, sovereign wealth funds, among other 
institutional investors. The ICESDF has stated that public and private savings 
amount to $22 trillion and financial assets amount to $218 trillion: a reallocation 
of a share of these sums would theoretically cover all of the estimated needs (United 
Nations, 2014, p. 11). Again, one may wonder about the changes that the SDGs 
will trigger – will their announcement help to redirect a small proportion of these 
available savings? And if so, why? Can SDGs serve as credible guidelines for decision-
makers to ensure that the public policies of each country promote more efficient 
allocation mechanisms (from a sustainable development perspective)? What are 
these mechanisms, or what should they be?
The UN estimates that institutional investors alone hold between $75 trillion and 
$85 trillion of financial assets. Pension funds, life insurance companies and sovereign 
wealth funds ($60 trillion in assets) have financial tools (long-term liabilities) 
that are compatible with the long-term horizon required for some investments 
in the post-2015 agenda (UNGA, 2014). As highlighted in the UN report on the 
implementation of the Monterrey Consensus and the Doha Declaration (UNGA, 
FIGURE 1 The investment requirements associated with the post-2015 agenda
The estimation of funding needs for some major goals or sectors raises numerous conceptual and methodological difficulties. The 
orders of magnitude proposed here are taken from the report of UN experts on sustainable development (GIEFDD) based on a literature 
review of institutions or organizations that conducted this estimation exercise for a specific sector or topic (IEA, UNCTAD, Lancet...)]
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2014), these ‘long-term investors today do not invest enough in the long term direct 
investment necessary for sustainable development, both in developing countries 
and rich countries – regardless of the institutional and regulatory framework. For 
example, the overall infrastructure investment represents less than 3% of the assets 
of pension funds’ (UNGA, 2014, p. 7; Table 1). 
The obstacles are well known and the subject of much analysis – weak local 
regulatory and institutional frameworks, lack of data, inappropriate risk sharing and 
transfer, etc. (OECD, 2013; World Bank, 2014b). However, the solutions to overcome 
these problems will come from major principles rather than implementation. This 
is examined below.
It should, however, be noted that sums that are mobilized domestically 
in developing countries currently exceed international funding (European 
Commission, 2013). According to data gathered by the European Commission, 
the ratio of domestic public resources and international resources is around 20:1 
(Figure 2). The overall total of international public finance dedicated to developing 
countries only represents 2% of the available funds in these countries. Domestic 
FIGURE 2 Domestic public financing in developing countries
On average, official development assistance flows represent one quarter of the funding sources of LDCs, while private domestic 
financing provides a similar proportion. This is compared to only 1% in middle-income countries where national funding capacity 
(public and private) is much higher.
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sources of funding are very heterogeneous, varying from one country to another. 
The mobilization of domestic resources is not a rhetorical agenda or an excuse to 
be used by impoverished international donors; it corresponds to the proximity of 
the readily available resources. 
Given the accounting difficulties associated with balancing needs and funding 
opportunities, the need for the diversification of sources blurs the distinction between 
public and private sources – a distinction that has been the essential reference of 
ODA since 1972. In a dynamic perspective, what matters more is the nature of 
funding and whether a financial return on investment is expected or not, and with 
what yield. Taken to its extreme, this distinction in the nature of funds requires 
an answer to the question of who ultimately pays: the taxpayer or the user? Like 
Russian dolls, this question contains other questions, is the taxpayer from the North 
or the South? Is it the rich user or the poor user...? SDGs funding in the long term is 
comparable to the issuance of a debt for which the underwriters and the schedule 
must be specified from the outset. 
Discussions on development financing are not new. The latest commitments of 
the international community date back to the Monterrey Conference in 2001 in 
the wake of the MDGs. As a reminder, the discussions were focused around six 
means of action: 1/ mobilizing domestic public and private financial resources; 
2/ mobilizing international private financing; 3/ the role of trade; 4/ official 
development assistance and other innovative sources of international public finance; 
5/ management of external debts; and 6/ international financial governance. The 
MDGs have undoubtedly led to a refocusing of assistance on some priorities, but they 
did not have the desired effect on the overall resource mobilization and its geographic 
allocation (Figure 3) (Nunnenkamp and Thiele, 2013; UNGA, 2014). A paradox of 
the current situation is that ODA funding capacities have never seemed so limited 
considering the scale of the issues and the potential private contributions, and never 
as essential given the challenges of designing and implementing alternatives and 
autonomous financing modalities – including innovative financing.
BOX 1 THE DYNAMIC PROBLEM
Ongoing public private partner-
ships demonstrate that the inflow 
of private capital in the form of 
grants or investments towards the 
SDGs cannot be taken for granted 
and that the SDGs and countries 
will not receive equal shares from 
the available capital.
The accounting perspective also 
suffers from a number of short-
comings. It is not very prescriptive, 
given the state of knowledge of the 
exact needs that each country asso-
ciates with the different SDGs. The 
level of ignorance on this matter 
leads donor countries to adopt a 
cautious stance, stating that SDGs, 
in the same way as the MDGs, 
cannot be ‘bought’. The accounting 
perspective, by dealing with large 
masses, complicates more than it 
facilitates the political discussion, 
confining it to humble injunctions 
to the fund holders. Finally, this 
approach leads to implementa-
tion problems being hastily iden-
tified as funding problems, disre-
garding the thorny question of 
how. In short, once the money is 
there, what do we do with it?
FIGURE 3 Mapping the financial resources
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The roles of ODA in the ecosystem of development 
finance
How can a large pool of savings be redirected into long-term investments 
(Glachant, Lorenzi, Quinet, Trainar, 2010)? This universal challenge is partic-
ularly difficult for LDCs for several reasons: 1/ almost all of these savings are 
located in developed and emerging countries; and 2/ competition on the global 
savings market between developed and emerging countries increases the proba-
bility of an exclusion of the poorest countries, that already exists – according 
to the paradox highlighted by Lucas (1990). Global capital does not flow into 
sectors and regions where it is most scarce and where, in theory, for this reason, 
its marginal returns should be the highest.6 At the heart of the Lucas paradox is 
the risk, or rather the uncertainty: too many uninsurable risks deter investors 
from undercapitalized sectors and regions. In other words, money goes to money 
– and economists from Lucas to Piketty have documented to varying degrees of 
6.  For further explanation of recent examples, see Azemar and Desbordes, 2013.
This map shows the priority allocation of international funding. It reads as follows: migrant remittances are the largest source of external 
financing in Nigeria, ODA is the main source of external financing of Benin and Mali. ODA is the main source of external financing of 
continental Africa, private external financing remains predominant in Latin America and Asia.
FIGURE 4 The nature of financial flows to developing countries
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refinement and elegance the concentration of wealth regardless (or almost) of 
merit and needs over time.
Can ODA contravene the fatal law of capitalism, can it reduce risk and bring closer 
together the expected return on capital and its theoretical return? What actions 
should be funded for this purpose – because it is understood that it is not the role 
for public subsidies to replace private capital – in order to increase private flows, 
which are the majority in gross volumes directed to developing countries (Figure 4)? 
What multiplier effect can be expected? 
For example, it is often suggested that feasibility studies for infrastructure projects 
should be financed by public funds to facilitate private investment, which is typically 
between 5% and 10% of the total project cost. The multiplier effect can then reach 
1:20 – which is huge – if the project is then funded entirely by private means. The 
EU experience of blended finance has demonstrated attractive ratios (1:30), but 
these ratios can decrease drastically (1:8) depending on the method of calculation 
used (Bilal and Krätke, 2013). Furthermore, most blended financing mechanisms 
set up by the EU almost exclusively involve public finance partners, which means 
Taken together, developing countries are the recipients of international financial flows that are primarily private (FDI remittances). ODA 
is marginal in terms of international flows and its relative contribution has shrunk significantly since the mid-2000s with the exponen-
tial growth of private funding to middle income countries.
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that the above mentioned ratios provide a rather poor estimate of how much private 
financing can be leveraged by blending. This highlights the different definitions of 
blended finance: it can mean a blending of grants and loans (within a given institution 
or across different institutions – public or private) or a blending of public/private 
financing, or a combination of the two. 
Other case studies presented by the World Economic Forum as successful examples 
of public-private partnership suggest that such a ratio is exceptionally high and cannot 
be generalized for all sectors (WEF, 2013). The World Economic Forum report gives 
some order of magnitude derived from projects on photovoltaic infrastructure (India), 
water treatment (Jordan) and agricultural development (Tanzania): the ratio is very 
high in the first case, 1:44, but it drops to 1:13 in the second example, and 1:1.6 in the 
last (WEF, 2013). 
Therefore, it is possible to distinguish at least two roles for ODA, without these roles 
being mutually exclusive. The first aims to directly promote capital inflows towards 
developing countries by tackling the failures that affect the project cycle – asymmetric 
information, moral hazard, lack of collateral, etc. It may then involve either the direct 
reduction of the risks associated with project development (financing of all or part of 
the R&D, of the feasibility studies or pilot projects) or responding to market failures 
(concessional loans, offer of warranty, etc.) and creating the necessary capital inflow 
conditions, by addressing the factors explaining the Lucas Paradox: availability of human 
capital that is additional to the flow of physical capital, quality of institutions, role of 
macro-economic policies, etc. (Azemar and Desbordes, 2013). In this perspective, the 
strengthening of institutions and the funding of public policies are essential, although 
they are targets for which ODA performance is difficult to measure (Treyer et al., 2014; 
Voituriez et al., forthcoming)7.
The second role is to influence the direct mobilization of the available funds by putting 
development agencies at the heart of intermediation and financial innovation (Tomasi, 
2013). In practice, this consists of aid agencies purchasing securities issued by companies 
and issuing others to investors, while ensuring a better sharing of long-term risks between 
underwriters. A few examples are provided below.
Green bonds issued by the World Bank or the European Investment Bank are part 
of the process. However, their volume is limited, although undergoing rapid growth 
– the World Bank has issued $6.4 billion of green bonds since 2008, including $3 
billion in 2013/2014 – and most importantly, these bonds have, until now, only been 
used to fund projects in middle-income countries (World Bank, 2014a). In September 
2014, the French Development Agency issued its first climate bonds at €1 billion for 
a ten-year maturity.
In the health sector, the International Finance Facility for Immunization (IFFIm) 
was created in 2006, which differs from climate bonds insofar as it is a pre-financing 
mechanism. It issues bonds that enable the funding of the Vaccine Alliance (GAVI), the 
7.  This can be illustrated in the health sector, where strengthening health institutions for instance provides long-term and 
heterogeneous results which are difficult to measure with a simple metric. 
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bonds being secured by future donor commitments. The Alliance was founded on the 
assumption that the financial cost of borrowing on the capital markets will remain below 
the benefits associated with obtaining the full amount promised at the beginning of 
the period and with the deductibility of aid. While GAVI is presented as a classic public-
private partnership, it differs from this description in practice because the risk is not 
borne by the private sector but by the public sector. Therefore, the ability of the IFFIm 
to raise funds ultimately depends on the creditworthiness of the donor states: IFFIm has 
been rated AAA by the rating agencies, which explains its success. A rating downgrade, 
that could follow the downgrade of a contributor’s rating, could undermine the initiative. 
The replication of this initiative in other sectors (climate, infrastructure or education) is 
not a trivial matter (Ketkar, 2014): firstly, the benefit of having all pledges in advance 
must be demonstrated for sectors other than health; secondly, the credibility of donor 
pledges could erode as their number increases to cover the various SDGs.
This initiative has led to the extension of advanced financing mechanisms by the private 
sector based on guarantees from either the public sector (donor or recipient countries) or 
private non-profit organizations (foundations): the Development Impact Bonds (Center 
for Global Development & Social Finance, 2013). These bonds are accompanied by 
performance targets that are measurable on the model of Social Impact Bonds (SIBs). 
There are SIBs pilots in the field of health, housing, education and justice services. A 
first experience of SIBs was recently launched in the education sector in India.8
It is fair to say that many innovations have emerged in recent years in terms of 
development finance. However, specific to certain sectors or certain problems, they 
are far from being transferable to others. Without providing a blueprint – in particular 
for the thematic funds – these innovations have had the benefit of encouraging the 
self-examination of donors, without leading to a profound revision of the objectives, 
means and practices that would today enable the huge needs of SGDs to be met. 
Conclusion
ODA seems essential for the implementation of the post-2015 agenda, to directly 
finance projects, programmes and policies and to attract funding, and also to ensure 
that funds, regardless of their origin, ‘produce’ development. We have also seen that 
ODA has been too low in comparison to the needs, and therefore should (non-exclu-
sively) either be increased (as was done in the UK) or be used as a vehicle of mobili-
zation, with conclusive examples that can be demonstrated.
However, questions remain beyond this observation. Is blended finance the 
appropriate vehicle to finance sustainable development in LDCs? Are there specific 
experiences transposable to other countries, other sectors and other scales (in terms 
of volume mobilized)? Beyond blended finance and public-private partnerships, 
which assessment methods and learning frameworks should be used? Can an 
assessment of the relevance of different funding instruments be carried out according 
to each country and sector? 
8.  http://www.cgdev.org/blog/first-development-impact-bond-launched
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Our review raises one last important issue, that of tools for joint experiments 
(from research to implementation) and learning. Building capacity in developing 
countries, and particularly in LDCs, to plan and mobilize funding with the priority 
given to domestic resources is a pre-requisite for making the post-2015 agenda 
really deliver. ❚ 
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CHAPTER 9
I
t seems very unlikely that the new development agenda 
and the fight against climate change will be adequately 
financed. Official development assistance peaks at 
around 0.3% of the GDP of donor countries, which is 
a long way from the commitments made in Monterrey 
in 2002. Furthermore, six years after pledging $100 bil-
lion per year from 2020 to fight against climate change in 
the South, ‘developed’ countries are still unable to show 
firm evidence of how they will keep this promise. Finally, 
encouraging avenues of so-called ‘innovative’ financing, 
such as taxes on financial transactions, container traffic 
or air travel, have almost stalled. In the spring, the Euro-
pean Union adopted a tax on financial transactions which, 
because it excludes the majority of derivatives, will only 
bring in a few billion euros per year, far from the €57 bil-
lion revenue estimated by the European Commission. As 
it stands, therefore, this is not the lever that the South can 
depend upon.
We could continue to list the bad news. And indeed we 
must keep this negative background in mind to understand 
why there is little trust on the part of the poorest countries 
in these negotiations; and also so that we do not absolve 
the policy makers of rich countries for their performance 
in this area. However, the future of development financing 
and the fight against climate change, which are the two 
crucial concerns for 2015, cannot be addressed by simply 
‘cutting and pasting’ from the past.
The new map of donors
Firstly, the mapping of donors is rapidly changing. For 
example, a country in Africa today has a choice of three 
Beyond the financing of sustainable 
development through public aid
Pascal Canfin, Senior Advisor for International Climate Affairs, World Resources Institute (WRI) 
Paris 1 University, Paris, France
funders to finance infrastructure projects, including very 
large ones: the system of bilateral and multilateral banks, 
which are often gathered around the same table, the Gulf 
countries and China. Moreover, in many UN organizations 
China is shifting from the status of a recipient country to 
that of a donor. And if the New Development Bank, formerly 
the BRICS bank, which was politically launched during the 
summer of 2014, really emerges at an operational level, 
the donor mapping changes taking place will accelerate 
further as this bank plans to have a capital of $100 billion, 
when that of the World Bank is now $223 billion.1 
It is difficult to accurately measure this evolution 
because none of the new donor countries are subject 
to the rules of the OECD’s Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC), which only includes traditional donors. 
This means that these donors are not required to report 
their assistance in the same way and are not subject to 
the DAC principles, such as ensuring that assistance is 
not motivated by economic interest. Without going so far 
as extending the DAC principles to new donors, an objec-
tive that now seems somewhat overly utopian, one of the 
major challenges of development funding for the 2015 to 
2025 decade is to advance towards a common system of 
assistance measurement.
The fight against tax evasion, an issue  
of the post-2015 agenda
The second issue to emphasize here is the vital importance 
of ‘domestic resource mobilization’. Indeed, while there is 
1.  This refers to disbursed capital and the callable capital of the Bank.
A PLANET FOR L IFE 193A PLANET FOR L IFE192
no development without private or entrepreneurial invest-
ment, there is also no development without the state. And 
there is no state without tax! However, while the average 
tax burden in OECD countries is 35%, it is about 15% 
in the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa (OECD, 2015). In 
addition, according to the NGO Global Financial Integ-
rity, illicit financial flows coming out of Southern countries 
are eight to ten times greater than the amount of official 
development assistance (Kar and leBlaNC, 2013). However, 
while monetary transfers from the North to the South are 
suffering from the financial crisis that has affected devel-
oped economies, the same crisis has also significantly 
strengthened the political will to fight against tax evasion 
by multinationals. State treasuries must collect funds and 
tax evasion has become particularly unacceptable in the 
light of tax increases for households. Developing countries 
are the first victims of tax optimization by multinationals 
FIGURE 1 Overall official development assistance (ODA) trend since 1960
Despite decades of renewed commitments, ODA has remained at about 0.3% of the GDP of donor countries, which is why poor countries 
have lost confidence in international negotiations.
operating in their territories, especially when such firms 
are exploiting the natural resources of their host countries, 
because these countries do not have alternative income 
streams and company taxes often constitute their main 
budget resources. Enabling Southern states to collect taxes 
to which they are entitled – for example by bringing an 
end to abusive transfer pricing that concentrates value in 
very low tax countries – is a high priority on an agenda 
that is progressing much more rapidly than we would have 
thought possible three or four years ago (sHarples, JoNes 
and martiN, 2014). This is why account transparency for 
every country must be one of the targets of the on-going 
negotiations of the post-2015 agenda (europeaN Commis-
sioN, 2011; fletCHer, 2014).
Solving the COP 21 financial equation
A third challenge is the specific issue of climate finance 
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in the context of the COP 21 to be held in December 
2015 in Paris, the objective of which is a much-needed 
international agreement on climate change. The view of 
the author is that the financial stakes in Paris are three-
fold. The first issue is to show a credible pathway to the 
famous ‘Copenhagen $100 billion’. Indeed, it is utterly 
delusional to think that an agreement in Paris could be 
possible without showing Southern countries how this 
$100 billion figure will be achieved by 2020. One could 
argue that a compromise is possible on the following 
principles: the $100 billion will consist of public and private 
money that has been ‘mobilized’2 by public money; this 
sum can only be reached with additional public money but 
2.  I use the term ‘mobilized’ to mean private money that would not be 
invested without the lever of public money in the form of grants, guarantees, 
bonuses, etc.
also by including the part of current official development 
assistance that contains a high carbon element, such as 
transport, energy and urban planning. In no way is the 
objective the transfer of funds from health and educa-
tion to the fight against climate change – which would be 
totally unacceptable – but the ‘greening’ of money that is 
already used to finance infrastructure. Indeed, it is unlikely 
that Northern countries will first pay to finance high CO2 
emitting infrastructure, and then pay again to mitigate the 
impact of these emissions on climate! The very meaning of 
the post-2015 agenda is to ensure consistency between 
the pursuit of development and global sustainability.
The second major financial issue for the Paris confer-
ence will be the definition of the new post-2020 archi-
tecture that will follow on from the $100 billion. While its 
outlines are still unclear, there is no doubt that a battle 
will be played out between those who want a renewed 
LIC and MICs do not have the same capacity to mobilize domestic resources (public or private). These resources represent 86% of 
MICs financing, compared to 53% in LIC.
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financial promise, that extends and amplifies the $100 
billion in 2020; and those who consider that the issue is 
above all about the need to change the entire financial 
system in a direction that is more favourable to the fight 
against climate change, which involves not hundreds of 
billions of dollars, but hundreds of trillions! This is the third 
financial stake for Paris. The new climate economy report3 
showed that the global financial investment required to 
return to an emissions trajectory that is compatible with 
the goal of a 2°C warming is only 5% higher than the 
‘business as usual’ scenario that takes us into a world of 
plus 4°C. Finding how to finance this, both in the North 
and South, is a key issue in the financing of sustainable 
development.
3.  See www.newclimateeconomy.net
As we can see, the very design of development finance 
cannot be reduced to a ‘magic’ number for official devel-
opment assistance that does not take into account, for 
example, the flows from new non-OECD donors or the 
economic gains in Southern countries related to the fight 
against tax evasion. The new agenda of development 
financing should be an opportunity to go beyond official 
development assistance to move towards a concept that 
is both more ambitious and in line with the developments 
of the twentieth century, that of ‘sustainable development 
financing’. All this will be played out in Addis Ababa in July 
2015 and in Paris in December 2015. ❚
FIGURE 3 A financial flows schematic
Financial flows to developing countries are always accompanied by reverse flows (‘outflows’): interest payments, capital repayments, 
legal or illegal capital outflows. The accurate measurement of these flows, partly illegal outflows, is becoming increasingly important 
in the development financing agenda.
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T
he year 2014 saw the announcement of the 
creation of new international financial institu-
tions originated by member countries of the 
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa), China in particular. The New Develop-
ment Bank (NDB), the Contingent Reserve Arrangement 
(CRA), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and 
the Silk Road Fund (SRF) have been created as a result 
of the frustration experienced by emerging countries with 
regard to the rigidity of the international financial architec-
ture. It is also an expression of China’s will to strengthen 
its regional and global geopolitical weight. However, while 
there is no doubt that these institutions have a geopolitical 
importance, their short-term impact on the architecture of 
aid is open to debate.
The recent proliferation of various financial 
instruments  
The NDB, the ‘BRICS Bank’, was officially launched at the 
sixth annual BRICS summit in Fortaleza in July 2014. The 
original idea was proposed at the forth summit in New 
Delhi in 2012, followed by a declaration at the Durban 
summit a year later, which reaffirmed the principle but 
did not provide specific guidance on future operating 
procedures. The Fortaleza NDB agreement specified the 
operational and governance procedures, while the bank is 
expected to become operational by 2016 following ratifica-
tion by the founding countries. It will have an initial capital 
of $50 billion, including $10 billion of paid-up capital and 
$40 billion of callable capital, which will be shared equally 
between the founding members.
The CRA, which was also created in Fortaleza, is an 
New international financial institutions: 
from multilateralism to fragmentation? 
Laetitia Martinet, Advisor, Strategy department, AFD
agreement whereby the BRICS committed resources through 
‘swap arrangements’, up to a total of $100 billion, including 
$41 billion from China, $18 billion each from Brazil, India 
and Russia, and $5 billion from South Africa. The objective 
is to build an instrument to relieve short-term pressure on 
the balance of payments of member states and to ensure 
mutual support and thus strengthen financial stability.
The creation of the AIIB – an Asian regional bank – was 
announced on 24 October 2014 at a launch ceremony in 
Beijing. The initial capital of the AIIB was $50 billion but could 
soon reach $100 billion. The 22 AIIB member countries now 
include China, the members of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), Mongolia, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait, Qatar 
and Oman. 
The AIIB will cover the same geographical areas as the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the same sectors as the 
ADB-supported ASEAN Infrastructure Fund.
In addition to these multilateral funds and institutions, 
China announced at the Asia-Pacific Economic Coopera-
tion (APEC) summit the creation of the SRF, a bilateral fund 
of a regional nature. With the primary objective of financing 
infrastructure – mainly transportation – the fund will be 
provided with $40 billion and will be managed by the China 
Development Bank.
The Silk Road diplomacy 
Although small in comparison to the sums of money 
associated with the Bretton Woods institutions, the 
capital of these new financial institutions is nevertheless 
considerable, the latter therefore accentuating the already 
increasing individual influence of the so-called ‘emerging’ 
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A strong political signal to reform international 
financial architecture
Officially, the BRICS Bank, CRA, the AIIB and the funds 
created by China are supplementary regional institutions 
and financial instruments, rather than intended to compete 
with existing international financial establishments. 
However, the creation of these institutions echoed the 
slow pace of governance reform of international financial 
organizations, dominated by the countries of the Organisa-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
At the ADB, China and India each have 11% of the votes, 
compared to 16% each for Japan and the United States; 
and since its establishment, the ADB presidency has been 
provided by Japan. As for the current reform of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF), which aims to reflect changes 
in the relative influence of member countries in the global 
economy, it is still awaiting ratification by the US Congress 
before it can take effect. The realignment of share quotas 
should allow China to become the third largest member 
of the IMF, with Brazil, China, India and Russia becoming 
among the ten largest shareholders. This quota reform, 
which was agreed in 2011 by the IMF Board, requires 
ratification by three fifths of the membership (i.e. 116 
members), representing more than 85% of the quotas. 
To date, 146 members, representing 77% of the quotas, 
have ratified the reforms, but the ratification of the United 
States is still required.
The creation of the BRICS Bank, the ARC and AIIB is thus 
an important sign of the political aspirations of the BRICS, 
especially China, to occupy a greater role in global finan-
cial governance that reflects their actual influence in the 
global economy. It is also a way of questioning the inher-
ited post-war system that is organized around the Bretton 
Woods institutions, whose leadership is largely assumed 
by the United States, Europe and Japan. 
Regionalization and multiplication  
of financing channels
The new institutions will strengthen the interdependencies 
among BRICS and their areas of influence, and also the 
convertibility of their currencies. Through the AIIB, China is 
accelerating the regionalization of its companies and of the 
yuan, thus promoting intra-regional trade. Ultimately, this 
donors for the financing of development, particularly infra-
structure.
The declared intent of the new financial institutions is 
to foster a different perspective to that of existing finan-
cial institutions. Thus, measures have been taken to limit 
the participation and/or influence of developed countries 
in their governance. Moreover, the NDB’s shareholding 
requirements de facto limit the bank’s governance partic-
ipation to its founding members (who may not repre-
sent less than 55% of the voting rights; while a single 
non-founding member may not possess more than 7% of 
the voting rights) and to the borrowing countries (which 
cannot represent less than 80% of the voting rights). These 
limits demonstrate the intention to avoid the World Bank/
ADB situation in which the main shareholders – countries 
which therefore have an impact on the governance of 
these institutions – are non-borrowing countries; with the 
notable exception of China, which like the five main share-
holders (United States, United Kingdom, Japan, Germany 
and France), has appointed an executive director at the 
World Bank since 2010.
Although the principle adopted at the launch of the NDB 
was that of the equal distribution of shares of the capital and 
the voting rights among the founding members, Shanghai 
was designated as the seat of the Bank after long negotia-
tions. The AIIB headquarters is also in China (Beijing), its 
prospective director is Chinese (Jin Liqun, chairman of the 
China International Capital Corporation, China’s sovereign 
wealth fund) and capital will be distributed according to a 
formula in which GDP is the main criterion, giving a promi-
nent place to China. China is also the leading contributor of 
the CRA. Its therefore has an unchallengeable influence in 
these multilateral institutions and mechanisms.
In addition to the SRF, during the ASEAN+3 summit China 
committed to provide $10 billion in preferential loans to 
countries within the organization, $10 billion in loans for 
infrastructure, along with a second phase of the China-
ASEAN Fund amounting to $3 billion. Through trade agree-
ments and investment in transport networks, China plans to 
interconnect Asian countries and thus build the foundations 
of Asian ‘co-prosperity’ led by Chinese growth. Through this 
action, together with the AIIB and the SRF, China is demon-
strating its financial power in the region.
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will enable China to have a thriving area of influence that is 
external to the power of the dollar.
Moreover, the proliferation of infrastructure financing 
channels, in which the NDB and AIIB are a part, might 
contribute to address the considerable needs of investments 
in developing countries. In Asia alone, these channels are 
estimated to be worth trillions of dollars.
In the context of the preparation for the third UN Confer-
ence on Financing for Development (Addis Ababa, July 2015), 
there is a clear weakness of the public funds mobilized by the 
members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) as official development assistance (ODA) with regard 
to the need for the realization of a universal agenda (which 
is estimated to be twenty times the current annual amount 
of ODA). Indeed, for many years there has been a call for 
emerging countries to make commitments to development 
funding. In this regard, the launch of these new financial 
instruments of development assistance is a clear signal of 
the mobilization and involvement of emerging countries in 
financing development.
The challenges ahead for the new sources of funding
However, the proliferation of funding represents a high risk 
of aid fragmentation. Indeed, it increases the complexity of 
global governance. It is the result of a larger movement of 
public policy tightening towards national issues that affect 
both high-income countries and countries with medium 
or low income. In this context, efforts of reconciliation, 
dialogue and consultation are more useful than ever.
The consideration of environmental and social issues, in 
view of some form of convergence of practices, is an essential 
aspect of these collaborative efforts. Development financial 
institutions – both bilateral and multilateral – along the lines 
of the Bretton Woods organizations have established a set of 
FIGURE 1 The BRICS Bank – competitor, alternative or complementary?
The new financial structures proposed by the BRICS seem more complementary and symbolic, rather than real competitors or alterna-
tives to existing international and regional financial institutions.
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standards and regulations that can have a positive impact on 
the environment and society, or at least can limit the negative 
impacts of funding. The strength of this body of standards 
results from its recognition by all institutions. The development 
of new sources of funding, freed from these criteria, would be 
extremely detrimental to the effectiveness of these standards 
and the positive impact they can have.
In this context of increased complexity and fragmentation of 
the assistance landscape, a number of initiatives are contrib-
uting to the building of a new paradigm, based on coordina-
tion and complementarity between the different actors. This 
is the case of the International Development Financing Club 
that gathers bilateral public financial stakeholders from the 
member countries of the OECD-DAC but also national financial 
actors from emerging powers. This Club gathers Development 
Agencies from France, Germany and Japan alongside South 
African, Brazilian and Chinese agencies. ❚
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FIGURE 2 BRICS are seeking an influence that reflects 
the size their economies
The voting rights in international or regional financial institu-
tions still largely understate the political and economic weights 
of emerging countries, encouraging them to find alternative ways 
to demonstrate their new statures.
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T
he challenge of the next Conference of the Par-
ties of the Convention on Climate Change (COP 
21) is to enable the international community to 
escape from the circle of distrust that has built 
up around the climate issue, and to deliver the 
‘paradigm shift’ that was called for at Cancun (COP 16) for 
‘building a low-carbon society that […] ensures continued 
high growth and […] an equitable access to sustainable 
development’. In UN parlance, this means abandoning the 
framing of the negotiations that has dominated since Ber-
lin (1995), through Kyoto (1997) and until Copenhagen 
(2009).1 This framework was focused on the issue of the 
sharing of the global emissions budget and has made us 
lose sight of the benefits of cooperation and the spirit of 
Rio (1992), which included climate policies in the per-
spective of sustainable development.2 
However, there is a risk that the circle of distrust could 
be re-established. In Copenhagen (2009), expectations 
were raised for financial transfers via the Green Climate 
Fund ($100 billion per year). These expectations could 
be disappointed in a context of financial crisis, strained 
public budgets and ‘fiscal fatigue’, especially when some 
of the recipient countries have new middle classes and 
are therefore seen as competitors.
This text discusses the notion that success is only 
possible by considering climate finance as a financial 
system reform tool, rather than a marginal department 
1. Even if another Kyoto adaptation was possible, see R. Guesnerie and H. Tulkens 
(2009), J.C. Hourcade, (2000) and J.C. Hourcade, L. Tubiana, H Le Treut (2010).
2. Rio picked up from the Stockholm compromise (1972): to obtain the full partici-
pation of Southern countries in environmental policies, these policies must not be 
an obstacle to their development.
of global finance. Also, a low-carbon transition should be 
considered as a lever for transformation away from the 
type of economic globalization that led to the 2008 crisis.
Why do we need ‘climate finance’?
It is only very recently that the economic literature on 
climate has tackled the financial issue. The Kyoto economy 
was characterized by a per-country allocation of the overall 
emission budget, efficiency was ensured by a single 
carbon price through a global carbon market, and equity 
was provided by a generous allocation of emission rights 
for low-income countries.
This article does not address the obstacle of the 
allocation of emission rights. Emerging countries are in 
a phase of development where the use of heavy indus-
tries is needed. They will be heavily penalized by any 
significant carbon prices and developed countries will 
be reluctant to give more than 1% of their current GDPs 
in compensation, given that they never met the objec-
tive of a 0.7% allocation of GDP for assistance during 
the post-war boom.
Instead this article focuses on another obstacle: the fact 
that carbon price provides an incomplete signal, which is 
drowned out by the noise from other signals (volatility of 
fossil fuel prices, property prices, evolving regulation of the 
electricity sector, etc.). In addition, carbon prices improve 
the profitability of low-carbon investments if all goes well, 
but they do not respond to the fact that technologies are 
often capital intensive and that, when investment costs are 
exceeded, the ventures can be perceived as overly risky, 
which threatens their capital value and makes additional 
loans very expensive.
A mechanism for green recovery: carbon 
Eurobonds 
Jean-Charles Hourcade, Director of Research, International Centre on Environment and development 
(CIRED), Nogent-sur-Marne, France
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FIGURE 1 Carbon markets today
It is this deadlock that climate finance has to remove 
by reducing the risks of low-carbon investments based on 
the social value of avoided emissions. It needs to do so 
urgently because emerging countries are rapidly building 
infrastructure that will determine much of the century’s 
greenhouse gas emissions. The challenge is to reorient the 
development choice for countries that are under the dual 
pressure of providing their middle classes with a decent 
standard of living, and the risk of confining three billion 
people to a poverty trap. This window of opportunity is 
rapidly closing.
Can climate finance exist in  
an unfavourable context? 
Seizing this window of opportunity seems impossible given 
the state of public budgets and the fragility of the banking 
system. However, we can look at the situation from the 
other way around: as the major decarbonization of econo-
mies requires a redirection of investment into 40% of 
the gross fixed capital formation (energy, construction, 
transportation, material processing and food production), 
it is therefore in accord with the latest IMF report that 
calls for a revival of infrastructure investments, a call that 
reflects a genuine concern for a sustainable recovery of 
the world economy.
The additional investment costs for a low-carbon transi-
tion are moderate, less than 1% of GDP by 2035. There is 
therefore no savings deficit blockage, but as is the case for 
other productive investments, there is a blockage due to a 
financial intermediation that prefers liquid assets to long-
term investments. Combined with a business management 
system that is very sensitive to the immediate value of a 
In parallel to the climate negotiations, different countries and regions have implemented, or started to think about, market instruments 
to encourage the reduction of carbon emissions (allocating emission rights, taxes, etc.). These instruments are insufficient to create 
the necessary change.
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company, and given the risks associated with productive 
investment, this behaviour pushes savings towards specu-
lative investments, particularly property.3
If the low-carbon transition could break this vicious cycle 
and accelerate the transformation of abundant savings into 
productive investment, then it would have a positive net 
effect on short and medium-term growth. This is especially 
true because this transition is 75% based on the better 
use of existing techniques and local labour, and concerns 
activities that are subject to little international competi-
tion. Although this requires a favourable business context.
The international debate around economic and 
monetary policies is well known: fiscal austerity versus 
the issue of currency. But easier access to credit may 
well revive the pattern of growth that led to an impasse: 
debt-financed consumption, competition through wages, 
property speculation, deindustrialization of many regions, 
agricultural modernization in tandem with the weakening 
of rural areas, technological choices with little regard for 
natural capital, costly imports of oil and fragile energy 
security. Even the idea of ‘project bonds’, i.e. bonds 
dedicated to the financing of infrastructure projects, can 
lead to a triggering of a lobbying game around random 
major projects that lack overall coherence. It is here that 
the climate-agnostic can see the value in financial inter-
mediation based on carbon assets.
Towards the creation of carbon assets4
Suppose that governments could agree on a social cost 
of non-emitted carbon (SCC) and a volume of emission 
reduction accessible by projects avoiding greenhouse gas 
emissions. A new asset could then be defined: the Climate 
Remediation Asset (CRA). Central banks could then open 
lines of credit in amounts equal to SCC and the volume of 
CRA; they could accept repayment in the form of carbon 
certificates (CC) validated by an authority similar to that 
of the clean development mechanism. Banks could grant 
loans to low-carbon investments that are partly refund-
able in CC and not in cash, which are therefore less 
3. Paul H. Dembinski (2014) on savings and sterile finance.
4. For a more complete development see: J.C. Hourcade, B. Perrissin Fabert and 
J. Rozenberg (2012). A comprehensive study is available at www.centre-cired.fr
risky, and their profitability would be increased by lower 
interest payments. Specialized investment funds could 
then issue bonds that are attractive to institutional and 
individual investors.
At the end of the process, central banks would trans-
form CCs into CRAs, which would be counted as assets 
alongside gold and currencies. There would be no blind 
injection of liquid funds; the increase of carbon reserves 
would be correlated with a properly controlled produc-
tion of wealth, and private savings would be deflected 
from speculative products by climate-dedicated financial 
products with a strong guarantee.
Such a system does not affect existing capital, as 
opposed to a carbon price, but guides the choices made 
towards the building of future capital. Thus, after a learning 
phase, the SCC level can be raised much faster than that 
of a carbon price, with lower transaction costs. Another 
advantage is the avoidance of discussions on the imposi-
tion of penalties on countries that do not respect legally 
binding commitments; such a country would simply be 
deprived of access to funding available within the system. 
Finally, even if only for the sake of the good manage-
ment of public accounts, states will have an interest in the 
launch of climate policies, including through carbon taxes, 
to enhance the attractiveness of low-carbon investment.
Conclusions
It is possible to think that there is a danger of cluttering 
the climate convention process with sensitive monetary 
issues that will unfold in other forums of global economic 
governance. However, it would in fact be within the role 
of the Climate Convention to provide issues for climate-
agnostic actors to seize upon, and the support of these 
actors is necessary. There now exists an opportunity to be 
grasped, that emerging countries seem fully aware of, as 
demonstrated by the Brazil submission in Lima.5
Distrust between countries would be re-established 
in the case where a minimal agreement was reached, 
accompanied by the staging of various initiatives that 
5. This submission calls for the recognition of: ‘the social value of mitigation activities 
[…] in line with the notion of environmental services […] and to create a consistent, 
coherent and long-term system of results-based payment through attribution of a 
financial value to verified mitigation.’
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FIGURE 2 A pro-climate financial architecture
could only poorly mask the fragmentation of action, what J. 
Jacoby calls a ‘favela approach’. We must be bold enough 
to very rapidly attract the interest of actors that are external 
to the climate issue and absorbed in other emergencies. 
Otherwise, it will take ten years to rebuild a negotiation 
process and we will drift further towards the terra incognita 
of a 3°C or 4°C warmer world. ❚
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The expanding search for 
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C
haos and uncertainty are the characteristics of the natural 
world under the pressures being wrought by climate change. 
Normal patterns of rainfall, temperature, and extreme weather 
are changing so rapidly that past baselines for these primordial 
forces are decreasingly relevant.
 Scientists call this state of flux ‘the end of stationarity’. We 
can no longer rely on past events to predict future probabilities. 
Now it’s becoming increasingly clear that the volatility we’re 
seeing in our natural world is reshaping our financial world, too. 
The past provides fewer and fewer clues to our future. Just as 
the migration patterns of songbirds no longer correlate to the hatching patterns of 
their insect prey, or mountain snow-packs no longer store water for the dry summer 
months, the economy faces similar miscues borne of the interactive loop between 
tumult in the atmosphere and tumult on the earth. New risks are entering into the 
equation, and new costs are creeping onto the balance sheets of corporations and 
nations. The elusive cost of carbon, paid out and fought over in so many different 
forms –including as one of the world’s newest and most unusual financial commodi-
ties – is in the process of becoming the greatest economic disrupter of the twenty-
first century. 
It’s not that carbon hasn’t always had a cost; it’s just that, until now, carbon’s costs 
have been mostly invisible. The current economic order, for the most part, does not 
The consumption of fossil fuels is the equivalent of a tax burden: huge 
sums of money will have to be taken from state budgets to deal with 
the consequences of climate change over the coming decades. How can 
this ‘hidden’ burden be made visible? The polluter pays principle points 
towards a carbon tax for fossil fuel-intensive industries. Would this be a 
successful approach?
* Adapted from the book: Carbon Shock: A Tale of Risk & Calculus on the Front-Lines of the Disrupted Global Economy 
(Schapiro, 2014, Chelsea Green)
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account for them. Just as an optical illusion tricks the eye into seeing something 
that’s not there, traditional accounting diverts our attention from invisible costs; 
we see only profits. Keeping these costs a mystery has been fundamental to our 
economic growth. Businesses benefit from a false ledger in which the environmen-
tally corrosive impacts of the energy they use to produce, distribute, and dispose 
of everything from almonds to automobiles have been dramatically undercounted. 
The world’s three-thousand biggest companies, according to the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP), cause $2.15 trillion in annual environmental 
costs (UNEP Finance Initiative, 2011).
Most of those costs are the result of greenhouse gases (GHGs) emitted from the 
burning of fossil fuels, from which 82% of the world’s energy is derived (Interna-
tional Energy Agency, 2013). In 2011, California Governor Jerry Brown shared 
his fears of climate change at San Francisco’s Academy of Sciences. The governor 
cited Thomas Hobbes, the seventeenth century political scientist who saw govern-
ment as an instrument of restraint upon mankind’s ‘brutish’ self-interest. ‘We want 
to avoid a Hobbesian situation,’ Brown declared, ‘the brutishness that happens as 
things get tighter’ (California Academy of Sciences, 2011). What Brown feared 
the most were the multiple billions of dollars that would be drained from the state 
budget to deal with the accelerating consequences of climate change and the clashes 
that would occur between the myriad powerful interests.
 Globally, finding Hobbes at play throughout our climate-stressed world is not diffi-
cult – we’re already paying what amounts to a tax on fossil fuels in all the many ways 
in which the public sector fills the financial void left by climate change. These costs 
hit us sporadically in different places and at different times, which is why they aren’t 
perceived as a ‘tax’. But every time we use fossil fuels, we increase our tax burden, 
a burden that unfolds like a sequence of trap doors, just like climate change itself.
The world’s two biggest economies, the US and the EU, estimate hundreds 
of billions of dollars in costs from heat waves, floods, and an accelerating flow 
of refugees fleeing lands in which they can no longer sustain themselves. Both 
classify climate change as one of the foremost challenges to political stability. The 
BOX 1 THE DANISH ENERGY AGENCY’S YELLOW BALLOON
During the 2009 Copenhagen 
climate negotiations, the Danish 
Energy Agency helpfully installed a 
huge yellow balloon over the city’s 
main square that stated in bold 
black letters etched into the outline 
of a globe: THIS IS THE SIZE OF 
ONE TONNE CO2. The installation 
was enormous – about two stories 
high and a block wide, the size of a 
hot-air balloon that could carry you 
into the atmosphere. It would take 
fifty billion of those balloons – filled 
with the gases generated primarily 
by utilities and oil refineries, coal-
powered manufacturing, transport, 
agriculture, and decaying and dying 
trees – to see what the GHG threat 
actually looks like. The balloons 
hang invisibly above our heads, 
altering the atmospheric balance 
and thus the balancing act of life 
here on earth. 
And every year there are more 
balloons. Those balloons full of CO2 
might as well contain cash, depleted 
from the world’s coffers with each 
new ton. Up go balloons full of 
money.
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World Economic Forum has identified erratic water supplies as one of the primary 
challenges to economic stability (World Economic Forum, 2014). The Food and 
Agriculture Organization predicts rising food prices as conditions shift toward a 
perfect storm – lower rainfall in already dry areas, and more torrential rainfall in 
areas that are already wet. In the US alone, recovery efforts from the 2012 hurri-
canes – the severity of which was attributed at least partially to climate change – 
amounted to more than forty billion dollars. President Obama’s Council of Economic 
Advisers foresees climate change costs rising forty percent for every decade that the 
level of GHG emissions continues on the current trajectory.
Somebody pays for those costs. Economists call these externalized costs – the costs 
borne not by the producer or the immediate consumer, but by society. Its primary 
characteristic is one of asymmetric risk – fossil fuel companies earn the profits while 
the public and public institutions (i.e. the government) bears the financial risks. 
Climate geopolitics and the carbon price
Seeing climate change through the prism of its costs may be the only way to 
overcome the illusions that have constrained us from making an honest assessment 
of our options. Fossil-fuel-based production is favoured both through misleading 
accounting and an estimated $500 billion in annual global subsidies to the fossil fuel 
industries (International Energy Agency, 2014). Using public funds to subsidize 
the fuel source that is undermining conditions of life on earth defies logic, not to 
mention free market principles. The combined effects of hiding fossil fuels actual 
costs with the market-distorting impact of subsidies contribute to the misleading 
calculation that fossil fuels are the most economically viable form of energy. The 
risks of this misleading economics for development in a carbon-constrained world 
are becoming clearer.
THE PERCEPTION OF RISKS AND THE DISCLOSURE OF EXTERNALITIES 
When it comes to risk, our brains are generally wired to see those right in front of 
us; we perceive patterns of threat that spur the fight-or-flight instinct. But the threat 
from climate change is of a different order – it’s kaleidoscopic, occurring in dramatic 
and subtle forms, all over the earth simultaneously. ‘Our risk management patterns 
are still wired to search for lions in the Serengeti’, commented Mark Trexler, CEO 
of The Climatographers, a climate risk consulting firm. ‘See lion – run. That’s what 
we’re still doing in the climate space.’1
But lions in the desert are not the threat. The Serengeti itself, that seat of human 
life that is a stand-in for the planet, is being transformed. The patterns we are now 
living through have never been seen before. 
What we term a ‘carbon footprint’ can also be seen as the embodiment of financial 
risk. In 2013, the Geneva Association of Risk and Insurance Economics, an insurance 
industry research association, called for a new paradigm for assessing risk, because 
1.  Interview with author, November 19, 2013.
BUILDING THE FUTURE WE WANT
A PLANET FOR L IFE208
changes in weather and temperature are outpacing traditional actuarial calcula-
tions (The Geneva Association, 2013). Lloyds of London concluded in a report on 
climate risks: ‘We foresee an increasing possibility of attributing weather-related 
losses to man-made climate change factors.’ Add to that the potential disruption 
of production and supply chains; the reputational consequences of consumers and 
investors becoming more aware of the environmental underside of their favourite 
products; and regulatory moves by governments, which are fitfully but increasingly 
instituting penalties on GHG emissions – and the risks mount. Few of these looming 
triggers, however, is required to be reported to potential investors – though any 
one of them could seriously undermine the financial value of companies reliant 
on fossil fuels. 
But these costs are for the most part off the official books of the companies most 
responsible because the public pays for them. ‘Look at the discrepancies in financial 
disclosure’, comments Pavak Sukhdev, former Special Adviser to the UNEP’s Green 
Economy Initiative and senior banker at Deutsche Bank, who is now CEO of a the 
New Delhi-based consulting firm GIST, which consults with the UN and other clients 
FIGURE 1 Collapse of European carbon prices
The European carbon market is the most advanced initiative in terms of including the economic cost of CO2 emissions. It remains, 
however, overly dependent on external factors (economic crisis, location of activities, technological change) and institutional ones 
(fixing the volume of tradable credits) to maintain an incentivizing carbon price.
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on identifying environmental risks and costs. ‘Companies have to disclose things 
like contingent legal challenges, directors’ bonuses, new regulations, that might 
add up to millions of dollars in potential liabilities. But then you’ve got billions of 
dollars in externalities that they do not have to report because no one holds them 
to account for them. And those can add up to billions of dollars…Externalities have 
been the biggest free lunch in the history of the world.’2
THE CARBON ECONOMY AND THE ‘QUANDARY OF THE CUP’
For almost two decades, negotiators have attempted to redress that free lunch – the 
imbalance between who creates the risk and who pays for it – by forging a price 
reflecting the differences in responsibility for damage to the global ecosystem 
caused by GHGs, and that is steep enough to trigger a shift away from fossil fuel 
based energy. But the withdrawal of the US from the Kyoto process in 2001 left 
the world to improvise a carbon price. Instead of one price we’ve had wild price 
variations and a widening division between countries that have at least a minimal 
price for carbon and those that do not.  
In the process, the varied responses to climate change have been shaking up the 
geo-political order just as it is shaking up the natural and economic order. New 
powers are rising and other powers diminishing. 
If the centre of climate change action has been Europe for the past decade or 
so, it’s now expanding to many new centres such as Brazil and China, two rapidly 
growing developing countries that are outpacing both the US and Europe in their 
rates of economic expansion. This axis is ripe with kinetic power in the climate-
induced shake-up underway.  In 2010, Brazil was the widely recognized leader 
on climate policy among developing countries. The country’s vast low-carbon 
resources of water, trees, and agricultural bio-wastes made it seem the environ-
mental harbinger; Brazil generates more than 80% of its energy from renewable 
sources, including hydro, thermal and wind, and only about fifteen percent from 
fossil fuels. 
In that year I visited Brazil’s national environmental authority, IBAMA, and spoke 
to Biancha Bastos Americano, one of the government’s lead climate negotiators 
during the presidency of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (2003-2011). She commented 
on how Brazil would fare in a world in which carbon has a price. 
Pointing to a ceramic coffee cup, she said: ‘See that cup. Brazil beats any country 
in a world in which carbon has a price. Including China! The energy used to process 
the clay for that cup was obtained from water-powered hydro dams in the Amazon. 
The cup was manufactured in a ceramic factory that is fuelled with biomass. It was 
transported here by a truck using bio-diesel. We will beat China every time in a 
world in which carbon has a price.’
The cup she referred to was a typical plain white espresso cup, much like any 
other espresso cup used the world over. Except that most of those cups are made 
2. Interview with author, May 22, 2013.
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in China, and this one was made in Brazil. It was a tiny bit more expensive than 
the cheap coffee cups imported from China, from factories most likely powered 
by coal. 
The idea that this plain white Brazilian cup would become comparatively less 
expensive than its imported Chinese counterpart if the latter had to include the 
price of the energy used to make it seemed to encapsulate the central financial 
question posed by the climate conundrum: how does the coffee cup made with 
more renewable energy become at least equally competitive with cups made from 
more destructive sources of energy? This ‘quandary of the cup’ is a tiny microcosm 
of the central challenge that has bedevilled the world for two decades. It was a 
surprise to the Brazilians when, some three years later, a response to that economic 
quandary came from one of the most unexpected of places.
BRIC SHUFFLE 
In September 2013 in Rio de Janeiro, a group of Brazilian, Latin American and other 
developing country officials gathered for a climate conference co-sponsored by 
the World Bank and the state of Rio de Janeiro. During the conference, Wu Delin, 
the vice deputy mayor of the Chinese city of Szenzhen, gave a talk that rocked 
the proceedings. The government in Beijing, he announced, had decided to start 
penalizing the producers of fossil fuels, asking the country’s most industrialized 
provinces to create their own cap and trade systems. 
Delin described Szenzhen’s plan to be the first province to require the most 
fossil-fuel intensive industries to purchase GHG emissions allowances. His city was 
positioning itself to be a test run for a national programme. Two hundred of the 
province’s largest emitters would be subject to emission caps, and they would be 
expected to buy allowances on the new carbon market being created in Szenzhen. 
The aim was to reduce the carbon intensity of Guangdong industry by 25% by 2015. 
‘We were stunned,’ said Walter Figueiredo De Simoni, Secretary of Environment 
for Rio de Janeiro state: ‘Our response was, “Wow! Just like that they’re going to 
have a carbon price”.’3  
De Simoni, an economist by training, had spent the previous year negotiating 
with businesses in the state of Rio de Janeiro to kick-start a market or implement a 
minimal carbon tax. But he’d been foiled by industry opposition. Businesses claimed 
that such a move would put them at a competitive disadvantage with their global 
competitors, namely China. Now China was announcing it would unilaterally accom-
plish what De Simoni had been trying to do unsuccessfully for more than a year. 
‘You look at the two countries,’ he said. ‘Brazil is seen as the greener one, but we’re 
not as prepared to act. China is seen as the dirtier one, yet they are preparing much 
more aggressively for this greener economy.’ Brazil, the ‘environmental powerhouse’, 
blessed with an abundance of  ‘green resources’ had been upstaged by China, long 
seen as the global villain of climate change. 
3. Interview with the author, October 17, 2013.
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It was a remarkable moment involving two of the most important countries in 
the evolving climate dynamic. Other markets were launched in 2014, in Shanghai, 
Beijing, Chongqing, and Tianjin provinces. The world’s biggest manufacturer and 
user of fossil fuels was beginning to give a price to carbon. Of equal significance, 
for the first time industries in these provinces will have to keep a running inven-
tory (although not yet publically available) of their GHG emissions. Practically 
overnight, the Chinese carbon markets became the second largest in the world after 
the European Trading System. Global consumers are starting to pay that price, as 
small as it is, in their Chinese imports.
China’s initiative came just months after the Chinese Academy of Environmental 
Planning proclaimed that the cost of environmental degradation to the Chinese 
economy had by 2010 rocketed threefold since 2004, to about 3% of the nation’s 
GDP. (One year after that, China would sign a historic climate accord with the US). 
And though carbon markets thus far have had a troubled history in actually lever-
aging a price high enough to trigger large-scale investments in renewables, they 
begin the process of lifting the lid on the accounting sleights of hand that have long 
kept the actual costs of fossil fuels out of sight.
FIGURE 2 Chinese carbon markets
Seven Chinese local carbon markets have emerged since the end of 2013. They are field trials for a possible future national market. 
Together they represent the second largest market after the European Union’s and help integrate carbon value into exported products.
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As for the Brazilians, they’ve become a powerhouse in promoting renewable energy 
technologies in Latin America and Portuguese Africa. President Lula committed to 
reducing emissions by 39.1% from 1990 levels by 2020 – a goal accomplished largely 
through significant cuts in rates of deforestation, though those reductions have been 
partly offset by increased CO2 emissions from transport and other sectors as the 
government embarked on an aggressive economic development plan under Lula’s 
successor, Dilma Rousseff. The country commissioned its own mini-Stern report, 
which concluded that if current climate trends continue the country’s GDP could 
drop by from five hundred billion to two trillion dollars by 2050. 
Finally, climate change is registering in the language that politicians and indus-
trialists understand – money. As our knowledge of the economic costs of climate 
change increases, the rigid Kabuki dance, in which each side behaves predictably 
along long-established lines, is being broken – as the 2014 accord between the US 
and China suggests.  
GHG accountability and the polluter pays principle
But this new opening also comes with a new set of (surmountable) challenges. 
The polluter pays principle at the heart of the approaches thus far raises a funda-
mental question in a global economy in which goods are produced in one place and 
consumed in another: is the producer or the consumer accountable for the GHGs 
associated with that production? 
‘You cannot decouple production from consumption,’ commented Cindy Isenhour, 
an Associate Professor of Environmental Studies at the Climate Change Institute at 
the University of Maine in Portland, Maine.4 The world may be ‘flat’ when it comes 
to production, but when it comes to GHGs it is definitely round – and the circle 
comes round to the world’s consumers. 
A brief portrait of three cities that are key players in this emerging dynamic 
offers a glimpse into the multiple ways of understanding the challenge of 
GHG accountability:
WHO’S RESPONSIBLE?
The city of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania runs like a muscle through the industrial history 
of the US. Long the centre of American industrial production, Pittsburgh produced 
the steel that became the backbone to America’s twentieth-century industrial might. 
Then in the 1980s and early 1990s, the steel started leaving. Today, Pittsburgh 
has been transformed into a different kind of symbol – that of the modern ‘green’ 
city. Municipal brochures feature a glittering downtown skyline with one of the 
highest concentrations of ‘green buildings’ in the US. Alongside the Allegheny 
River, a route that once hosted a tramline carrying workers to the factories, there 
is now a tree-lined ‘Greenwalk’ for pedestrians. Just blocks off the Greenwalk the 
hulks of those steel mills are still visible. They, too, have been transformed – into 
4. Interview with the author, January 3, 2013.
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condominiums with a river-view, gourmet restaurants, music clubs and boutiques. 
Where there were once generations of families reliant on forging heavy metals, 
there is now an intellectual and creative class firing up innovations in the city’s 
burgeoning high-tech and bio-med industries, backed by an assortment of world 
class universities.
A coalition of businessmen, city planners and environmental engineers staked out 
a development plan that positioned Pittsburgh as a hub of innovation in ecologi-
cally oriented design. The 2.3 million residents of ‘greater’ Pittsburgh were together 
found to be responsible for 6.8 million metric tons of GHGs let loose into the atmos-
phere; roughly 2.3 tons per capita. By 2013, the city was on the way toward its goal 
of reducing emissions by 20% by 2020 from 2005 levels, and aims for progres-
sively steeper declines in the future. Pittsburgh is considered among the leading 
urban climate innovators.
Downtown, the skyscraper windows are angled to maximize natural light, heat 
is piped in from thermal pools deep underground, and solar panels line the roofs 
far above the bustling sidewalks. Public transit has been expanded, subsidies for 
solar and thermal energy have promoted an expansion of small and large-scale 
renewable energy for residents and businesses, and waste disposal services have 
been improved to enhance recycling and other energy-saving measures. Major 
property developers agreed to halve their 2003 carbon footprints by 2050; the city 
now has the highest concentration of LEED-certified buildings in the country. Even 
the US Steelworkers, one of the country’s first industrial unions, now has a huge 
banner draped from its downtown headquarters promoting ‘GREEN JOBS’. The 
city’s transformation has been so complete that the G20 held its yearly conference 
there in 2012 and highlighted the city’s ‘green’ strategy as a post-industrial model. 
Pittsburgh, once home to the industrial empires of Andrew Carnegie and Andrew 
Mellon, is now one of the ‘greenest’ midsize cities in America, according to the 
Economist’s Green City Index (Economist Intelligence Unit, Siemens AG, 2011).
Court Gould, Executive Director of Sustainable Pittsburgh, a coalition that 
helped with the city’s transformation, commented that in the old days, ‘a father 
would take his son out to their yard, look back toward the mills and the smoke 
rising over them, and tell him, “Look there, that’s my job. That smoke there, that’s 
money”.’ 
 ‘Not any more. Pollution no longer has the smell of money. Now it’s the smell 
of costs. It’s the smell of someone not paying attention to the bottom line. It’s a 
sign of inefficiency.’
Pittsburgh’s GHG emissions plunged from the days when the sky was filled with 
waste gases that would, according to accounts of the time, turn entire afternoons 
into twilight. The city lost its manufacturing base, and it’s a far nicer place to live 
as a result. It re-tooled its efficiencies, cast off the harmful by-products of manufac-
turing and refashioned itself as a city far more reliant upon brains than on brawn. 
So whatever happened to all those inefficient pollutants that once came spewing 
from Pittsburgh? Where did the GHGs go?
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THE PRODUCERS
Guangzhou is a city of ten million people on China’s southeast coast. The freighters 
that come into the ports here and in the surrounding Guangdong province are 
loaded with a container about every second – some forty million crates a year of 
goods exported around the world. Industrial clusters throughout the province are 
home to more than a thousand steel manufacturing and trading companies. They 
produce the skyscraper girders, auto parts, appliances, ships, refrigerators, and even 
American bridges – all those steel products that once were made in Pittsburgh and 
other Midwestern cities. 
Guangdong is also, in the UN’s estimation, one of the top-ten carbon emitting 
provinces in a country that is itself the leading emitter. Some ten thousand miles 
from Pittsburgh, the CO2 that used to come from that city now fumes into the atmos-
phere from Guangzhou. As industry migrated, so went their GHG emissions. The 
Chinese manufacturers are producing the emissions that would otherwise have been 
produced in Pittsburgh and, more broadly speaking, by all those factories that have 
either outsourced their production from the US or been crushed by Chinese compe-
tition. Between 1990 and 2010, reports the Center for International Climate and 
FIGURE3 Carbon in international trade
The exchange of goods accounts for 20% of global carbon emissions. The proportion of developed and developing countries engaged 
in international trade is very important in terms of these ‘hidden’ emissions.
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Environmental Research, the emissions embodied in products imported by devel-
oped nations from developing ones – which for the most part means China – grew 
by an average of 10% annually. 
The World Bank estimates that about a quarter of all the production in Guangdong 
province, and indeed throughout China, is destined for export to the US, Europe 
and Japan. The resulting GHGs are, in economists’ terms, known as ‘embedded 
emissions’. They are the pollution back-story to the goods we consume. 
Guangdong’s residents have a per capita annual footprint of 7.8 tons (Wang, Zhang 
et al., 2012) – quite a bit more than the average Pittsburgher. But while only 6% of 
Pittsburgh’s emissions come from industrial sources, the Chinese industrial sector 
accounts for 56% of the emissions in China – almost ten times higher, as a percent 
of the total, than those of Pittsburgh. 
The discrepancy between the industrial emissions of Pittsburgh and Guangzhou, 
which started trading places as centres for steel production in the 1980s, suggests 
that the lifestyle choices of Pittsburghers have not changed as much as the economic 
support system, based on GHG intensive manufacturing, changed all around them. 
Urban Chinese residents, some of them people who have literally replaced those 
American steelworkers, have a far smaller personal footprint as a percent of the 
overall total than do their Pittsburgh counterparts. The Chinese, in short, are 
producing GHGs on our behalf.
The Carnegie Foundation estimates that Americans’ per-capita footprint would 
jump by 2.4 tons annually if their consumption – mostly of goods made in China – is 
taken into account. Virtually every developed country, according to the Stockholm 
Environmental Institute, has seriously under-estimated its emissions by twenty to 
thirty percent because they have not accounted for increased consumption.
Globalization has flipped the calculus on the central question of who is accountable 
for GHGs. Richard Feldon, a San Francisco-based urban planner, worked with the 
US branch of the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) to 
design a set of emission reduction protocols. These protocols, adopted by American 
cities in 2012, are aimed at more than two hundred cities around the world. Feldon 
said that deciding how to include consumption in GHG calculations was the most 
controversial issue faced over the three years it took to identify the primary GHG 
sources in US cities, because it blurs the line between our contribution as consumers 
and industry’s contribution as producers. It gives a new understanding to the ‘green-
ness’ of cities.  
 ‘Lets say Pittsburgh still had its industrial base, and that steel from Pittsburgh was 
being used in a city like San Francisco,’ Feldon explained. ‘Well, it would be unfair 
to say that San Francisco, under that scenario, is a greener city than Pittsburgh.’ 
The same equation, he said, applies to Pittsburgh and Guanghzhou – or, say, the US 
and Europe, jointly the world’s biggest consumers, and China, the world’s biggest 
producer. It also means that when you do the numbers, the US goes from being 
the second biggest GHG emitter to the first; Europe goes from third to second; and 
China flips from first place to third.
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 Urban dwellers will represent 70% of the world’s population by 2020 – so reducing 
city emissions is one of the fundamental challenges of devising a new energy system 
that keeps GHGs to at least liveable levels. Just because emissions aren’t happening 
in our backyard doesn’t mean that they’re not ours. This is a reality that at least one 
of the world’s cities is facing head-on.
ACCOUNTING FOR CONSUMERS
Welcome to Manchester, birthplace of the industrial revolution. This city has experi-
enced a trajectory similar to that of Pittsburgh. What steel was to Pittsburgh, textiles 
were to Manchester. Also like Pittsburgh, Manchester has dropped from being one 
of its nation’s leading GHG emitters to a centre for high-tech innovation, and is host 
to a cluster of leading universities conducting cutting-edge research into renewable 
energy. The legacies of both cities are interwoven deeply into the evolution of GHGs 
and their contribution to climate change.
 Manchester was home to the world’s first coal-fired factory, ground zero in the 
historical allocation of responsibility for GHGs. In the eighteenth century that coal-
fired energy was put into the service of processing the vast amounts of cotton that 
Britain was obtaining from its colonies in Asia and North Africa. Indeed, one can 
see Manchester as having assumed the industrial GHG contribution on behalf of 
the British colonies, which were expected only to send raw materials to the mother 
country for processing and manufacture. By 1850, Manchester was widely consid-
ered a model for the modern industrial city.
 ‘From this foul drain,’ wrote Alexis de Tocqueville of his visit to Manchester, shortly 
before his legendary foray to the US, ‘the greatest form of human industry flows out 
to fertilize the whole world. From this filthy sewer pure gold flows.’
 Today the textile companies are long gone – many returned to India and China. 
By the 1990s the city had rocketing unemployment. Practically an entire generation 
of workers were compelled to live on state benefits or leave Manchester. Their GHGs 
went with them.
 Then in 1996, the IRA carried out a powerful bomb attack that injured more than 
200 people and decimated the downtown neighbourhood. It was then, according to 
Sarah Davies, head of environment strategies for the Greater Manchester Combined 
Authority, that the city was compelled to decide how it wanted to rebuild itself.
 There was a ‘shift in the mind-set,’ she said. Manchester would return to its role as 
a centre for technological innovation, but this time that innovation would be adapted 
to the emerging vision of the new low-carbon economy. ‘There’s the sense,’ she said, 
‘that we created the energy-hungry economy. And now we have some responsibility 
for finding our way out of it.’
 Pittsburgh and Manchester’s industrial history may be similar, but the way they 
deal with their GHG accounting is not. Pittsburgh’s Climate Inventory, a blueprint for 
emission reductions, states: ‘Emissions resulting from many personal and business-
related activities and decisions that might be evaluated in an individual, carbon-
footprint-style inventory are excluded from a city-level GHG inventory approach.’ In 
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other words, the city is not counting the carbon embodied in the goods and services 
its residents consume, or generated by their travel.
 By contrast, the long-term plan published by the Manchester City Council calls for 
accounting for, and reducing, emissions by city residents ‘wherever those emissions 
take place.’ These embodied emissions include the energy needed in the growing and 
transport of food; the extraction and processing of oil used by the city’s automobiles 
and factories; the emissions generated through the manufacture of electrical devices; 
and estimates of aviation emissions. Adding these consumption-based emissions adds 
roughly 30% to each citizen’s GHG contribution, according to a 2012 estimate by the 
Greater Manchester Combined Authority.
 The Authority, representing some three million people in the city and surrounding 
communities, launched an initiative to reduce the city’s footprint not only at home, 
but also in the countries producing the goods consumed by its residents. Its room to 
manoeuvre is limited; cities do not generally have a foreign policy. But within that 
limited space, Manchester’s procurement policies favour imported goods with lower 
GHG impacts than their competitors, and the city has embarked on an effort to educate 
employers and homeowners on precisely why purchasing goods closer to home, and 
reducing energy usage, is good for the city’s economy, as well as for the planet.
 Davies’ office sponsors the city’s Carbon Literacy Project, which aims to educate 
residents on why reducing carbon emissions makes economic as well as environmental 
sense. ‘People want to earn more, pay less, have a decent quality of life, that’s what 
people aspire to,’ she said. ‘So carbon literacy must be put through these channels. 
They need to see “prosperity” as “green”.’ Manchester’s long-term aim is to reduce 
emissions 41% from 2005 levels.
 ‘Having this target makes us more attractive to investors,’ Davies explained. 
European, Japanese and other companies have been pursuing green R&D – drawing 
on the rich talent pool from local universities – and textile companies are being 
lured back to the city, attracted by new fuel-efficient ink and dye technologies. 
This creates jobs and shortens GHG-intensive transport costs. Between 2007 and 
2012, the ‘green’ sector of the city’s economy grew by thirty-seven thousand new 
jobs, representing $7.5 billion in money passing through Manchester that would 
otherwise have gone elsewhere – an ‘elsewhere’ that likely would have been using 
far less energy-efficient technology. The Greater Manchester economy grew 4% in 
2012, fed largely by the infusion of green investments, Davies said, at a time when 
growth in the UK was flat.
 Of course, cities, as well as nations, are circumscribed in their ability to influence 
the production practices of other countries: governments are accustomed to acting 
within the traditional confines of national jurisdiction. 
But just as climate change is altering the fundamental conditions here on earth, 
it is also altering our sense of the limits to those traditional concepts. Pittsburgh 
and Manchester are both signatories to a commitment signed by more than three 
hundred cities worldwide that have committed to reducing GHGs. Both are largely 
unheralded leaders among the world’s cities in facing the challenges of climate 
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change. But Manchester is one of the few cities attempting to leverage its limited 
influence to ensure that dirty, GHG-intensive industries are not simply moved off 
our ledger books and onto others. Its approach suggests a way forward as urban 
areas around the world wrestle with the underlying inequities involved in the fight 
to slow their GHG emissions. 
A CARBON PRICE FOR AN ACCOUNTABLE ECONOMY  
Ultimately, climate change is the single most effective eye-opener to how globally 
connected we all are – the corrosive effects of climate change unite us across national 
frontiers, as does the fight to slow the rate of change down. Compel fossil fuel inten-
sive industries to include their actual energy costs, and you create a far more level 
playing field on which renewables can compete. A uniform price for carbon would 
ensure that cities like Manchester are not outliers but in the mainstream. It could 
ensure that major production centres would also benefit; solar and wind energy in 
China and India are expected to account for as much as two-thirds of new power 
additions by 2030 (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2014). 
 The World Bank reports almost 25% of the world’s GHG emissions are now subject 
to a carbon price– ranging from the Kyoto signatories, to several US states, two 
Canadian provinces, Korea, Mexico and the seven industrialized provinces of China, 
as well as various forms of carbon taxation in Sweden, the Canadian province of 
British Columbia and elsewhere (World Bank, 2014). It’s a diverse spread that is 
nevertheless sending a signal that GHG pollution henceforth comes with a price. That 
price is nowhere near enough to generate the funds necessary to aid the transition 
from fossil fuels and to shift investment patterns. But we can plausibly consider this 
a floor for a trend that will begin to erase the false accounting that has dominated 
until now. 
 You could inject a black dye representing carbon into the circulatory system of 
the twenty-first century economy and see it appear behind every major economic 
calculation by governments and by companies from here on out, rising with inten-
sity and focus. Questions, then, will rise around the pivotal issue: Who pays? And 
how do we ensure that those costs are borne substantively by the fossil fuel compa-
nies and not by the society that has borne the burden of those costs for the past two 
hundred years? ❚
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Managing risks to achieve sustainable 
development
P. G. Dhar Chakrabarti, Distinguished Fellow at The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI), New Delhi.
S
endai, the capital city of Miyagi Prefecture, 
Japan, will host the Third UN World Confer-
ence on Disaster Risk Reduction (WCDRR-3) 
during 14-18 March 2015, coinciding with 
the fourth anniversary of the Great East Japan 
earthquake. This earthquake battered the province with a 
complex cocktail of disasters – tsunami, flood and nuclear 
meltdown that led to the leakage of radioactive material 
into soil, water and ocean, threatening public health and 
safety in the region. For Japan, the conference is a perfect 
setting to showcase to the world the way it has been able 
to recover from an unprecedented disaster, just as it did a 
decade earlier when it hosted the WCDRR-2 in Kobe, the 
capital city of Hyogo Province that was flattened by the 
1995 Great Hanshin earthquake.
For the global community, WCDRR-3 provides an oppor-
tunity to reiterate the importance of disaster risk reduc-
tion (DRR) for sustainable development, to connect DRR 
with the ongoing processes for the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals (SDGs) and climate change and to redesign 
the global framework on risk reduction, based on the 
experiences gained and the lessons learnt during the 
previous decades.
The emergence of a world action plan on DRR:  
the Yakohama Strategy
The global discourse on DRR started in 1987 when the 
World Commission on Environment and Development 
submitted its epoch-making report Our Common Future, 
highlighting the three million lives lost and eight hundred 
million people affected by disasters worldwide during 
the previous two decades, which resulted in damages 
exceeding $213 billion (THe WorlD CommissioN oN eNviroN-
meNt aND DevelopmeNt, 1987). The UN General Assembly 
responded by declaring the 1990s as the International 
Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR).1 During 
the middle of the decade the UN organized WCDRR-1 in 
Yakohama, which brought together senior policy makers, 
technical experts and representatives of non-governmental 
organizations ‘to develop an action plan to put the results 
of science and technology at the service of disaster-
prone regions of the world’. The Conference adopted 
the Yokohama Strategy for a Safer World: Guidelines for 
Natural Disaster Prevention, Preparedness and Mitigation 
and its Plan of Action. 
The Hyogo Framework of Action: building resilient 
nations and communities
A review of the progress of the Yakohama Strategy demon-
strated that there was no quick fix technological solution 
to the spiralling disasters, which needed multi-pronged 
interventions (uNiteD NatioNs, 2005). The Boxing Day Indian 
Ocean tsunami that killed more than two hundred thousand 
people across countries and continents, barely three weeks 
before WCDRR-2 in 2005, raised global concerns for DRR 
as never before. The Conference adopted the Hyogo Frame-
work of Action 2005-2015: Building Resilience of Nations 
and Communities to Disasters (HFA) with Priorities of Action 
on five fronts – political, technological, social, economic 
and humanitarian. The decade long implementation of HFA 
delivered some progress across all priority areas. In partic-
ular, almost every country developed legal and institutional 
1. UN General Assembly Resolution GA/ 54/219 dated 22 December 1999
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chains, representing a systemic global economic risk for 
businesses, governments and society at large.
Poorly planned and managed urban development, 
environmental degradation, poverty and inequality and weak 
governance mechanisms continue to drive rapidly increasing 
loss and damage associated with ‘extensive’ low-severity 
high-frequency risks. These types of risks are having a 
devastating impact on vulnerable low€income households 
and small and informal enterprises that provide the vast 
majority of employment in many countries (World Bank2; ILO 
2012). Extensive risks are increasing even in countries and 
areas that are not exposed to major hazards, highlighting 
how both development and DRR have not been sustain-
able and effective; this is particularly detrimental to low€ 
income communities. 
2.  http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS
frameworks for disaster management; many countries 
established national multi-stakeholder platforms; regional, 
national and local-level risk assessments were taken up; 
education and awareness on disasters was improved; and 
capacities for disaster preparedness and response were 
enhanced in most of the countries. All these measures have 
contributed to a downward trend in mortality risks, at least 
for those weather-related hazards for which early warning 
is possible. However, damages and losses due to disasters 
have increased manyfold. Economic globalization has led 
to a massive increase in risk exposure, as new private and 
public investments have been concentrated in hazardous 
areas, such as cyclone and tsunami-prone coastlines, flood 
risk river basins and in cities that are vulnerable to earth-
quakes. ‘Intensive’ risks of high-severity low-frequency 
disasters have accumulated in hazard€exposed areas 
and are now transmitted around the world through supply 
FIGURE 1 The increasing frequency and cost of disasters
The combination of climate change and the lack of risk anticipation and management leads to an exponential growth of the economic 
cost of natural disasters.
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Linking disaster risks with sustainable 
development and climate change 
Disaster risk management can no longer remain isolated 
from the overall strategy of sustainable development. A 
three-dimensional perspective of the disaster-development 
nexus is well established: first, disasters erode the hard-
earned gains of development by damaging lives, liveli-
hoods and assets of communities and countries; second, 
a lack of development perpetuates and aggravates existing 
social and economic deprivation, particularly of the poor 
and low-income people, making them vulnerable to disas-
ters; and third, development often causes new disasters 
by creating new risks. 
Mainstreaming DRR in development has often been 
talked about but there has been little progress in ensuring 
that development reduces rather than enhances disaster 
risk. Therefore, the post€2015 framework should explicitly 
include public policies that provide incentives and oppor-
tunities for risk sensitive investment across all sectors, 
public as well as private, households and communities. 
The creation of a more resilient humanity and environment 
requires strong international and local commitment, and 
drive to engineer the necessary changes in current devel-
opment practices, processes and patterns. Risk manage-
ment must be part of sustainable development policies and 
practices to reduce existing risk and prevent the creation 
of new risk accumulation.
Furthermore, the Special Report of the IPCC on 
Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to 
Advance Climate Change Adaptation (SREX) in 2011 has 
confirmed that anthropogenic climate change manifested 
in rising temperature, changing rainfall patterns, glacial 
melts and rising sea level has the potential to increase 
hydro-meteorological disasters, such as heat and cold 
wave, drought, flood, flash floods, cloudbursts, landslides, 
forest fires, cyclones, hurricanes, etc. Climate change may 
further increase the vulnerability of communities, particu-
larly through ecosystem degradation, reductions in water 
and food availability, and threats to livelihoods. The report 
concluded that ‘the interactions among climate change 
mitigation, adaptation, and disaster risk management 
may have a major influence on resilient and sustainable 
pathways’ as presented in the diagram below:
What is at stake in Sendai? 
The adoption of the post-HFA framework on DRR at the 
WCDRR-3 – ahead of the General Assembly’s SDG decla-
ration in September 2015 and the expected climate agree-
ment in COP21 in December 2015 – provides an oppor-
tunity to integrate DRR with SDGs and climate change 
mitigation and adaptation, something that the HFA lacked. 
As the global development paradigm shifts from general 
declarations to specific action programmes with clearly 
defined goals and targets; and as diverse approaches 
and actions are being integrated into common develop-
ment goals, the post-HFA framework on DRR is likely to 
conform to this trend. Specifically, the new framework 
should address the following issues:
First, risks should be considered in their totality, both 
natural and man-made. The global initiatives so far – 
IDNDR, Yakohama and HFA – have all focused on natural 
disasters, leaving aside agricultural, industrial, environ-
mental, nuclear, transport, health and other man-made 
disasters to be addressed separately. An increasing knowl-
edge and experience of disasters have shown that they 
are not caused by nature alone. In fact, disasters result 
when man-made vulnerabilities, such as housing, infra-
structure, transport, industry and health, are exposed to 
the hazards of nature. Often man-made hazards interact 
with natural hazards to create complex disasters. Anthro-
pogenic climate change is the best example of the way 
greenhouse gas emissions have contributed to an increase 
in climate-related disasters, which may appear to be 
natural disasters but are essentially man-made. Each 
type of disaster has common elements requiring similar 
interventions, and therefore a common framework would 
avoid fragmentation and promote better coordination in 
planning, strategy and response.
Second, the global framework of DRR should be broad-
ened to encompass every aspect of disaster risk manage-
ment to include pre-disaster risk prevention, mitigation and 
preparedness (disaster risk reduction), along with post-
disaster response, relief and recovery (disaster manage-
ment). While different agencies may deal with specific 
aspects of risk management, all of these elements should 
be included in a common ‘disaster risk management’ 
framework as they are inter-related. 
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FIGURE 2 Climate change, risk and development
Third, the new global framework should encourage 
synergies between DRR and climate change adapta-
tion (CCA), which share the common goal of reducing 
population vulnerability to extreme climatic events, but 
have diverse legal, institutional and policy mechanisms, 
creating an unnecessary fragmentation of initiatives. 
Improved synergies would not only avoid duplication and 
derive optimal benefits from scarce resources, but also 
add value to the process through lessons learnt from the 
two perspectives. More and more countries are developing 
policies and strategies for integrating DRR and CCA; the 
same approach should be applied to the post-2015 devel-
opment agenda for a sustainable future.
Fourth, the vision of the post-HFA framework should not 
remain limited merely to saving lives and property; it should 
be far more positive and aspirational in aiming to secure 
healthy and resilient nations and communities. Therefore, 
the strategic goals of the framework should be reformu-
lated to emphasize that all existing overt and underlying 
risks are addressed, all new risks are prevented, and all 
residual risks are managed well to minimize impacts and 
maximise resilience. This may seem a tall order, but it 
is the way that this vision needs to be constructed. The 
priority areas of action should also be refocused to improve 
risk communication and risk governance through better 
accountability and monitoring and enhanced partnerships 
and alliances with all stakeholders at all levels.
Finally, the strategic goals and priority areas of the 
post-HFA framework should be reduced to a set of quanti-
tative and qualitative targets to be achieved at the local, 
national, regional and international levels, which can be 
monitored and measured in the same manner as the 
SDGs are expected to be, based on the experience gained 
from the implementation of the Millennium Development 
Development models directly determine the level of vulnerability of a society. As a result, development and risk prevention must now 
be considered jointly and over the long term. ]
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Goals. This will ensure that the post-HFA framework does 
not remain a loosely formulated agenda that is left to 
national governments to follow of their own volition, but 
that it contains clearly defined, commonly shared and 
easily measurable global goals and targets that would be 
achieved jointly by all stakeholders at all levels. ❚
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I
n 2009, the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Commission (stiGlitz 
et al., 2009) submitted a report to the French President 
on the new measures of societal progress. Against a 
backdrop of financial crisis and the questioning of an 
unequal and unsustainable growth model, the critiques 
that for many years had been levelled against the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) resonated anew (meaDoWs, 1972). 
These critiques underline the inability of this key economic 
indicator to capture worrying developments such as wid-
ening income and wealth inequality or the degradation of 
environmental and public health. 
Five years later, the Beyond GDP (BGDP) indicators have 
been adopted by the highest levels of state in several 
European and non-European countries such as the United 
Kingdom, Belgium and Bhutan. The current abundance of 
new indicators is helping to reshuffle the cards of political 
discourse, thus making it possible to legitimize new issues 
(such as biodiversity protection or concern over individual 
well-being). In fact, BGDP indicators offer political actors 
the possibility of constructing an innovative narrative: faced 
with the exhaustion of our current growth model (Demailly 
et al., 2013.), they can help to open up a new space for 
public action and breathe life back into the democratic 
debate in a context of in-depth reconsideration of political 
action and discourse.
There are several obstacles to the effective integration 
into policymaking of the many initiatives underway. The 
discussion and efforts often focus on fine-tuning indicator 
methodology, while the prerequisites for their effective use 
in policymaking have received less attention, although a 
few recent studies have addressed this issue.1 This article 
focuses on BGDP indicators with a social aspect, i.e. 
indicators or dashboards with multiple dimensions – in 
particular economic, environmental and social – and not 
only sectoral ones. The indicators discussed here have 
been driven by public authorities at the national or regional 
level in six territories: Australia, Belgium, the UK, Wales, 
Wallonia and Germany, and excludes many initiatives taken 
by local authorities, non-governmental organizations and 
territories.  
Six initiatives to fuel the discussions  
on BGDP indicators
Australia set up BGDP indicators as early as in 2002. 
They have been developed and supported by the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics and consist of a dashboard 
comprising 26 dimensions grouped around four themes: 
society, economy, environment and governance. The 
dashboard has been published frequently and holds 
particular interest for the media and the general public. 
Although the indicators were not originally designed to 
evaluate government actions, politicians and officials 
make regular use of them.
Since 2011, the UK has produced a comprehen-
sive dashboard for BGDP indicators under a national 
programme for measuring well-being, which was initi-
ated by Prime Minister David Cameron. Monthly reports 
are published to comment on the country’s performance 
1.  Shift Project (2013), Carnegie Trust (2012) and BRAINPOoL (2014).
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on the different aspects of well-being and some indica-
tors have been used to inform decision-making.
Wales has been using BGDP indicators since 2000. 
They currently take the form of a 29-indicator dashboard, 
synthesized into five key indicator groups, providing infor-
mation on resource use, the environment, the economy, 
society and well-being. The establishment of this 
dashboard is in the Welsh constitution, and the indicators 
are published annually. However, they do not have a great 
resonance in the media or the political world.
In early 2014, Belgium ratified a law aiming to estab-
lish indicators to complement GDP. These indicators are 
currently being developed by the Belgian Federal Planning 
Agency. A review of the progress made on BGDP indicators 
is planned for the annual report of the Banque nationale 
de Belgique, and their development will be debated in 
parliament each year.
Wallonia adopted five key indicators in 2013, dealing 
with: social issues (the Social Situation Index and the Well-
being Index), the environment (the Ecological Footprint 
and Biocapacity Index and the Environmental Situation 
Index) and economic capital. The initiative is supported at 
the ministerial level. The Walloon Institute for Evaluation, 
Prospective and Statistics (IWEPS) published a report on 
key indicators in May 2014, but this has not yet attracted 
a great deal of media interest.
In Germany the ‘W3 indicators’ were defined and 
proposed for use by a parliamentary inquiry commission. 
This set of ten indicators (GDP plus nine complimentary 
indicators) encompasses three dimensions: the economy, 
ecology and well-being. For each of these indicators, 
‘warning lights’ have been defined to show whether 
critical limits have been exceeded. The inquiry commis-
sion suggested that the federal government should publish 
FIGURE 1 A proliferation of initiatives and approaches to measure prosperity
There is now a real proliferation of indicators and initiatives to measure prosperity in different ways. This has created political debate 
that has yet to be structured to influence the policies implemented.
A PLANET FOR L IFE 227A PLANET FOR L IFE
CHAPTER 10BUILDING THE FUTURE WE WANT
an annual well-being report, and that groups of govern-
ment experts should be mandated to officially comment 
on these indicators on a regular basis.
Lessons learned from international experience
Other countries have already established such indica-
tors or are planning to do so in the near future, such as 
Canada, Finland, New Zealand and Japan. These national 
and regional cases inform the debate on the formalization 
of BGDP indicators, keeping in mind the different roles 
played by GDP, which remains the reference – implicitly 
or explicitly (Figure 2).
Firstly, it is clear that this issue of new indicators is not 
only a concern for some NGO activists and academics, it 
FIGURE 2. The use of prosperity indicators – three levels of representation
Three types of use for BGDP indicators can be identified: symbolic, political and instrumental. Here, these categories are applied to GDP.
Many decisions are made on the basis of GDP growth forecasts: structural investments, social security funding, private investment 
and decisions on individual savings. In people’s minds, economic growth remains associated with economic stability and employment: 
although GDP growth no longer adequately reflects positive changes in living conditions, a drop in GDP in the short run correlates 
relatively well with a rise in the individual’s feeling of malaise (StevenSon and WolferS, 2008). 
receives support from the highest levels of governance: 
executive and legislative powers. While sometimes even 
statistical institutes seize the topic, as shown in the Austra-
lian example.
It is also interesting to note that the promotion of these 
new indicators is no longer the preserve of the left-wing 
or environmentalists. In France with Nicolas Sarkozy, 
or in the United Kingdom with David Cameron, such 
indicators have received the support of conservatives. 
However, there is no general agreement on the type of 
indicators required: the Walloon indicators, backed by 
green and left-wing politicians, are obviously not the 
same as those favoured by David Cameron’s Conserva-
tive party. Unlike the Walloon indicator dashboard, the 
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UK version, although comprehensive, has no indicator 
for income inequality.
Furthermore, the current examples of BGDP indicators 
do not seek to replace GDP, but to complement it with a 
battery of additional indicators, rather than a single one 
that would aggregate all relevant dimensions. The different 
national experiences have shown that the development of 
such indicators alone is not sufficient, they must be used 
effectively in order to have an impact on the structuring of 
the political debate, to challenge leaders, to steer public 
policies or develop new ones.
At present, these new indicators are used mostly as 
mass communication tools (such as in Australia and Wales) 
but increasingly they are becoming part of the political 
debate: for example, the UK government gives serious 
consideration to such indicators; the Belgian Parliament 
makes them the subject of an annual discussion; and 
independent experts in Germany will regularly review the 
evolution of the country’s new indicators.
However, in most cases there remains a lack of appre-
ciation of their real importance at this level. Some experts 
seek to conduct upstream assessments of policy impacts 
on these indicators, but this would entail much work 
for researchers and administrations that would need 
to develop new theoretical frameworks and conduct 
numerous empirical studies. It is worth noting, however, 
that GDP and the methods of standard national accounting 
also took many decades to establish and to become the 
heart of the system for evaluating public policy. ❚
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Reinventing civilization
W
hat is a crisis? What resolves a crisis? These simple 
questions hide complexity. Was American slavery a 
crisis? For slaves, yes. For slave owners, no. Vantage 
point matters.
Most commentators have an elite vantage point. 
When they say ‘crisis’ they mean a painful deviation 
from established norms hurting them and their constit-
uencies.
Elites therefore deem rising tides, howling winds, 
surging immigration, and of course falling stock prices 
crises precisely to the degree they live near the tides, endure the hurricanes, fear 
immigrants, or suffer portfolio depletion - or to the extent they fear dissent from others 
that would hurt elite agendas. Painful for them. Unfamiliar. So ‘crises’. Pain endured 
by others, however, is for them only rhetorically relevant. 
We know this because to address crises, elites enact policies that protect, comfort, 
enrich, and empower themselves, while trying to preserve underlying social relations 
that benefit them, even if doing so worsens life for others. For not rich people things 
are different. The current ‘crisis’ is a perturbation on top of ‘what has been’, which is 
itself a permanent crisis. The not rich should mean by crisis a major harmful devia-
tion from what ought to be, not from what has been. To be change-oriented seeking 
what ought to be rather than status quo-oriented trying to preserve what has been 
requires seeking new relations consistent with real civilization. But what qualifies as 
real civilization? And why would attaining real civilization end current crises? And 
what should we do, today, to attain real civilization?
In response to the multiple crises we face, marginal changes are insuffi-
cient. A civilization capable of radically changing the established modes 
of operation and to adapt to the challenges must put forward new values 
and institutions.
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Values of real civilization
Here is a minimal list of core values for a civilized society, which, if attained, would 
have maximal implications. 
SELF MANAGEMENT
All people should have a say over decisions in proportion to the degree they are affected 
by them. Different deliberation and voting methods may best approximate such self 
management in different situations. 
Sometimes one person one vote majority rule can do an excellent job. Other times 
consensus will do better. Sometimes more deliberation, debate, and challenge will 
better propel self management, other times, we can do with less. Sometimes a single 
person should overwhelmingly decide an issue – as I decided to type this sentence. 
Other times a highly affected group should overwhelmingly decide, though in context 
of larger decisions taken by larger groups that set boundaries due to effects on them. A 
work team apportions its own tasks, but a workplace decides output levels, though in 
context of all society’s preferences.
Self management means no person deserves more say due to being male or female, 
gay or straight, or having a different economic position, cultural affiliation, and so on. 
The most typical criticism of self management is that some people can make better 
decisions so why forego their greater insights? To quickly address this opinion here: First, 
this ignores that fair say has social and personal benefits even in cases where it would 
yield less insightful choices. But, second, it also ignores that each of us is the world’s 
foremost expert on our own preferences so that each of us expressing our personal prefer-
ences is warranted by the simple fact that we know best what we want. Crucially, it also 
masks that nothing in self management precludes expertise, and indeed personal and 
collective well-being requires ample attention to expert insights. I decide whether I want 
to undergo an operation but only after a doctor tells me the need and implications. The 
doctor’s expertise should inform my decision. But the doctor shouldn’t decide for me. 
Who prefers to privilege the preferences of some people above the preferences of 
other people, subordinating the latter to the will of the former? Elitists will laugh at 
self management – but we can temporarily adopt it as a value, judging its worth as we 
discern its impact.  
EQUITY
What is fair? Philosophers debate. Constituencies battle. We know that society produces 
stuff which requires effort. We know that enjoying what is produced conveys benefits 
and that the conditions under which we work affect us. Our value question is, how 
should we apportion it all?
Suppose we tally up the benefits and debits that each person receives, both from 
producing and from consuming, as individuals and socially. 
Why should one person have a better mix of benefits versus debits than other people? 
Why shouldn’t all people have a fair share of benefits for in turn shouldering a fair 
share of burdens?
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As an example, for economic involvement this type of equity implies that we should 
each receive consumption rights to enjoy stuff in accord with the duration, intensity, 
and onerousness of the socially valued labour we contribute to generate stuff - unless, 
of course, we are unable to work for health reasons, in which case humanity dictates 
that we should get a full share, plus socially supported medical care, in any case. 
This treats everyone the same. If you work longer, harder, or in worse conditions, 
you get more. If you work less long, less hard, or in better conditions, you get less.
Everyone has a mix of responsibilities to contribute to social benefits and in turn 
receives options to consume from the social product. Taken together, the total of 
our production and consumption should be comparably rewarding for us all. This is 
equity, and one can similarly decide what is equitable in households, schools, and even 
regarding conditions of dispute, and so on. One might hesitate to opt for equity thinking 
that inequity creates motivations to excel without which the total product will shrink. 
This is, however, an absurd myth. Rational incentives do not depend on, require, or 
even benefit from inequity. We certainly need incentives to work longer, harder, or in 
worse conditions – which is what equitable remuneration conveys. We do not need to 
get more for being genetically better endowed, or to produce something more valued, 
or to use better equipment, much less because we own lots of stuff. 
SOLIDARITY
Another value is that people should feel solidarity, not simply in families or in small 
(or large) tribes, but also more broadly across humanity. Circumstances and options 
should not produce a zero sum rat race where our local or distant neighbour’s loss 
becomes our gain. Instead, my well-being and your well-being should be intertwined 
so we each benefit in tandem enjoying feelings of empathy and benefits of mutual aid. 
Who would instead prefer anti sociality as a value? 
DIVERSITY
Also uncontroversially, another value is diversity. We should not put all our eggs in 
one basket. Partly we want to insure against losing them all at once. Partly we realize 
that while we can each do only what we ourselves do, we can all vicariously benefit 
from others doing a wide range of things we do not do. Variety is the spice of life. Who 
would prefer social uniformity and even homogeneity to diversity? 
ECOLOGICAL WISDOM
As a last value, we should of course want to live in the world without defiling it and 
compromising further survival. Our accounting of why something is worth doing 
should assess implications for the environment - and thus for life - immediately and 
into the future. Who would instead favour unsustainability?
Civilized institutions 
If we assume the above are worthy values, pending evidence to the contrary, what 
institutions could make them real in people’s daily lives?
FIGURE 1 The Real Civilization
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WORKER AND CONSUMER COUNCILS AND NEIGHBOURHOOD  
AND REGIONAL ASSEMBLIES
For each citizen living in a society, or each person working or consuming in an economy 
to be prepared to participate in arriving at decisions in proportion as he or she is 
affected requires a place to do that. 
In workplaces, we opt for workers councils and divisions say, or teams. And for broad 
issues that transcend individual workplaces, each local workplace council is part of 
an industry council. The sum of industry councils is all workers in a whole economy.
For consumption each person consumes as an individual, often, but also typically 
as part of a family, a living unit, a neighbourhood, a region, or a country, including 
having a council for the collective consumption by each.
Politics is similar, but now the venues for decisions are geographical. There are, for 
example, neighbourhood, county, city, state, and country assemblies.
The structure and logic of each council or assembly are similar. Actors at the appro-
priate level express preferences, deliberate and debate, and finally tally their prefer-
ences fulfilling, as well as possible, collective, cooperative, self management.   
The foundation of a ‘real civilization’ that breaks with the one in which we live and is able to deal with crises requires a new hierarchy 
of values, and the development of new institutions that are participatory, decentralized and equitable.
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BALANCED LIFE CIRCUMSTANCES
Next comes organizing and apportioning tasks. We want what people do to be fair, as 
well as people doing things they are able to do well and that are worth doing. But a 
subtle but profoundly important issue arises.
What we do affects how we feel and who we are, but also what else we are able to do. 
If we spend most of our time doing acts that convey confidence, knowledge, skills, 
social connections, and access to decisions, it will prepare us for being creative and 
initiating. But if we spend most of our time doing acts that deskill us, bore us, reduce 
our knowledge, isolate us, and diminish our confidence, then beyond those acts we 
will be ill prepared for creative involvement. 
Using the economy as an example, if our work is overwhelmingly disempowering, 
which is to say, if we do a few rote tasks over and over each day, then when we are 
not at work as well as while we are on the job, we will be prepared for little more than 
obeying orders. On the other hand, if our work is overwhelmingly empowering, then 
it will leave us ready to take initiative and exert influence both while at work and 
also beyond. 
This is a major observation. In the economy, suppose we call those who do mostly 
empowering work coordinators and we call those who do nearly entirely disempow-
ering work, workers. This maps a real and tenacious class difference. Not only will the 
coordinator class dominate the working class - setting agendas, determining options, 
etc. - but, strikingly, everyone will, at least by virtue of easily apparent data, tend to feel 
that the situation is appropriate. Coordinators will appear prepared and able, confi-
dent and initiating. Workers will appear unable, lacking confidence, obedient. The 
appearance will make it seem natural that coordinators rule and workers obey, even 
though, in fact, such a pecking order is not natural but instead a product of contingent 
social relations making some people more confident and prepared and other people 
less confident and prepared. 
What this reveals is that class differences in the economy, and positional differences 
in the rest of society as well, that establish and even seem to justify harsh hierarchies, 
can arise not only from ownership relations, but also from the kinds of tasks we do for 
the greater part of our waking lives. Thus it is not only owning or not owning means 
of production that can relegate some people to rule and other people to obey, but also 
monopolizing empowering tasks or doing mostly rote and obedient tasks.
In the economy, we call the solution to this class division a balanced job complex. 
That is, we define jobs so that everyone gets a fair share of empowering and disempow-
ering tasks. And we can apply the same logic, with only minor variations, in all realms. 
We must also acknowledge, however, that until we all experience classlessness 
on a massive scale, some will say changing the division of labour to have balanced 
job complexes is insane. They will say some people deserve to be doctors, lawyers, 
engineers, decision makers, etc. - while others ought to be subordinate because they 
cannot make good decisions and will even be oppressed by being required to do so. 
Of course, this is precisely analogous to sexists and racists claiming the same things 
about women and minorities. Dominators claim the dominated are subordinate due to 
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being inferior and to ask more of them would hurt them. They self-servingly mistake 
the effects of oppressive structures for the cause of those structures. 
In short, while some will say that having balanced job complexes and life roles 
violates nature, they ought to be ashamed to harbour such classist views, just as others 
should be ashamed of harbouring racist or sexist views. We can all, with very rare 
medical exceptions, shoulder a fair share of both creative and decision responsibili-
ties. If we want classlessness - and who will admit to not wanting it - balanced job 
complexes and life circumstances are essential. The unbalanced alternative creates 
rule by those who are structurally empowered.
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF BENEFITS AND DEBITS
The value we espoused earlier, equity, when writ into institutions, entails that society 
apportion its responsibilities and offerings in such ways that each member gets a fair 
overall package. 
Taking the economy, for example, this means we should receive a claim on consump-
tion from the social product in proportion to our duration and intensity of work contrib-
uting to the social product, and to the onerousness of the conditions under which we do it. 
The inclination to resist this proposed innovation will be that such a remunera-
tion scheme would cripple output. Who will want to be a doctor, even in a balanced 
job complex, if there is no large reward for doing so? This underlying belief is almost 
universal, but it is nonetheless utterly absurd. 
Would you really, other things equal, prefer to skip college, skip medical school, and 
skip being a doctor (or having some other empowering position) to go straight from 
high school directly into, say, a coal mine, or to tending a stove in McDonalds? The 
claim implies you would. But would you prefer flipping burgers to being in college 
so much that you would have to be paid twenty or even fifty times as much for forty 
years, every year, to get you to undergo the so called hardship of college and empow-
ering work? Would you opt for rote repetitive labour over some empowered role, if 
the pay for being a rote worker were half (rather than a small fraction) of the pay for 
doing some more empowering work? What about if it was the same? What if it was 
more for rote work? The truth is - ask students - pay the doctor a good living wage, 
and people wouldn’t instead do only rote work even for a whole lot higher pay than 
doctoring, lawyering, engineering, or whatever. 
But, of course, with the institutions we are proposing the situation doesn’t arise. 
Everyone works at a balanced job, doing some coordinator type empowering tasks and 
some working class type more rote tasks, receiving a fair income for the combination. 
The arrangement gives everyone an incentive to work capably and well, doing useful 
activity, for as long as needed for their well-being, because duration and intensity of 
work is what earns income.
PARTICIPATORY PLANNING AND GENERALIZED SELF MANAGEMENT
The idea of the last institutional innovation underpinning a civilized social and 
economic setting is that the apportionment of energies, resources, and labour, and 
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of the benefits that derive from their utilization, should be decided, again, consistent 
with collective, cooperative self management as well as in a way that gets the tasks 
done insightfully and in tune with people’s needs and desires. 
In current economies the allocation function occurs by way of markets or central 
planning. These institutions are, however, horrendously flawed tools, and that remains 
true even if there is no private ownership of productive assets. Harsh and irrational 
competition, authoritarianism, ecological calamity, fiscal crises, anti social personal 
motivations, and class division are intrinsically promoted for enabling the benefits 
these tools convey to the most powerful and most wealthy.
For the values we have settled on, in contrast, new structures of allocation, like the 
new structures of local decision-making, remuneration, and division of labour, are 
needed. Indeed, markets and central planning would each by their operations subvert 
the above mentioned desired institutional choices and all the values we proposed. 
A solution with the desired attributes is called participatory planning. The basic idea 
is simple, though a full discussion would take more room than we have here. 
We have described having workers and consumers councils. Work happens. 
Consumption happens. The allocation task is that each workplace must arrive at an 
agenda regarding inputs from other workplaces and labour and outputs it generates 
for whoever wishes to receive them. Likewise, each individual consumer, neighbour-
hood, city, etc. must arrive at an agenda for what it will receive to consume, that others 
will produce and provide. 
Of course there are some requirements.
The decisions of each participating workplace, individual consumer, and collective 
consumer, must sensibly match up to minimize or eliminate shortages or left over 
waste. Also, however, we certainly want choices to account for the personal, social, 
and ecological costs and benefits that accrue so as to pursue options which are overall 
positive while avoiding options which are overall negative. Finally, we also want the 
processes in allocation to foster values we favour and facilitate relations we desire, 
rather than to subvert what we hope for or even demolish it.
Thinking through the above, and realizing that we are talking about millions of partici-
pants negotiating the amounts and distribution of vast quantities of goods and services 
reveals that this is a major set of constraints on a massively complex problem. So, now what?
Well, the usual answer is, let’s have markets or central planning or a combination 
of the two. The problem is that markets and central planning in any combination fail 
miserably on every attribute of the above list of sought characteristics. 
So we propose, instead, participatory planning. Each workplace council and by aggre-
gation higher councils, and each individual and collective consumer, take into account 
last year’s actions and predicted changes for this year to propose their preferred activi-
ties. We can’t expect that they will all immediately match up desirably. Thus, each 
participant, in light of the proposals of other participants and the implications of those 
for predicted costs and benefits, will have to modify their preferences and resubmit. 
Still no match, but closer. So perhaps it happens five times, with some mechanisms 
for facilitating coming more closely into accord each time. 
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It is a cooperative process, in which actors massage their requests and offerings in 
light of their own desires and the revealed desires of others, as well as the revealed 
social and ecological costs and benefits to society. 
Details aside, the claim of participatory economics is that this planning can be done, 
without competition, without an authoritarian centre, and arriving at a worthy plan 
that manifests collective self managed preferences all by a process consistent with, 
manifesting, and facilitating other features sought for society including balanced jobs, 
equitable remuneration, and self managing councils - and thus without class hierarchy 
and rule. 
One should not read the above and say, okay, great, I like the values, I want class-
lessness, so I favour participatory planning and participatory economics. One should, 
instead think - if this claim is true, then I ought to favour this vision, and therefore I 
need to look into the logic and features of the claim further, to decide. Meanwhile, 
here we can at least consider some implications, as if, indeed, we already knew that 
the claim is true.
Ending crises
Why would attaining the above modest list of institutions - self managing councils, 
balanced job complexes, equitable remuneration, and participatory planning – elimi-
nate the types of crises we are currently enduring, and many other types, as well?
The short answer is because these new institutions won’t intrinsically produce, as 
part of their very logic, the dreaded outcomes. Indeed, these new structures would 
propel their participants in virtually opposite directions.
What about plagues, drug epidemics, rampant immigration problems, wars, and 
situations in which the value of one’s holdings collapse, workplaces under produce or, 
for that matter, over produce, or global warming and ecological disasters proliferate?
Having a participatory society does not preclude a disease developing and spreading. 
But it does ensure that assessments of how to address such problems dramatically 
change. Rather than the allocation of intellectual energies to medical tasks being ruled 
by profit potentials, they - like all decisions - will be ruled by best estimates of impacts 
on human well-being and development. Errors will remain possible, of course, but 
systematic violations of health - as we now have all over the world - will not. 
Take Ebola. Because of its enormous risk, in a civilized world a vaccine would have 
been developed long before now. If some new disease came out of the blue, medical 
care and containment would be rapid and effective. Media reporting of associated 
risks would be accurate rather than fear mongering to attract audiences for commer-
cial gain. Currently, the medical dangers of escalating Ebola fear in the US outpaces 
dangers of the disease itself. Perhaps worse, to the extent the dangers are real and 
serious – and they may very well be – uninformed media-hyped hysteria actually 
impedes careful approaches.
Regarding health more broadly, in a civilized economy there would be no incen-
tive to accumulate profit for the few while ignoring, blocking, and even exacerbating 
conditions of danger on the job, toxic environments, or the need for worthy insurance. 
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Even more critically, there would not be debilitating poverty, horrible malnutrition, 
widespread starvation, etc.
Similarly, a good society removes the incentive to produce and distribute addictive 
drugs (or foods), by making it impossible to earn and enjoy great wealth based on such 
endeavours. This latter point is obvious, albeit remarkable, once raised. 
That is, in a participatory economy income is a function of duration, intensity, and 
onerousness of labour undertaken in context of a workers council in an industry which 
the plan labels worthy due to popular desires for its product. Now suppose that some 
cartel, or corporation decides to try to amass wealth via providing an addictive drug 
– crack, cigarettes, sniffing glue, diet pills, or whatever – by creating a gigantic market 
for it. How would people doing that earn anything from their actions? 
Such activity won’t garner resources via the participatory planning system. And even 
if resourceful dealers find a way to escape that barrier and they temporarily manage 
to amass huge revenues (actually also impossible unless each dealer was not only able 
to produce and distribute, but to also get income for lots of false names, how would 
they then enjoy their massive income, since any huge amount of consumer benefits in 
the hands of any individual must be a result of cheating, stealing, etc. That is, no one 
can work long or hard enough to legitimately amass such excessive wealth, so having 
really excessive wealth reveals that one is a thief.
Since penalties for illegal activities presumably exist, and since options to enjoy the 
fruits of illegal activities are nearly nil, and since even generating exorbitant sums in 
the first place is virtually impossible, other than by direct theft, and since everyone 
gets fair income in any event, there is zero reason to cheat, steal, push drugs, or even 
just try to sell as much as possible of some product for any reason other than to meet 
the needs of its users. A dealer risks debits, as severe as society chooses to impose, 
and can’t enjoy massively more benefits due to dealing drugs than normal benefits 
doing any legal and socially admired pursuit - other than by hiding it away in his or her 
basement since a civilized society lacks massive differences in income, so that visible 
grossly excessive consumption is a billboard saying, I cheated.
Potential immigration problems could persist until equitable relations were interna-
tional - at which time there would be no reason for mass migrations. This gives each 
participatory society very good reason to help spread participatory structures broadly. 
Consider trade. It ought to occur in a manner that actually benefits weaker and poorer 
parties more than richer ones, so as to reduce gaps in wealth, rather than benefiting 
powerful and richer parties more, thereby increasing gaps in wealth. This positive result 
is not intrinsic to the new institutions existing in one country but depends instead on 
future policy choices among countries. On the other hand, populations would function 
in environments without antisocial pressures, emphasizing solidarity, and enjoying 
security, so it is reasonable to predict they would favour positive policies.
Wars over oil or tungsten, or for imperial sway over trade routes, or to ratify or protect 
corporations, or to bolster political elites, or to punish populations, would disappear 
because these dynamics would disappear, at least, as with immigration, once new 
institutions are international. 
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Typically, war, and even colonialism, is not about benefitting whole populations at 
the expense of other whole populations. Instead it is elites in one country who promote 
war at the expense of the population of their own country, and, as a kind of gigantic 
collateral damage, the population of other countries as well. 
The idea is simple. Suppose Britain colonizes India. It steals wealth, oppresses the 
population, etc. So, the population of India certainly suffers. But who gains? Britain? 
Not so fast. Britain is an abstraction. 
What is taken from India goes overwhelmingly to corporate elites in London. The 
bill for this extraction is, however, paid by the British population, in their taxes, and 
of course the Indian population. This can even mean that for every $2 depleted from 
Britain in costs of maintaining empire, only $1 comes back in ripped off profits. And 
yet empire persists. Why? Because the population pays the $2 and the corporate elites 
collect the $1. It turns out war is often wealth redistribution at home.
Now consider wars like in Indochina, undertaken to preserve empire from a ‘bad 
example’ (a country choosing to extricate), or wars in the Middle East, undertaken to 
control oil largely as a bargaining chip in international relations, and so on. Who pays 
– everyone in the targeted country, and, as well, everyone in the host country who is 
paying taxes to support the costs. Who benefits, elites in the host country – materially 
and politically – and also some quislings, often, in the targeted country.
Now why does all this disappear as we attain civilized relations? Because in a civilized 
society there are no elites to benefit, and because the populations of each country, 
well informed and capable, would never sanction such sadistic aggrandizement by and 
for a few. There is neither an institutional push toward war, nor is there a compliant 
population that would accept it.
What about what people usually mean by crises, that is, economic dislocations? If 
productive units over produce so that there is great waste that is simply thrown out 
– which is an endemic condition of contemporary economies without even counting 
useless war production, duplication, etc. – that is a crisis for resources and labour 
allocation. It becomes a crisis for elites only if it hurts profit possibilities. 
If productive units underproduce, so there are shortages, and do so in a runaway 
pattern - too little consumption causes cuts in production, causes further cuts in 
consumer income, yields still less consumption, etc. – then it is crisis as well, certainly 
for the population and also for elites, when, again, it grows enough to hurt profit 
possibilities. 
A civilized economy would avoid all this by correlating output and consumption 
closely, and doing so not to aggrandize a few, or to abide orders given by a few, but 
to equitably address everyone’s needs in light of the self managing preferences of 
everyone. But this is participatory planning plus equitable remuneration and balanced 
job complexes, and with these institutions there is simply no motivation to do other 
than fulfil the agreed scenarios of society’s plans as best units can. There is no way 
for individuals or groups to make higher income by producing less than desirable, or 
more. There is also no way to make higher income by inducing consumption through 
adverts or deception, since that doesn’t actually meet needs.
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Similarly, in a civilized economy, any project that destabilizes ecology makes no 
sense. There may be benefits for some, but there will also be offsetting harm for many, 
perhaps immediately, or certainly in time. If the economy’s allocation system (as with 
markets or central planning) seeks to benefit only some, or has a short time horizon, 
or just doesn’t even account for the ecology in its weighing of factors, then horrible 
violations will occur, as we witness in current societies. But if an allocation system 
properly assesses the ecological as well as social and personal implications of choices, 
and then it weighs the impact on everyone, and chooses actions consistent with people’s 
wills in light of carefully conveyed information, and proportionate decision inputs for 
everyone, then these violations will disappear. Informed and confident populations 
will never agree to policies enriching a few while hurting the many. 
When all is said, however, the real virtue of a participatory economy and participa-
tory society isn’t in eliminating current dispositions toward crisis, as important as that 
is, it is in eliminating the business as usual condition of permanent crisis regarding 
inequality, authoritarianism, alienation, ecological collapse, etc. The virtue is attaining 
self management, equity, solidarity, diversity, ecological sustainability, classlessness 
and freedom, feminism and intercommunalism, for all.
Again, I don’t claim that the above - either the brief synopsis of defining institutions 
of real civilization or the brief account of their implications for what are called crises - 
should convince you. Indeed, it shouldn’t. Questions should arise in your mind. More 
assessment is needed to make a full case. I claim only that the above presentation, 
albeit brief, ought to motivate further investigation and thought. After all, if things 
are as indicated above, the implications for current activity are profound, and that is 
important to determine.
Current choices
What would having a vision like the one described above, called participatory economics 
and, more broadly, called participatory society, imply for today’s practical choices?
The answer in the large is as self evident as the rest of this discussion. If you want 
to get someplace new from where you are, it behoves you to take steps that take you 
where you want to go, rather than steps that take you somewhere else. 
Taking it one degree further, you shouldn’t reinforce unwanted old structures nor 
should you create new ones that are contrary to reaching your destination. Conversely, 
you should want to undermine unwanted old structures and to develop new struc-
tures in tune with your aims. The familiar slogan is, ‘Plant the seeds of the future in 
the present’.
This agenda should affect changes you seek to win, how you go about winning 
changes, and what new structures you construct. 
Thus, with this view you should want to win changes that better the lot of people 
who are suffering. You should want to seek those changes in ways that develop 
consciousness, commitment, and desires suitable to winning still more gains all on 
the path toward your destination. And you should want to build new institutions - 
both for struggle and when possible also for daily life - whose attributes also increase 
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consciousness, commitment, and desires suitable to winning still more gains, and 
whose features are such as to be compatible with and able to melt into the features of 
the new society you seek.
Suppose we take a couple of examples: say you desire improvements in income for 
some poor constituency such as low wage workers. Of course you will demand and 
seek to win higher pay. But with the approach suggested here you would do it talking 
not only about the immediate demand, but about what is really ultimately warranted, 
equitable remuneration, including developing awareness of what it would look like and 
imply, and of what it would take to win, and of how the current effort to win more pay 
for some workers could be a part of a longer project to win equitable remuneration for 
all. You would organize, as well, in ways that would leave your constituency not only 
more aware and desiring still more gains, but also stronger and ready to embark on 
winning more. Thus you would develop campaigns and even organization designed 
to move on to new goals after winning the current one. 
The same logic applies far more generally. Say you are addressing some more macro 
issue such as defence spending - again, you would make demands for immediate gains 
in defence spending cuts, but you would use rhetoric and discussion elaborating 
ultimate aims - say a new mode of allocation - and you would try to create structures 
of struggle that would persist and keep battling to eventually melt into new structures 
of a new society. 
If you compare the above - which is taking a non reformist approach to winning 
reforms that would benefit worst off constituencies while developing on going 
campaigns and movements with ever increasing commitment and clarity about ultimate 
vision - to current approaches to dealing with various crises, the difference should be 
evident. It is, as mentioned at the outset of this essay, the difference between being 
status quo oriented (now called reformist) and being change oriented (now called 
revolutionary) and it is precisely the difference that people of good will and serious 
intent must embrace on the road to a better society. ❚
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CHAPTER 11
I
n 2014, a number of reports and events have high-
lighted the enthusiasm shared by the public authorities, 
NGOs and the private sector for social business and, 
more broadly, for the social and solidarity economy, 
these include: the presentation of the Faber-Naidoo 
report on a new approach to development assistance; the 
reports of the social impact investment taskforce estab-
lished by the UK Presidency of the G81; the Global Social 
Business Summit held in Mexico City; and a new law on 
social and solidarity economy that was enacted in France. 
This general momentum is due to the fact that the 
actors involved in social business are seeing a range of 
new frontiers, such as the ability of social business to 
sustain projects that have so far been funded by NGOs 
and development agencies; that it has the ability to solve 
social problems while limiting the use of public funds; 
and that it can facilitate the testing of technological and 
organizational innovations in new models of production 
or distribution (private companies). But what about the 
reality? Can social business contribute to the renewal 
of development aid policies? Which specific challenges 
need to be addressed? This article provides an analysis 
of an approach that is often presented as a solution to the 
reconciliation of profitability and social concerns.
Defining social business
‘Social business’, ‘social and solidarity economy’ and 
‘social entrepreneurship’ are similar concepts that overlap, 
for which there are as many definitions as there are actors 
1.  http://www.socialimpactinvestment.org/
The growing power of international social 
business
Nicolas Vincent, Research officer, AFD
Raphaël de Guerre, Project Manager, AFD
claiming to be part of the movement. The underlying idea 
is to harness the power of businesses and the economy 
for social (and/or environmental) benefit. The specific term 
‘social business’ was popularized by Muhammad Yunus 
and it was based on the ‘no loss, no dividend’ principle 
that prohibits the distribution of dividends. Since then the 
term has escaped the control of its author and today there 
is no harmonized definition of social business. However, 
the different approaches seem to converge towards two 
common principles (a primary social objective and the 
search for financial independence), while they gener-
ally differ on four more secondary criteria: (1) govern-
ance with varying degrees of openness to stakeholders 
(beneficiaries, employees, suppliers, neighbours, etc.); (2) 
the management and allocation of profits (which should be 
fully reinvested in the opinion of Yunus, or partially distrib-
uted according to others); (3) the level of innovation in the 
solution provided by social business, and (4) the status 
of the organization (commercial enterprise, development 
project, foundation, cooperative, association, NGO, etc.). 
To remain sufficiently broad, this article uses the term 
‘social business project’ rather than ‘social enterprises’. 
Indeed, many projects claiming to be social businesses 
do not (yet) have any legal status.
Social business can be considered to be at the cross-
roads between market forces, businesses and social 
missions. The idea is for the intended benefits of an entre-
preneurial operation (optimized) to be utilized for a higher 
purpose than merely profit. Given that social business 
can be applied to all areas of development  (financial 
inclusion, nutrition and food security, health, education, 
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housing, water, sanitation, energy, etc.), it can therefore 
be present in all economic sectors, albeit with a predomi-
nance in microfinance.
The objective of social business models is to provide 
new answers to social problems where public policies are 
failing, especially in developing countries. Such models 
are therefore designed to become financially independent 
(or at least that is the ultimate goal) so as to be sustainable 
and durable. To policy makers and development assis-
tance actors, the support of social business enables the 
promotion of decentralized and innovative solutions that 
reduce the demand (eventually) on public funding. Social 
business can then serve as a lever to increase the social 
impact of public expenditure.
Today, most multinational companies have foundations 
or funds dedicated to the development of social business. 
These funds are often operated in parallel with Bottom 
of the Pyramid (BOP) strategies that involve the adapta-
tion of products so that they can be sold to the poorest 
people. For such multinationals, social business not only 
provides benefits in terms of image, but it also serves 
as a means to stimulate reverse innovation by carrying 
out trials in developing countries of new production and 
marketing ideas.
Specific development challenges
In addition to the usual difficulties for small and medium-
sized enterprises in developing countries (such as 
financing, business environment, knowledge of the market, 
etc.), social business projects face additional difficul-
ties inherent to their model. Indeed, trying to address a 
social problem by creating market value to ensure project 
FIGURE 1 Defining social business
Social business, which combines the market, business and a social mission, aims to take advantage of the intended benefits of an 
entrepreneurial operation to serve social or environmental objectives.
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sustainability very often involves the ‘creation’ of a market 
that did not exist. Therefore, solving a social problem in a 
financially viable way often requires an original idea, an 
innovation, and typically involves a long learning process.
There is a significant tension between the social objec-
tive and the imperative of financial stability. How can this 
stability be achieved when producing a good or service 
for the poor? How can a price be determined that is low 
enough to be accessible to the targeted beneficiaries but 
also high enough to allow the company to break even? 
There is also a natural temptation to assign multiple social 
objectives to a social business project: should a company 
that claims to be ‘social’ be exemplary and therefore 
have a social mission for all of its stakeholders (clients, 
employees, suppliers, neighbours, etc.)? This approach, 
however legitimate it may be, often leads to insurmount-
able difficulties and to contradictions between social 
objectives (for example supporting a smallholder sector 
while practicing low prices for customers).
Moreover, a social business project must find its place 
in the field among NGO activities and the market for 
commercialized products, which is a potential source 
of conflict. NGO activity can indeed affect the social 
business project (for example, there is incompatibility in 
cases where an NGO is subsidizing the free distribution 
of a product, while a social business is offering a similar 
product at a low price); and a social business project that 
is too close to an existing market may experience hostile 
private sector competition.
There are also operational challenges. Firstly, how can 
funds be attracted towards projects that are risky and 
unprofitable by nature? For instance, most social business 
projects are innovative (in terms of techniques, organi-
zation or distribution). Also, the initial business model is 
Nutri’zaza is a social enterprise in 
Madagascar (with a limited company 
status) that has a social mission to 
fight against chronic malnutrition, 
which affects nearly one in two 
children. The company is the culmi-
nation of a development project led 
by an NGO that created the Koba 
Aina dietary supplement. Since 
1998, the French development NGO, 
GRET, has been raising awareness 
amongst mothers on the subject of 
child malnutrition and has distributed 
a type of baby food of high nutritional 
quality via a number of ‘restaurants 
for babies’. The infant food is made 
mainly from local ingredients and is 
part of the Nutrimad project (created 
by GRET, IRD and the University of 
Antananarivo). The project took 
on the status of a company in 
September 2012 following years 
of learning and testing to develop a 
distribution network for a liquid baby 
food (for 6 to 24 month old infants) 
that is affordable to the poorest 
households. The GRET NGO and 
four other shareholders (including 
two French investment funds, SIDI 
and I&P) were behind the creation 
of Nutri’zaza, with the support of a 
grant from AFD that was intended 
to cover the losses in the first years 
of its operation. It now manages a 
network of 39 restaurants for babies 
in seven towns in Madagascar, while 
64 counsellors are engaged in daily 
home sales. Sachets of ready to 
prepare baby food are also avail-
able in grocery stores. Each month, 
more than 60,000 portions are sold.
To maintain the social mission 
of this limited company, founding 
shareholders have strengthened 
the normal modes of govern-
ance (management and direc-
tors’ boards, shareholders’ general 
meetings) with an ethics and social 
monitoring committee (including all 
stakeholders) and a shareholder 
agreement that makes the social 
objective the priority of the business. 
The committee meets twice a year 
to monitor social indicators of the 
business: the number of children 
reached, number of meals provided, 
accessibility for the poorest (product 
selling price), number of counsellor 
jobs created, nutrition education 
activities carried out, etc.
NUTRI’ZAZA: AN EXAMPLE OF SOCIAL BUSINESS IN SEARCH OF FINANCIAL BALANCE  
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fragile and should be reviewed as and when the project 
is tested and there is therefore a high degree of risk, 
which is a major obstacle to mobilizing financing during 
the testing and project initiation phase. Once the project 
has broken even (or is close to doing so), the low profit-
ability inherent in the project does not attract the ‘classic’ 
shareholder. However, many investment funds dedicated 
to social business and development agencies have already 
been mobilized with sufficient volumes to fund the most 
mature projects today (AFD, 2014).
How can continuity of funding be ensured when most 
social businesses experience statutory changes during 
growth, for example changing from an associative to a 
commercial status? Finally, how can project objectives, 
the adopted governance principles, human resources 
management and the prioritization of objectives be trans-
lated into daily organization and functioning? How can 
social objectives be secured in relation to the financial 
constraints? The development of the business and organi-
zational model and its governance are the main issues 
to ensure the sustainability of social businesses. Again, 
experimentation and adjustments are necessary.
If public policy makers wish to encourage the emergence 
of social businesses, they may seek: to create an enabling 
legal and regulatory environment (for example, this was 
the intention of the law on social economy, adopted in 
France in 20142); to accompany the projects upstream 
at the stage of experimentation of innovative solutions 
(business incubators and nurseries); to raise patient 
capital that is intended to have a social impact and a 
limited financial return (dedicated investment funds, 
philanthropic ventures, etc.); to facilitate the networking 
of social business actors for the exchanging of experi-
ences; and to finance capacity building or invent simpli-
fied impact measurement devices that will be called for 
2.  The new law recognizes the place and role in the economy of activities that are 
characterized by three principles: being at the service of social and sustainable 
development; allocating profits for this purpose and not for the enrichment of 
shareholders; making collective and democratic decisions. It sets a framework for 
these activities and reinforces devices that help to promote them. This definition, 
which is broader than the historical scope of the social and solidarity economy, 
still includes companies with a cooperative mutual and associative status, as well 
as foundations, but now also includes commercial companies claiming the same 
principles. The statutory approach that prevailed until then is now out-dated on the 
basis of principles defining their social mission.
by investors claiming to be engaged in impact investment.
Alongside investment funds dedicated to social 
business, most funders have recently adopted financing 
and accompanying strategies and instruments. However, 
the resources that are being mobilized on this issue seem 
to be drawn towards the more mature projects (which 
are still few in number), while smaller experimental and 
uncertain projects are struggling to find support. Who is 
willing to take the risk? ❚
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‘S
econd track’, parallel agenda, positive 
agenda, solutions agenda and collabora-
tive initiatives are all terms that describe the 
broad range of initiatives taken by develop-
ment actors (public authorities and agencies, 
companies, financial sector, NGOs, local authorities, uni-
versities, etc.). A new international architecture seems to 
be emerging from these various networks of actors, along-
side and in conjunction with the international negotiations 
between states that are driven by professional negotiators. 
These initiatives are taking up an increasing amount of 
space and gaining recognition at international conferences. 
In recent years, for example, the actors involved in these 
initiatives have asserted themselves strongly, especially 
at the Rio+20 Conference, during which more than 700 
‘voluntary commitments’ were presented.
Given the increasing importance of these initiatives and 
the commitment of significant actors that are increasingly 
numerous and diverse, some discussions and proposals 
are emerging to better take into account these non-state 
initiatives in multilateral frameworks, including within the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). The future French Presidency of the twenty-first 
Conference of the Parties (COP 21) to be held in Paris in late 
2015 has pledged to reserve a large space for civil society 
and solution providers within climate alliances that bring 
together all of these actors. Similarly, in December 2014, 
the Peruvian presidency of the COP 20 in Lima organized 
the ‘Action Day’, which aimed to present initiatives and 
encourage stakeholders alongside the ongoing negotia-
tions to take climate action. Finally, the many initiatives 
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presented by the diverse array of stakeholders have made 
a large contribution to the success of the Climate Summit 
2014 ‘Catalyzing Action’ that was organized by Ban 
Ki-moon on 23 September 2014 in New York.
We can only celebrate and applaud the energy and 
ambition manifested through these many initiatives. 
However, this raises many questions and gives rise to 
debates and often harsh criticism regarding the value 
of any one particular initiative. For example, the Global 
Alliance for Climate-Smart Agriculture, which includes 
large agribusiness multinational companies whose models 
are highly controversial in terms of the main criteria of 
environmental sustainability or social inclusion, is attacked 
by NGOs and defenders of family farming.
Another question arises repeatedly: in what way do 
these projects have a real impact on emissions and do 
they represent the latest embodiment of green washing, 
in the absence of control mechanisms and international 
reporting? What additionality do these commitments offer: 
have these projects or funds been repeatedly proposed 
in the past, like a kind of declaration ‘recycling’ machine 
that serves only communication objectives? Do these 
programmes contribute effectively to sustainable develop-
ment? Finally, some developing countries are questioning 
whether these voluntary initiatives are a way to escape 
national commitments.
Contributing to the efforts to limit climate  
change impacts
Given the climate emergency (remembering that the future 
2015 Paris Agreement will only be implemented from 
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2020), it is necessary to drastically and rapidly reduce 
our emissions. Estimates of the Emissions Gap Report, 
published annually by the United Nations Environment 
Programme, show that, even if states adhere to their 
commitments up to 2020, a significant gap will still remain 
between actual emissions and the level of emissions that is 
compatible with a global warming of 2°C by 2100. There-
fore, these initiatives are sometimes presented as opportu-
nities to act quickly and to significantly reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions. However, so far it has been extremely diffi-
cult to actually measure the impact of these initiatives, 
given their extreme diversity and absence of frameworks 
and methodologies to ensure effective monitoring. Also, 
there is sometimes a lack of transparency and publically 
available data regarding their progress. Moreover, an inter-
national of the reductions achieved by all of these projects 
would not be very meaningful as they relate to different 
sectors, and there would also be a high risk of double 
counting the emissions reported by states.
In the longer term, scientific data show that it will be 
necessary to reach carbon neutrality by the end of this 
century. Such an effort will certainly not be possible only 
through voluntary initiatives but will require significant 
state commitment, particularly to implement the incen-
tives and infrastructure necessary to enable a change in 
our production and consumption modes. However, the role 
of non-state actors to support this transition is crucial. 
While states can lead the way and give strong and clear 
signals to show that such a transition is underway, it will 
not happen without the dynamism of these actors, particu-
larly local communities and businesses, that implement 
this transition and propose solutions to move towards 
low-carbon development. It is therefore necessary to 
design a new form of alliance in which these joint efforts 
are complementary and mutually reinforcing as part of a 
virtuous circle. National contributions, to be determined 
and presented by states in 2015, will demonstrate the 
efforts that each country will commit to after 2020. At this 
juncture there may be an interesting opportunity to imple-
ment this new ‘alliance’, in which non-state actors could 
work with governments to increase their levels of ambition, 
accompanying the transition through their commitments 
and the solutions they offer. 
Improving the understanding and measurement of 
the progress of initiatives
To enhance the effectiveness of these initiatives, the lack 
of coordination and fragmentation of which are often criti-
cized, many actors have tried to better orchestrate this 
complex web, with two main objectives: to have a more 
detailed overall vision of the myriad initiatives to better 
analyse them, and to encourage more action.
An initial effort has already been launched to gather 
the available information on major international initia-
tives. Databases have been established by the Univer-
sity of Oxford that gather hundreds of commitments, 
and Ecofys, the University of Cambridge and the World 
Resources Institute are developing an online database 
project to gather information on these initiatives (Climate 
Database Initiative). Other think tanks, NGOs and some 
international agencies are undertaking similar efforts. 
Similarly, coalitions of multiple actors within sectors 
(chemical industry, aeronautics industry, etc.) or as part 
of territorial approaches (cities or regions, local authorities, 
etc.) have also developed their own tools. There is there-
fore an abundance of data without the necessary harmo-
nization, consistency or common indicators. Enhanced 
exchange and coordination mechanisms between these 
initiatives are needed.
In addition, this information could help better identify 
areas where there is duplication and could encourage 
exchanges and collaborations, as well as areas that are not 
covered and to understand the underlying reasons. As for 
the evaluation of the fulfilment of commitments, this is only 
possible if there is a minimum number of common indica-
tors and regular and transparent reporting. Ultimately, if a 
type of observatory or governance mechanism was imple-
mented, it would be possible to analyse the gaps and 
encourage actors to join forces.
That said, the issue of governance or the coordination 
of voluntary initiatives is far from simple. At the Rio+20 
Conference the idea of a movement like ‘Transparency 
International’ for sustainable development or a ‘Sustain-
able Development Watch’ was promoted, to drive diverse 
actions. The independance and impartiality of such an 
institution would be key to ensure its legitimacy and 
recognition by international institutions. This project is the 
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subject of discussions within international civil society, 
but also in the framework of the multilateral system. The 
Secretary-General of the United Nations – whose team in 
charge of preparing the September 2014 Climate Summit 
has played a major role in trying to bring together and 
develop initiatives – had suggested as early as 2013 
the creation of a UN Partnership Facility, without much 
success to date. The Climate Convention Secretariat 
has also shown great interest in these issues, but lacks 
resources to ensure effective monitoring and coordination 
of these initiatives. The Global Compact, the main inter-
national initiative of socially responsible businesses, also 
plays an important role in identifying and encouraging 
private sector initiatives.
As mentioned above, many political questions arise 
regarding the real motivation of actors, particularly 
economic ones, who implement these initiatives, and it 
is not easy to imagine a system of monitoring, evalua-
tion and coordination within or linked with the United 
Nations, which is a system primarily developed by and 
for states. The rapid changes observed in recent years 
show that there is a strong focus on these issues, and 
that non-state actors are determined to play a role in the 
transition to a low-carbon world. The Paris 2015 Climate 
Conference could be the opportunity to seal and imple-
ment this alliance, which may also apply to the post-2015 
development agenda on the targets of the Sustainable 
Development Goals. ❚
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FIGURE Major announcements at the Climate Summit (New York, September 2014) 
Voluntary initiatives from stakeholder groups today contribute to the outcome of global political summits.





